Kuala Lumpur, 6 September 1964
965. Secret
Malaysia and the Security Council
Before leaving Kuala Lumpur I am setting out below my preliminary thinking on the form that a resolution in the Security Council might take.1 I was not impressed by the possible draft resolution initially proposed by the British. I felt there was too much emphasis on the paratroop incursion and not enough on the ‘crush Malaysia’ policy. The preamble might possibly include a reference to Indonesia’s repeatedly avowed intention, contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, to crush Malaysia and the continuing campaign to incite the Indonesian people to this end. These are facts that Indonesia cannot refute.
2. There seems little point in seeking to condemn Indonesia and an attempt to do so is only likely to alienate support, especially of the Afro-Asian countries. Latin American and even some Western countries might also be reluctant to condemn. I have expressed this view to Razak who agrees.
3. While the first draft resolution will presumably be tough I believe that, bearing in mind the probable American attitude, we should have a carefully considered ‘compromise’ resolution ready. Something along the following lines, based largely on Afro-Asian language, might be worth considering:
Preamble
Having considered (the agenda item).
Viewing with deep concern the use or threats of force against the territorial integrity of any country (or Malaysia).
Recognizing that ‘all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life’.
Realizing the need for nations to ‘live together in peace with one another as good neighbours who develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.
Operative Paragraphs
(i) Declares the policy of ‘crush Malaysia’ to be contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles of the Bandung Declaration, and calls for its immediate cessation, including in particular all acts of overt or covert aggression.
(ii) Calls further upon all member states of the United Nations to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Malaysia and refrain from any intervention or interference in its internal affairs.
(iii) Invites, on the basis of and after compliance with, operative paragraphs (i) and (ii), representatives of the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia to meet under the aegis of the United Nations and with the assistance of the Secretary-General in order to seek ways and means of re-establishing peaceful and neighbourly relations with one another.
4. The last paragraph may involve dangers but it seems useful to establish that future talks between Malaysia and Indonesia should be on the basis of an end to aggression and respect for Malaysian sovereignty and should avoid any reference to a dispute. Moreover there are sure to be pressures for United Nations involvement and this may be one way of channelling them usefully. I have assumed that careful drafting can protect against a Russian veto of the other operative paragraphs of the resolution.
5. I believe the Americans will want to promote a United Nations presence in Malaysia, possibly even a fact-finding mission. I see some disadvantages in the latter.
(a) The Indonesians have already rejected the findings of one such mission sponsored by the Secretary-General himself. (This is a point which the Malaysians will no doubt wish to make in the course of the debate.)
(b) It would be time-consuming, probably tying the hands of the British, with the likelihood that its report would again be disavowed by Indonesia.
(c) It would, by implication, throw doubts on Malaysia’s case and give Indonesia opportunities to claim that the United Nations had accepted that there was no Indonesian aggression.
6. On the other hand a United Nations presence might deter the Indonesians. The British seem to think that it would be more likely to hamper their own efforts and that the disadvantages would outweigh the advantages. However, I do not think that the Malaysians should necessarily be afraid of a United Nations presence. In view of the likelihood that United States thinking will be in this direction I have suggested to Razak that he should arrange for early British and Malaysian military and police consultation to decide on what terms it would be most advantageous.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 3]
1 Critchley had agreed to go to New York to assist in the presentation of the Malaysian case in the Security Council (see paragraph 11, Document 199). Critchley and the Australian Mission to the UN had been advised that ‘Australian assistance to [the] Malaysian delegation must be unobtrusive’.