Canberra, 21 September 1964
645. Confidential
Malaysia
Thank you for your careful assessment of the Security Council proceedings.1 It is now under study.
2. In pursuit of our objective of ensuring that the United Nations (this is, the Security Council) remains effectively seized of the matter please make an early call on U Thant. In the course of exchanging views with him on the Council’s proceedings you might put it into his mind that:—
(i) his standing in the matter is strengthened by the expressed opinion of the great majority of the Council in support of Malaysia’s complaint of aggression;
(ii) the opinion of the majority amounts to the complete rejection of Indonesia’s criticism of the Secretary-General’s report on the establishment of Malaysia;
(iii) despite his public pronouncements, President Sukarno is sensitive to developments in the United Nations. The role he sees for himself among Afro-Asian countries makes him especially sensitive to the expression of the views of Afro-Asian countries in the United Nations;
(iv) in these circumstances, U Thant may be able to exert some influence on Indonesian thinking.
3. You will recall that U Thant was previously inclined to doubt that Malaysia could achieve much through recourse to the United Nations. Broadly, we hope he will now seek to exert influence on the situation through a more positive personal interest.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 5]
1 On 18 September, Hay and Critchley had provided a full report of the proceedings of Malaysia’s case in the Security Council in response to a DEA request for a ‘careful assessment of their significance’. In their view: the Malaysians had performed well and had established UN support for their stand that talks with Indonesia should follow Indonesian respect for their territorial integrity and political independence; the Indonesians had ‘shocked’ Council members with their ‘revolutionary approach’ and their commitment to non-recognition of Malaysia and their policy to crush it—the Indonesian delegation admitting that their actions had been wholly directed from Jakarta; the Soviets had worked closely with the Indonesians in an effort to ‘tone down’ their statements; and despite their suspicions of Britain’s position and intentions in the area, the Afro-Asian group, while prepared to accommodate Indonesia as an historical leader of the group, significantly showed that they were not prepared to accept Indonesia’s authority to challenge the UN Charter and to use armed force against a fellow member of the UN.