New York, 10 September 1964
78. Secret
US Attitudes to Security Council Action on Malaysia
Mr. F. Underhill,1 Deputy Under Secretary South West Pacific Affairs, who is with the United States delegation during the Security Council debate on Malaysia’s complaint against Indonesia, called on me on September 9th at his request. He was interested in my views on the type of resolution that might emerge and whether we considered there was any advantage in looking for a means of conciliating Malaysia and Indonesia.
2. Underhill began by reporting the conversation with Sudjarwo2 that morning and explained, with what proved to be considerable accuracy, Sudjarwo’s likely reply to Malaysia. He added that while Sudjarwo had been expounding Indonesia’s position, Dr. Zain, Indonesia’s Ambassador to Washington,3 had been making ugly noises on the side. Underhill commented that it was a pity that Sudjarwo was handling the Indonesian case. He was a pleasant man who would create the best effect for Indonesia. If Zain had been in charge ‘our task would be much easier’.
3. Underhill quickly came to the point that the United States was interested in a U.N. presence in Malaya as a means of discouraging the Indonesians from continuing their attacks. More than that, he was wondering whether there was any possibility of working towards a solution on the basis of the Philippine proposal for an Afro-Asian mediating body.4
4. I emphasized that it was difficult to see what there was to mediate. The only real dispute was over Malaysia’s right to exist. This was clearly not a matter for negotiation. The Malaysians could hardly be expected to accept any form of conciliation unless it were clearly understood that aggression would stop and Malaysia’s sovereignty would be respected. As I saw it, Indonesia would not agree to this. Among their objectives they wanted an Afro-Asian group to recommend further ascertainment in the Borneo territories with the purpose of undermining the new state. Malaysia would thus be put in the difficult position of having to refuse an Afro-Asian recommendation and this would weaken our common cause in South East Asia.
5. Underhill queried whether Malaysia might accept an ascertainment if it were to be made in the indefinite future. I pointed out that this would also suit Indonesia by creating uncertainties and doubts, especially in the Borneo territories of Malaysia. Federations were difficult enough to establish without additional uncertainties as the result of external pressure.
6. I suggested that at the present time our position was strong. Malaysia had the advantage of U Thant’s ascertainment, freely elected popular government, a developing economy and, with its allies, the military strength to withstand Indonesian aggression. It might prove that Indonesia would eventually have to be restricted by the use of force, but at least our basic position was favourable. It would be unfortunate if the Western powers encouraged and assisted the erosion of this position and we had to defend Malaysia from a weaker base.
7. Underhill seemed to be in sympathy with my arguments. He said the Philippines were bent on making things even more difficult. They had cabled asking for the right to be heard in the Security Council debate and had indicated that they wanted the Macapagal proposal for an Afro-Asian conciliation group to be taken up. Underhill agreed with my comment that it was important to insist on an end to aggression and acceptance of Malaysia’s integrity and territorial sovereignty. He feared, however, that any resolution unsatisfactory to Indonesia would be vetoed by the Russians.
8. Taking up the point that there might be an advantage in a U.N. presence, Underhill said he understood that this would be acceptable to the Malaysians. He asked whether I thought this proposal should be included in a resolution. I commented that, in my personal opinion, there would be advantages in seeking to give any such U.N. body authority to investigate on the spot in Indonesia as well as Malaysia.
9. Underhill said the United States was anxious to avoid any escalation in the military conflict over Malaysia if at all possible. He reflected American concern lest the British regard the Security Council operation as merely an exercise to justify stronger military measures against the Indonesians. I made it quite clear that this was certainly not our approach. At the same time, I emphasized that we could not afford to appease the Indonesians further. They seemed to be intent on making trouble in the hope that the United States would operate on the West Irian pattern,5 exert pressure for a negotiated settlement on the basis of concessions by Malaysia. Underhill said that the Americans were well aware of this and had no intention of doing so.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 4]
1 Francis Underhill.
2 Tjondronegoro Sudjarwo, Indonesia’s Second Deputy Foreign Minister.
3 Dr Zairin Zain.
4 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.
5 A reference to US encouragement of negotiations in response to Indonesian military and political pressure during the Dutch–Indonesian dispute over the territory of West Irian (see footnote 8, Document 7).