Canberra, 21 September 1964
76. Top Secret Immediate SECRET PERSONAL
Military Counter Measures
Reference your telegram No. 941.2
In summary, for your information, in the period between the paratroop drop and the complaint to the Security Council the Malaysian Government sought and obtained assurances from Britain and Australia and New Zealand that further attacks on Malaya and Singapore would be answered by counter measures against targets on Indonesian territory. A number of targets in the island areas near Malaya and Singapore were selected as a limited initial response. That would be the only action taken unless the Indonesians thereupon launched air or naval attacks. Reinforcements were made to cover that eventuality and military plans were approved for destroying Indonesia’s air and naval offensive capacity.
2. The above is for your personal information only. The ‘London Times’ of 12th September contains an item on the subject.3
3. The British have confirmed that they have not conveyed secret warnings to Indonesia.4 They have not felt the need to do so in view of the efforts of Jones,5 the disclosures in the ‘Times’ and the publicity given reinforcements.
4. Our view, from which the British do not dissent, is that because of the military superiority of the Commonwealth forces available there is much to be said for making sure that the Indonesians have a clear grasp of the military consequences of miscalculation, failure of orders or mistakes. We are also worried about the fragmentation of authority in Djakarta.
4. 6 We note your view of the deterrent effect of what has been done already.7 Accordingly, a diplomatic initiative on your part does not seem necessary at the present moment. However, the atmosphere can change rapidly. This message gives you standing authority to make the points set out below in your regular contacts with Indonesian political and military leaders when you consider it advisable to do so.
5. The points from which you may draw are:—
(i) The initial reaction in many quarters to the events of the 2nd September was to have the launching of effective defensive counter measures. However, Malaysia had decided to give the Security Council the opportunity to exercise its functions without immediate recourse to its inherent right of self-defence. This decision showed great restraint on the part of Malaysia. The Indonesians should ask themselves whether, especially in view of the position they took in the Council, such restraint was to be expected if future incidents occurred.
(ii) The Indonesians would know from their sources of information the extent ofBritish reinforcements. In the Australian Parliament, because of the inevitable disclosure of movements of personnel, it had been necessary to confirm that additional pilots and ground staff had been sent to Malaysia.
(iii) The Indonesians should be in no doubt that the Commonwealth and Malaysian forces are at a level of operational readiness, at a high state of alert, and that plans existed for appropriate military defensive counter measures in the event of further attacks and to cope with all possible developments. It was impossible to disclose detail as to the nature of the incident which would cause a response, but it was earnestly to be hoped that the Indonesians, by putting themselves in the place of the Malaysians in their thinking, would draw the right conclusions. If the Indonesian Government wished to avoid incidents, they should be at pains to prevent mistakes which could cause retaliation.
(iv) The Indonesians might allege British and Malaysian subversion in dissident areas. You should be willing to listen to their side of the case taking into account Dean’s flat denial in the Security Council.
6. In addition, it is suggested that your services attaches should seek to convey a mood of vigilance and preparedness coupled, of course, with our grave concern that military hostilities should not develop.
[NAA: A11537, 13]
1 Addressed to Shann ‘only’.
2 16 September, in which Shann had agreed with the desirability for prior consultation before Australian forces were deployed. But he noted that as he was ‘completely in the dark as to planned reaction to possible Indonesian action’, he was unable to judge what the Indonesians might do and whether there would be a need for an evacuation of Australian personnel.
3 Under the heading ‘Strong Hint to Indonesia—Retaliation not ruled Out’, the Times defence correspondent wrote about the forthcoming British naval exercises to be held in the waters between Malaysia and Indonesia, and added that it was ‘understood that the British government in consultation with the government of Malaysia are resolved that any further aggression against the mainland of Malaya will be met if necessary by retaliation against Indonesian military targets’. Speaking of the Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation developing into open war, he reported that ‘many military experts in London are now convinced … that if the action in the Security Council is not effective and if there is a further Indonesian attack on Malaysia—especially on the mainland of Malaya—the response is likely to be immediate and drastic’.
4 On 18 September, DEA had asked Eastman ‘to discuss with the Foreign Office whether there had been any secret diplomatic exchanges with the Indonesian Government concerning warnings of the possible military consequences of further attacks and intrusions’. The question was raised in the context of whether or not Shann should be instructed ‘to disclose to the Indonesians the chain of military consequences that they could set in train through miscalculation, failure of orders, or mistakes’
5 The State Department had instructed Jones to inform Sukarno, ‘clearly and sternly’, that if Indonesian aggression against Malaysia continued, Indonesia had to expect British retaliation and that the US would not be in any position to restrain such action. Sukarno reportedly said that Indonesia had no plans for further military action against Malaysia ‘unless the British started something’, and that he remained anxious for a peaceful settlement to the dispute.
6 Paragraph numbered as in original document.
7 On 17 September, Shann had reported that ‘from Sukarno down, the Indonesians … were really perturbed that they had gone too far, and had miscalculated the reaction of the British’. He remained unconvinced, however, that Sukarno would remain restrained on his return from his four week overseas trip due to commence the following day.