Canberra, 26 September 1964
Confidential
Non-Aligned Conference—Malaysia
We are concerned that the Second Non-Aligned Conference to begin in Cairo on 5th October, and to be attended by President Sukarno, might lead to some weakening of the Afro-Asian support and understanding for Malaysia which has been built up at the Security Council and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting.
2. For your own information only, we understand that the Tunku has decided against seeking an invitation to participate in the Conference, although he has written to heads of participating governments with the objective of forestalling Indonesian efforts to win support. Whether or not Malaysia will do more, e.g. by sending a special delegation in Cairo at the time, is not yet known. Indonesia will have opportunities to take up issues such as those of neo-colonialism and foreign bases which it was unable to press during the Security Council debate. There are relevant items on the agenda. It will be important for Indonesia’s tactics to be carefully watched.
3. We should like you to do what is practicable towards influencing the Government to which you are accredited towards maintaining the force of international opinion which has been brought to bear upon President Sukarno. It should be possible for you to avoid any impression of Australia making Malaysia’s case for her. In addition to the merits of Malaysia’s case, Australia’s own direct interests are involved through commitment to Malaysia and the nature and course of Indonesia’s international behaviour and conception of international relations as disclosed in the Security Council discussions. Points from the Council discussions include the following:—
(a) Indonesia’s admission of the use of armed force against her neighbour. The Norwegian draft resolution, supported by nine of the eleven Council members, including the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Bolivia and Brazil, specifically deplored the paratroop drop of 2nd September;
(b) the refusal of Indonesia to undertake in future to respect Malaysia’s territorial integrity;
(c) the contention by Indonesia that non-recognition of Malaysia entitles it to attack and subvert Malaysia.
4. You may be able to make the points that President Sukarno will, to some extent, be influenced in choosing his future course of action by the standing he is given in the non-aligned conference and by the reception that is given to his campaign against Malaysia. President Sukarno is sensitive and difficult at any suggestion of criticism but he is not indifferent to it. The role that he sees for his country as a leading member of both the non-aligned and the Afro-Asian groupings, together with his views about ‘new emerging forces’, provide the circumstances for the members of these groups to influence him quietly but significantly. The withholding of any encouragement or any tendency to condone are important elements in this process.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 15]
1 Cablegram was addressed to New Delhi 508; and repeated to Dar Es Salaam 182; Phnom Penh 208; Accra 137; Cairo 173; Rangoon 164; Vientiane 336; Lagos 112; London 4644; Washington 2323; New York 663.