Canberra, 11 September 1964
4396. Secret Immediate
It is essential that Australian Government should have authoritative indications at Ministerial level of British Government thinking and intentions on their handling of relations with Indonesia.
2. You have Australia’s general objectives to be sought from Security Council discussions, our telegram 4324,1 and you can understand our concern that we should see as clearly as possible where we are headed for in the event that discussions in New York do not restrain Indonesia from further armed attacks on Malaysia. You are also aware of United States concern reported by Waller about possible British intentions.2
3. Please raise following questions as a matter of urgency with British Government—
(a) If there is another overt attack by Indonesia what do they propose to do militarily?
(b) What will Australia be asked to do?
(c) What steps are they taking to see that the United States is aware of their intentions?
4. We ask that question because we think there could be nothing more serious than for the United Kingdom and the United States to be in disagreement on this matter.
5. Because we are so deeply involved both in the present and in the future of this region there should be close and continuous contact with the British Government at senior level.
6. For your own guidance: in general we believe that until Security Council discussion is ended, we should not take any military action except in response to a further act of clear aggression by Indonesia and this response should be narrowly limited to what is necessary for defence against the attackers or to prevent them from renewing the attack. On the other hand if purely military considerations called for action on a more massive scale, we would wish to be consulted before any decision was taken that might alter the whole character of the situation. When Security Council discussion is ended and depending on the outcome of this discussion it may be that some more definite warning backed by military capacity to give effect to it may have to be given to Indonesia. Consideration of and preparation for any such measures would clearly call for close consultation with the United States. We ourselves would be directly and immediately involved in the consequences of such measures and we require to be consulted at all stages.
7. Other views expressed in the Sub-Committee3 were that we assume that Malaysia would not take armed action on her own without the concurrence of the United Kingdom. It is considered basic that the United States be informed by the United Kingdom of any intended armed action in order to secure a clear indication by the United States that it concurs in such proposed action or will not subsequently indicate anything other than its approval. For the sake of international presentation our strong view is that any armed action, if taken by us, should obviously be in response to an overt attack and this means that such action should follow promptly the incidents which occasioned it. In advance of any decision there should be a clear view of the military and diplomatic consequences of such recourse to force.
[NAA: A1945, 245/3/19]
1 8 September, setting out the three objectives listed in paragraph 12, Document 204.
2 On 8 September, Waller had reported the State Department’s concern that Sandys was ‘determined on vigorous action’, and its ‘alarm that London may act precipitately and beyond its capacity in taking retaliatory action against Indonesia’. Waller had taken up his appointment as Ambassador to the US in August.
3 That is, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Sub-Committee of Cabinet.