Canberra, 13 September 1964
4401. Top Secret
The following is the text of a message handed to the British High Commissioner in reply to the British Government’s message of the 12th September concerning retaliatory action against Indonesia.1
Begins:
The Australian Government is grateful for the message conveyed by the British High Commissioner on September 12th and for the opportunity of commenting on British thinking about the kind of military assistance which it would be necessary to give to the Government of Malaysia in the event of another Indonesian attack in Malaya/Singapore.
2. The Australian Government shares the British view that any riposte which may be authorised should quickly follow the attack and we agree with the four criteria set out in paragraph 2 of the British paper.2
3. Our military advisers have examined the targets and as defined in the message sent through British Defence Liaison Staff channels. They comment that on the basis of the information available to them the targets selected by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, are achievable and suitable. Although they would not cause real damage to Indonesian military capability they would serve the political objectives of attempting to deter further raids and of strengthening Malaysian morale.3
4. We note that the measures, the authorisation of which for planning purposes is being sought from British Ministers, are within the capability of British forces already under Commander-in-Chief’s command. At the same time the British Government recognises that Indonesian reactions will be unpredictable and there is some risk that the Indonesians may mount counter attacks on Malaysian targets. With this estimate we agree and we have been particularly impressed by the view stressed by our advisers that there could be a rapid development into a Plan ALTHORPE situation.4 In fact we feel that the decision to attack the proposed targets virtually means that the next step will be the execution of Plan ALTHORPE should the Indonesians react with counter attacks. This could take the form of air strikes against bases in Malaysia which would have military risks for us as there are only two fully developed operational airfields at Butterworth and Tengah.5 We assume that in proposing the plan of action which is now under consideration the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, has satisfied himself that Indonesia’s air offensive capability at this stage is not such that unacceptable damage could be inflicted on our forces.
5. For these reasons the Australian Government would wish to be consulted before the launching of an attack was authorised and satisfied that an attack proposed by the Commander-in-Chief had followed a specific Malaysian request relating to a further Indonesian raid or landing in Malaya or Singapore adequately confirmed. We recognise the great importance of a quick decision and propose that a Malaysian request following a further Indonesian raid be passed to the Australian High Commissioner (and to the New Zealand High Commissioner should such be the wish of his Government) at the same time as it is passed to the British High Commissioner in Malaysia so that consideration could proceed simultaneously in the three countries.
6. We have considered the British enquiry as to whether the Australian contingents for use in Plan ALTHORPE could now be put under the Commander-in-Chief, Far East’s Operational Command and facilities at Darwin made available to him. We assume that at this stage the British request is limited to those forces who are already in the Strategic Reserve and that the intention is to confirm the availability of these forces for Plan ALTHORPE including their use for offensive action as necessary. We confirm their availability for this purpose. We also confirm that facilities at Darwin and Fremantle would be available if required in the development of Plan ALTHORPE although there should be further specific consideration of the use of Darwin before offensive air operations were conducted from that base. In confirming the availability of our forces we wish to emphasise that this is on the clear understanding that the Australian Government would be expressly consulted before the execution of Plan ALTHORPE as is provided in the Plan.
7. The Australian Government notes that the American Government is being notified of the British intentions as defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the British message.6 We understand that the United States has also been informed of ALTHORPE preparations. The Australian Government attaches the highest importance to keeping the United States fully informed of British plans and intentions not only in relation to the initial retaliatory action but also Plan ALTHORPE and of ensuring that the United States is not opposed to the action contemplated. Although it is assessed that United States military support would not be required in Plan ALTHORPE it is fundamental that the United States should not be opposed to Commonwealth action.
8. Following the message which the Australian Prime Minister sent to the British Prime Minister on 11th September through the Australian High Commissioner in London,7 the Australian Ambassador has seen Mr. Rusk and conveyed the two points which were described in Sir Robert’s message. In reply Mr. Rusk said he was entirely agreeable to combined contingency consultations subject to confirmation from the President. The Secretary of State suggested that consultations be in a low key as a safe-guard against leakage, but agreed that some such exchange of information was necessary and desirable.8 We understand that Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Mr. Bundy) plans to initiate consultations in London on September 17th in which Australia and New Zealand would participate.9
9. We suggest that it would be an advantage if the timetable of consultations with the United States could be accelerated and to this end we suggest that the British Government might consider instructing their military authorities to discuss Plan ALTHORPE with the United States military authorities without further delay. It is our strongly held view that the discussions with Bundy should pay particular attention to the political effects both internationally and within Indonesia of the planned initial tactical air and naval attacks under Plan ALTHORPE against strictly military installations and the proposed subsequent attacks on strategic targets.10
[NAA: A1838, TS687/9/2 part 1]
1 Not published.
2 That is, suitable targets for a retaliatory strike, agreed in advance with CINCFE, would ‘(a) be seen to relate directly to a specific Indonesian attack; (b) be militarily useful; (c) offer the minimum risk of casualties both to our own force and to Indonesian civilians; (d) be least likely to provoke escalation of the fighting’.
3 The seven targets selected were confined to the Riau archipelago and islands off the Sumatran coast. All were the bases closest to the Malay peninsula and included at least three from which it was believed that the seaborne infiltrations into Malaya had been mounted.
4 Plan ALTHORPE was designed, if fully implemented, to eliminate Indonesian air and naval offensive capability, including the military installations which contributed to that capability, as quickly as possible.
5 RAF base in Singapore to which RAAF bombers, fighters, signals and other support units were attached.
6 That is, on the matter of target selection.
7 The message informed Douglas-Home that Menzies had asked Waller in Washington to see Rusk urgently to convey Australia’s views on the importance of close Anglo-American consultation on matters relating to the current Malaysian–Indonesian situation, and to suggest that there was a suitable opportunity now for the US to propose Anglo-American military contingency consultations.
8 The meeting took place on 11 September.
9 On 16 September, the US modified this proposal to two separate talks—one with Bundy and British officials and the other with Australian and New Zealand representatives.
10 Before the talks, Eastman was advised that DEA considered there were ‘two main broad principles’ that should govern any proposed military operations: ‘there must be no failure and they must be capable of being carried through with swift success’. DEA believed the purpose should not be to ‘defeat’ Indonesia, and operations should, therefore, be ‘limited to sufficient reproof and containment to prevent Indonesia succeeding in its present aims’. It was essential to avoid any fragmentation of Indonesia, breakdown of civil order, excessive damage to the Indonesian economy, or destruction of the Army’s internal control and stabilising role.