Canberra, 11 September 1964
AP102. Secret
Malaysian Complaint in Security Council
Following is a summary of Departmental thinking of present Security Council consideration of Malaysian complaint. The Malaysians requested an urgent meeting of the Council under Article 39, describing recent parachute drops as ‘a blatant and inexcusable aggression’.1
2. From the Malaysian and our point of view, the essential purposes in the Security Council discussions appear to be:
(a) to have a thorough discussion of Indonesia’s most recent acts and the whole policy of confrontation in the Council;
(b) through this discussion and, if possible, through an appropriate resolution to inhibit further Indonesian aggressive actions;
(c) to make easier the justification and public presentation of retaliatory action against Indonesia, should further Indonesian acts of aggression occur.
3. The present composition of the Council is the five permanent members and Bolivia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway.
4. The exercise will be a difficult one, and it was largely for this reason that until recently we had thought it inadvisable for the Malaysians to go to the Council. However, recent Indonesian actions and the obvious risk of escalation led us to the view that Indonesian armed activity was now so blatant that it had to be stopped and that failure to go to the Security Council would weaken Malaysia’s claim that they were the victims of unprovoked attack.
5. Before the debate started,2 the British suggested a draft resolution to the Malaysians which would state that the recent para drop was an act of aggression and that in its operative paragraphs condemn this aggression and call on Indonesia to give an immediate assurance to desist from actions of aggression and provocation.
6. Such a draft would have the advantage of firmness and simplicity. However, it would almost inevitably be vetoed by the Soviet Union and might not be supported by Morocco and the Ivory Coast and create difficulties for the Americans, who do not want to have to condemn Indonesia in such blunt terms.
7. The next point is whether the Malaysians and their supporters should work for a milder alternative resolution which would have a better chance of being adopted while still having an inhibiting effect on further Indonesian action. Australia is not a member of the Security Council, and we are thus not called upon to endorse specifically a number of alternative drafts which have been suggested. We consider, however, that any milder resolutions should at least censure Indonesia in some form, and call for the cessation of hostile acts against Malaysia and respect for her sovereignty.
8. The next major question is whether the resolution should go further. If it simply censured Indonesia, then Malaysia would have achieved an advantage from the exercise and would be in a position to go back to the Council if further acts of aggression occurred. It would, however, be an advantage if the Council remains continuously seized of the situation at the initiative of Malaysia. It will then be much more difficult for Indonesia to get the question into the General Assembly in a context more to their choosing. Subandrio has already said to Shann that Indonesia prefers the Assembly as a forum. Indonesia would have more sympathy and support in the Assembly than in the Council.
9. Suggestions have been made that the ‘mild resolution’ should go beyond censuring Indonesia and make some provision for a United Nations presence in Malaysia. Other suggestions have been made and have already been put forward by the Philippines in the Council (details at present unknown),3 for the question to be referred to an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, the formation of which was proposed by the Philippines at the Tokyo Head of Government meeting in June (All Posts Savingram No. 72 refers).4
10. The Malaysians themselves in the Council have suggested United Nations peace observation team or something of that nature which could be sent to Malaysia, although other Malaysians have indicated that they did not like the idea because they thought it might inhibit their ability to respond if Indonesian aggression continues. British circles seem to have the same idea, although they have not, as far as we know, taken a final and definite position. On balance we think the idea of a limited United Nations presence has a lot to recommend it. We think the Council might call for some machinery of a peace observation nature under the Secretary-General. This person or persons would be directed to identify and report to the council on any further acts of aggression. Tactically, this would prevent recourse to the General Assembly, and while it might embarrass, it would not necessarily impede a suitable response by Malaysia if further aggression occurs.
11. The suggestion regarding the Conciliation Commission is much more difficult. In the Council debates, the Indonesians are admitting a serious degree of complicity in the attacks on Borneo States and Malaya, but are trying to justify them on the grounds that the British and the Malaysians are doing the same or worse to Indonesia and that the root of the trouble is the foreign imperialist presence in South-East Asia. This points the way for the sort of initiative which the Filipinos have taken to propose recourse to their Conciliation Commission which, free of outside interference, would propose an Asian solution. The situation has dangers for Malaysia. If the crucial fact of Indonesian aggression ceases to be the essential point of the debate, and if emphasis is put on mediation, then the outcome is likely to be a victory for Indonesia, in that the impression might be given that both sides are at fault. We, accordingly, feel that any proposals for conciliation machinery will need to be very carefully examined and whole-hearted Malaysian agreement would be an essential condition for acceptance. Without further instruction, you should not give encouragement to the Filipino proposal.
12. At this stage we cannot give any more detailed guidance. The desirable objectives of the exercise are:
(a) a firm resolution against Indonesia, although not necessarily one using the word aggression;
(b) avoidance of any form of United Nations’ mediation on terms unacceptable to Malaysia;
(c) avoidance of recourse to the General Assembly (from which follows the need for an affirmative resolution by the Security Council enabling it to continue to be seized of the problem).
13. The foregoing is sent to you for your background information. It may be drawn on generally in any discussions you have with the Government to which you are accredited, but you should not give the impression that Australia is seeking to play a prominent role, either in the Security Council discussions or elsewhere. You should, however, make clear our concern at the military risks in the present situation and our desire for the widest possible support for Malaysia’s right to be allowed to live in peace without outside military interference, in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Charter.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 4]
1 Article 39 states: ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security.’
2 The debate began on 9 September.
3 The Philippines representative made a brief statement on 10 September.
4 Not published (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks).