Canberra, 3 September 1964
827. Top Secret Immediate
Indonesian Paratroop Landings in Malaysia
Your 953.1
You should be aware by now that British Government has told the Malaysian Government that the Security Council should be summoned immediately in an emergency session at which the Malaysian representative should make a statement of his Government’s complaint against Indonesia with the object of achieving a firmly worded Resolution condemning Indonesia’s unprovoked aggression and calling upon the Indonesian Government to give an immediate unequivocal assurance to refrain from any further acts of aggression.
2. You should know also that we have just heard that United States State Department has decided that if Malaysia decides to go to the Security Council the United States will support them and that the State Department considers that Malaysia now has a good case.
3. There is a meeting this afternoon of Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of Cabinet but in the meantime and subject to outcome of that meeting, Minister has agreed that you should put forward the following considerations to the Malaysian Government.
4. We agree with British belief that the Malaysian Government should take a complaint against Indonesia to the Security Council without delay. We base this belief partly on the indications of the effect on morale in Malaysia of recent Indonesian landings. The effect of yesterday’s landings from the air may be even more serious.
5. We have also taken into consideration recent indications of Indonesia’s attitude as revealed in Sukarno’s 17th August address and his more openly pro-communist and anti-American stance.2
6. In supporting a reference to the United Nations Security Council we are aware of the dangers to Malaysia’s position in the event that the Council adopted an indecisive Resolution which implied that there were faults on both sides and which simply called on both sides to abstain from hostile acts and accept some form of mediation. A long term danger to our position would lie in the extent to which discussion generates sentiment calling for removal of foreign bases and troops from the area as a whole.
7. On the other hand action in the Security Council might conceivably serve to bring such international pressure on the Indonesians that they refrain from further actions which endanger the security of Malaysia. This could happen whether or not a clear-cut condemnatory Resolution was passed by the Council and whether or not some such Resolution was vetoed by a member of the Council.
8. Furthermore a compelling purpose in reference to the United Nations lies in the necessity for some United Nations consideration to precede any armed retaliatory action which the British might contemplate against Indonesia. Such armed retaliation in the meantime would perhaps be welcomed by Indonesia as enabling them to substantiate the case which they will undoubtedly submit that the position is one of resistance to colonial imperialism.
9. For this reason we consider it essential to urge on the British Government that they should not take armed retaliatory action until the United Nations has been seized of the matter and certainly not until the United States has been consulted and agrees. You will understand that because of our specific commitments to the Untied States to consult in respect of their and our ANZUS obligations we would wish the Americans to be informed and accept plans for armed action against Indonesia.
10. We can understand the resentment and concern of the Malaysians and their wish to have immediate action against Indonesia but you should point out to them that it is in the interests of all of us to see the threat from Indonesia as a whole and also as part of a most difficult pattern of problems in the South East Asia area.
11. In the event that the Malaysians take a case to the Security Council the Australian Government would wish to give them such advice and support as we can. This would take the form of behind the scene assistance in New York to the extent of which the Malaysian Government may be willing to accept it and support through diplomatic channels in the capitals of various United Nations members. If you feel able to proffer advice to the Malaysian Government you might say that we believe that a senior minister should go to New York for the purpose of presenting the Malaysian case. Ismail, in view of his seniority in the Cabinet and his experience in the United Nations, seems the obvious man. We should be glad also of your views on the desirability of yourself being in New York at that time. The Indonesians are to be expected to put up an effective propaganda showing in the Council and amongst other United Nations members and a convincing presentation of the Malaysian case will be essential.
[NAA: A 1838, TS686/4/1 part 1]
1 That is, cablegram 935 (Document 198)—number incorrectly transcribed.
2 DEA believed that the ‘distinguishing features’ of Sukarno’s address ‘were its tones of uncompromising hostility to moderation and reason, its strident acclamation of the greatness of Indonesia, and its explicit statement of support for Communist policies in Korea, Indo-China, Cuba and elsewhere’. Officers were also concerned that non-alignment had been ‘forthrightly rejected’. Sukarno’s ‘wide-ranging direct and indirect condemnation of US policy’ worldwide in the address had subsequently turned to a direct attack on US policy in Vietnam and included strong statements of Indonesian support for North Vietnam.