Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1963
90. Secret
Malaysia—Relations with Philippines
Manila’s 72 to you.1
I agree continued public restraint by Tunku is important. He promised Thanat Khoman2 during the latter’s recent visit that he would exercise this and so far he is living up to his word. On the other hand, I understand Thanat has been angered by failure of Macapagal to keep similar promise—Tunku had also assured Thanat that he would make early visit to Manila to talk with Macapagal but this does not seem feasible for time being.
2. If Macapagal is thinking along lines of paragraph 2 of Manila’s 72 to you,3 his attitude seems based on following false assumptions—
(a) Philippines has responsibility of obtaining sovereignty over North Borneo. (Even so, assuming that it did, Indonesia would be unlikely to accept this in longer term.)
(b) United States would not lend support if United Kingdom were unable to resist Indonesian attack on border territories.
3. If Macapagal believes he may obtain North Borneo through collapse of Malaysia his attitude seems irresponsible and dangerous not only to West but also to Philippines.
4. Although Indonesia (and apparently now Philippines) can be expected to ask for self-determination for North Borneo territories under United Nations auspices I consider this is not practicable before Malaysia.
5. My own appreciation in present circumstances is—
(a) Federation and Britain are now committed to Malaysia which, short of war, seems inevitable.
(b) There is no prospect of early political demise of Tunku.
(c) Britain will defend Borneo territories in face of Indonesian pressure. If pressure is such that British run into difficulties, United States would be obliged to assist (main effort now however should be to prevent such situation arising).
(d) Western interests in area cannot be divorced from support of Malaysia at this late stage.
6. I believe that we should continue to seek opportunity for personal meeting of Tunku and Macapagal and that Thais may still be best placed to bring this about.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 1]
1 1 February. It counselled that ‘continued public restraint by Tunku is important in the present atmosphere’ in Manila.
2 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand.
3 The embassy advised that Macapagal probably saw ‘the political demise of Tunku as the lesser of two evils in a contingency in which—(a) the British defence agreement is unable to protect Borneo territory; (b) United States refuses to underwrite defence co-ordination; and will therefore urge North Borneo claims, which at present can be prosecuted without immediate “ confrontation” with, and might in the same circumstances, be accepted by, Indonesia’.