Canberra, 1 February 1963
I am writing about the forthcoming quadripartite talks in Washington on Indonesia’s intentions in South East Asia and what we should do about them. The British Government has asked for a stepping up of the timing of these talks on the grounds that there could be actual conflict between British and Indonesian forces in the Borneo territories in the immediate future. They are, of course, particularly keen to obtain a clear picture of likely American reactions to such an eventuality. Because of the implications for our own forces in Malaya and our general relations in the area, I am planning to raise the matter in Cabinet on Tuesday, 5th February, and I should be grateful to have the benefit of your views before doing so. I have told the British we cannot be ready for a discussion in Washington before Thursday.
In our own preliminary thinking we are trying to separate the question of what the united position of our countries should be towards the possibility of increased Indonesian meddling in Borne from the deeper and long term problems of security in the area. Allow me to express some of the considerations which have entered into our thinking.
The presence of Australian forces in Malaya is important for the defence of Australia2 and this inclines us towards Malaysia and makes the Tunku’s goodwill important. As I see it at present, this does not mean that of necessity we must wholeheartedly endorse the project of Malaysia. Malaysia has many weaknesses and although we have publicly called it an imaginative idea we have never gone overboard in support of it. Nevertheless we must somehow make it plain to Indonesia that we will not tolerate acts of expansionism and that we disapprove strongly of attempts at subversion or infiltration. We should accordingly let the Indonesians know that we feel the British are right in preventing Indonesian infiltration.3 We have been asked by the British for the use of naval vessels for patrol purposes and we provided them,4 (as I think you did a cruiser), because we recognised that Britain had certain rights, and a duty as well, to protect her territory against outside interference. In this we were assisting Britain in the exercise of those rights and the performance of that duty.
While prepared to take this action I do not believe that any of us is entirely happy about Malaysia. In the first place although Malaya seems to be a smoothly functioning state, it does not necessarily follow that they would be equally able to administer the Borneo territories. There is also the question of the vigorous and energetic population of Singapore and the very obvious problem which it presents.5 I still think that Malaysia probably represents the best solution any one has s of ar produced but it is a far from perfect one.
You will have seen from the reports of the Philippine delegation talks in London that they are laying stress on the argument that Malaysia in its present form will not in fact contribute to the security of the area but that it may actually lead to an increase in Chinese influence.6 Indonesia is clearly influenced by similar considerations although I do not believe we can rule out territorial greed as an important, and perhaps dominating, factor in Indonesian thinking as well.
It seems to me that we must recognise that if we encourage the formation of Malaysia in the teeth of Philippine and Indonesian opposition, we are creating a state which not only has serious intrinsic weaknesses but begins its existence in the face of a persisting hostility from its two nearest neighbours. Its security can be guaranteed, especially if the Americans join in; but it is difficult to see where this would end or for how long it might go on. We may in fact have to do this. As of this moment I am inclined to think that the extension of the Anglo Malay defence arrangements to Malaysia will involve us in this direction.7 But I believe that as well we should make a real effort to reconcile the Philippines and Indonesia to the concept of Malaysia. I have been pressing London for some time for an early start to the Philippine negotiations. I believe their successful outcome has been seriously jeopardised by delay which has taken place and by the apparent British unwillingness to recognise that there could be a genuine element of apprehensiveness in the Philippines’ attitude to Malaysia.
Clearly neither the Philippines nor Indonesia have a right to take part in the settlement of the Borneo territory but I think if we are to moderate their hostility in any way we must recognise in our own deliberations that they have a legitimate interest in developments affecting neighbouring territories. Therefore I suggest we should make it clear to both Manila and Djakarta that we support the British action in preventing, if necessary by military means, any interference in British territory. But at the same time, recognising ourselves that both countries have a real direct interest in the security of the area, we should be astute t of ind and take any opportunity, not inconsistent with our clear stand towards their expansionism, which offers a prospect of discussion with them with a view to lessening any general apprehension they may have.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 1]
1 Keith Holyoake, New Zealand Minister for External Affairs (also Prime Minister).
2 In addition to supporting treaty commitments in the region (see Document 1), Australian forces were deployed in Malaya as part of Australia’s ‘forward defence’ policy of the time. This policy was directed towards defending Australia as far as possible from its own coastline.
3 British authorities were acting on a message received from the Tunku, 24 January, warning that an ‘Indonesian attempt to infiltrate some 3000 men’ would occur within the following week.
4 Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the Far East were made available ‘to help patrol territorial waters off the North Borneo coast or on the high seas’.
5 See footnote 16, Document 1.
6 See Document 17.
7 The UK Government had advised that AMDA, with which Australia was associated (see footnote 6, Document 4), would be extended to Malaysia on its formation.