Canberra, 4 February 1963
Secret
Indonesia—Quadripartite Talks in Washington
Initial United Kingdom Approach
In mid January, 1963, the United Kingdom approached the United States in Washington expressing concern about developments in Indonesia and asking for discussions with the Americans on the question of policy towards Indonesia. Australia was invited to participate in these discussions which were initially envisaged as tripartite but later expanded at our request to include New Zealand.
Main Lines Of The British Approach
- 2. When the British approached the Americans and ourselves they delivered an aide memoire in which Indonesia was portrayed as having been proved expansionist. While the United Kingdom concern was the result of Indonesian action towards Brunei and the worsening of Indonesian/Malayan relations, the British paper did not stop at Indonesian diplomatic intentions towards Malaya and Malaysia. It spoke of inevitable Indonesian military interference in the Borneo Territories, Portuguese Timor, the Philippines and eventually Australian New Guinea. It also envisaged increasing Indonesian reliance on the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese.
- 3. The object of the British approach to the Americans and ourselves appears to be aimed at obtaining firm United States support for Malaysia. Following recent expressions of great concern by the Malayan Prime Minister over the imminence of large scale infiltrations into the Borneo Territories from Indonesia,1 the British urged that the talks be held as soon as possible. They regarded their assessment of Indonesian intentions as a clear warning and that our countries were all equally concerned. For the British the main question involved was how firm a warning should be given and what inducement might also be used to persuade Indonesia to adopt a more acceptable attitude to her neighbours. (The British are well aware of the importance of American aid to Indonesia in her present economic difficulty.)
- 4. The need for a reappraisal of our countries’ attitudes as envisaged would take place in the Washington talks is also underlined by the Anglo-Philippine talks which only recently concluded in London. The Philippines claim that they fear and distrust the concept of Malaysia. They insist that Indonesia should be consulted on general questions affecting the security of the two countries’ immediate neighbourhood. The British were unable to convince the Philippines in London that Indonesia represented a threat to their security while the Philippines was adamant in its interpretation that Malaysia is in fact such a threat.
Current Attitude Of Countries Participating In The Talks
United Kingdom
- 5. The British are anxious for a United States commitment to see Malaysia come into existence and to give some long term support to it. They are also concerned that a united front should be presented to Indonesia. They have a vague but developing recognition thatsome inducements must be given to Indonesia and the Philippines if their hostility to the concept is to be reduced. However, they have not changed their assessment of the long term threat of Indonesia in the region.
The United States
- 6. The United States has expressed its approval of the concept of Malaysia in general terms regarding it as basically anti-Communist, as a stabilizing force and a means of retaining western interests, both political and military in the area. They approve the action which the British have taken s of ar in Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories but consider that it is primarily a British responsibility. While they are prepared to discourage the Indonesians from external adventures and anti western actions they do not appear prepared to take drastic measures which could adversely affect their relations with Indonesia. The United States also recognises that the Philippines and Indonesia may be genuinely concerned about the effect which Malaysia will have on their security and that their views may have to be taken into account.
New Zealand
- 7. The British were not enthusiastic about inclusion of New Zealand in the Washington talks apparently considering that this would reduce the possibility of quick and effective decisions and could inhibit full and frank discussions. Your initial assessment of the broad questions which are likely to arise in Washington was put to the New Zealand Prime Minister whose reaction was favourable.
Australia
- 8. Australia has no military commitment except to Malaya, through its association with the Anglo Malayan defence agreement. While we have never given our unqualified support to the concept of Malaysia, we have regarded it as the best solution to the problem of Singapore and the Borneo Territories offering at the present time. In addition the presence of Australian forces in Malaya is important for the defence of Australia and this inclines us towards Malaysia and makes the goodwill of the Malayan Prime Minister important.
- 9. We feel that the British have been right in the action which they have so far taken in the Borneo Territories and believe that any Indonesian interference there should be strongly resisted. With these considerations in mind we agreed to a British request for the use of our ships in naval patrols.2 Up to the present time we have considered that control of developments in these territories was primarily a British responsibility and that our rights and duties in the matter were met by moral support and this limited military assistance. However, because of the forthcoming Washington talks and the possibility of increased Indonesian involvement in the Borneo Territories we will now need to examine fully the question of Malaysia and our long term attitude towards it. In determining this we will be influenced by the advantages and disadvantages, both in the short and long term, of the Malaysia concept, our assessment of Indonesian intentions and any expansionist tendencies which it may have and by our long term interest in relations with Indonesia. These considerations are set out in detail below.
Considerations Influencing Australian Policy At The Washington Talks
1. Australia and Malaysia
10. I consider the advantage of Malaysia to be the following—
(a) The presence of Australian forces in Malaya continues to be important for the defence of Australia. It could be more easy to maintain these forces in that area if a Federation of Malaysia on the lines at present envisaged were to come into existence.
(b) The proposed Federation of Malaysia should also assist in maintaining the stability of the area as well as reducing the possibilities of Communist subversion. The proposed federation should ensure the retention of Singapore in non Communist hands and avoid a weak independent Borneo State which would be vulnerable to Indonesian and Chinese subversion. While it may not in fact strengthen the present Government of Malaya, this government now being greatly committed to the concept, would be seriously embarrassed if Malaysia failed to eventuate.
(c) The proposed federation should also assist in the retention of British military and political influence in the area. Britain has certain rights and duties towards Singapore and the Borneo Territories and the proposed Federation of Malaysia attempts to fulfil British obligations while giving the territories an independent status.
11. Disadvantages associated with the concept appear to be—
(a) The strain which this will impose on the Malayan Government and administration by being required to undertake a major increase in its responsibilities.
(b) The problem of the racial composition of the proposed federation is not amenable to an early solution and may be only worsened by an extension of the Malayan policy of discrimination and repression.
(c) If the formation of Malaysia is encouraged without regard of Philippine and Indonesian opposition the new state would have to begin its existence in the face of hostility from its two nearest neighbours. While its security might be guaranteed it is difficult to see where this would end or for how long it could continue. Indonesia would retain a continuing capacity for subversion in all the units of Malaysia, the total population of which is only Vl0 of that of Indonesia itself.
12. On these grounds alone I can not see how Malaysia can be forced into being without an early and genuine attempt to obtain Philippine and Indonesian acceptance.
2. Indonesian Expansionism
13. We must be clear in our own minds what in fact Indonesian expansionism means to us. Does it mean that the Indonesian Government has embarked on a grand design directed at bringing neighbouring territories under its dominance; does it mean that Indonesia is now internally united with a military strength greater than that of its neighbours and for this reason its interests must be taken into account in decisions affecting the future and status of territories in her neighbourhood; does it mean that because of her increased military power she is now in a position actively to concern herself with anti colonial measures in the area or does it mean she has now developed a clearer understanding and purpose with the result that she will resist attempts to influence developments affecting the region if her own interests are not taken into account. To arrive at an assessment of what we consider to be Indonesian intentions in the region we must start with a consideration of the West New Guinea question.
14. I believe that Indonesia’s West New Guinea campaign was not merely aimed at the territorial expansion of Indonesia. It was an historical claim for which there was some justification. It was not merely an attempt by the Indonesian Government to divert popular attention from economic difficulties. The real lesson of West New Guinea was that Indonesia found that by skilful diplomacy and the threat and use of force it was able to achieve success and the acquiescence of countries which had previously not taken Indonesia’s claim seriously. West New Guinea was a situation the circumstances of which cannot be completely duplicated. In her attitude to her neighbours Indonesia can be expected to be influenced by an appraisal of her security interests in the area, her Afro-Asian sentiments, anti colonialism and cold war considerations of which she has a realistic appraisal.
15. While there appears to be no overriding philosophy behind Indonesia’s foreign relations she appears determined that decisions affecting her interests and security will not be taken without her approval. She is concerned that her international prestige will be enhanced and as the biggest and potentially most powerful nation in the region expects to have an influence on developments there. At the same time her intense anti-colonialism will cause her to distrust attempts by Western nations to change the status of territories in her immediate neighbourhood. However, Indonesian leaders have privately expressed an awareness and concern about the danger of Communist China to countries in the region and they have argued that their opposition to Malaysia stems from a fear that if the proposed federation comes into existence it will be susceptible to Chinese subversion and thus become a threat to Indonesia’s long term security.
16. While recognising that Indonesia like Australia has a vital interest in developments affecting the region we must make it plain that we cannot tolerate Indonesian expansionism and that we disapprove strongly of attempts at subversion or infiltration. We must be concerned that Indonesia should not believe that she can benefit from the use of threats and intimidation.
17. Potential areas where Indonesia may seek by subversion or military action to change the present status are
(i) Brunei and the Borneo Territories. I do not expect Indonesia to attack the Borneo Territories but if her interests are not taken into account she seems certain to continue attempts at infiltration and subversion on an increasing scale.
[ matter omitted ]
3. Australian Indonesian Relations
23. As a basic assumption underlying our relations with Indonesia I believe we can expect that Indonesia will not turn Communist in the immediate future, that it will not disintegrate and that it will not suffer an economic collapse. I also believe that Indonesia has the potential to become the most powerful, as it is in fact already the most populous country, in the region. We can also assume that future Indonesian governments will continue to be opposed to colonialism or neo-colonialism and concerned to maintain a position of non alignment with either the West or the Soviet Union and Communist China. Indonesia can also be expected to take an increasing interest in developments in the region affecting her long term security and her international standing.
24. Australian relations with Indonesia will continue to be complicated by inherent differences between our two countries. Australia is firmly committed to the retention of the Western position in Asia and to the support of the present pro western governments in Asia. Indonesia believes that the long term security of the region would be better served by independent and non-aligned South East Asian nations, which would imply a withdrawal of Western military and political influence. In the long term Indonesian leaders do see the threat from an expanding Communist China. In doing anything now to prepare for this threat Indonesia is very limited by the hold of its anti colonialism, in fact its anti western attitudes in respect of the area. Its way out of this is to pursue an opportunist policy towards Communist China for the time being and thus to buy time in which to be able to build up her own armed forces and to work towards having a dominant political influence over her neighbours (who being racially divided are susceptible to Communist Chinese subversion).
25. Despite the Philippines’ membership of SEATO and the firm military protection guaranteed to it by the United States we are now getting clear indications that the Philippines Government accepts a good measure of the Indonesian interpretation— certainly in respect of Malaysia. In essence the Philippines Government appears quite unprepared to discuss security in the area without taking Indonesia’s interests into account.
26. In our attitude towards this developing closeness between Indonesia and the Philippines we should not be concerned merely to create disunity between them. Instead we should be influenced by the awareness of the present, and particularly the potential contribution which the two countries can make to the security of the area. This contribution will be significantly enhanced by mutual agreement on the long term problems facing the area. What most concerns us, however, is that the united hostility of these two countries should be directed towards Malaya and British interests in the area. We must seek to reduce the tension between the three countries which appear potential allies of Australia against the greater threat to the area. To do this it will be necessary to acknowledge the rights and obligations of Indonesia and the Philippines and accept that they must be given the opportunity to demonstrate that they are willing to discharge their responsibilities to the overall security of the area.
27. While we must indicate our recognition of Indonesian and Philippines interest in developments affecting their immediate neighbourhood we would also expect them to show their respect for the interests of ourselves and other countries directly concerned. This respect would derive not merely from general considerations but also from a recognition of the strength and stability of Australia and its ability to contribute to the security and long term development of the region.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1 part 12]
1 See footnote 3, Document 21.
2 See footnote 4, Do cumen t 21.