Canberra, 17 January 1965
NO. 1/1965. Top Secret
Current Malaysian Situation Following Indonesian Build-Up
Introduction
The Committee considered a message dated 15th January from the British Prime Minister to the Acting Prime Minister setting out the measures Britain proposes to take in response to the increasing Indonesian threat to Malaysia, in particular the Indonesian build-up in Kalimantan.1 In brief the main measures are as follows:—
(a) the Commander-in-Chief, Far East will be authorised, subject to the agreement of the Malaysian Government, to extend where necessary to 10,000 yards from the border in Sabah and Sarawak the patrolling and ambushing previously restricted to 3,000 yards;
(b) the Commander-in-Chief, Far East will be authorised to implement between 12 miles and 3 miles off the Indonesian coast in the Malacca and Singapore Straits the patrols he now carries out on the high seas;
(c) British forces in the Malaysian theatre are being reinforced.
2. The British Prime Minister’s letter points out that, in addition to the reinforcements in (c) there still remains a need for additional helicopters, S.A.S. troops and a further infantry battalion. Britain could provide the battalion herself only by withdrawing it from Germany.
Increase In Border Patrolling
3. The proposal to extend patrols and ambushing across the Indonesian border in Borneo from 3,000 yards to 10,000 yards is supported from the Australian military viewpoint. Mr. Wilson’s letter states that, in considering this extension, Britain is not contemplating any departure from her essentially defensive strategy. This aspect is commented on below in relation to any possible Australian participation in the extended patrol and ambush activities.
Naval Patrols Between 3 Miles And 12 Miles Off The Indonesian Coast In The Malacca And Singapore Straits
4. The proposals to conduct naval patrols nearer the Indonesian coast in the Malacca and Singapore Straits is also supported. This would make the patrols more effective by giving greater surveillance over the build-up of Indonesian sea-borne raiders and improving prospects of intercepting them. The six R.A.N. ships deployed to Malaysia should take part in the extended patrols on the same basis as their R.N. and Malaysian counterparts.
Possible Commitment Of Additional Australian Ground Forces And Helicopters
5. Mr. Wilson’s letter, in referring to the need for additional helicopters, S.A.S. troops and a further infantry battalion in Malaysian Borneo (paragraph 2 above), does not make a specific request for Australian and New Zealand assistance. Advice from Australian representatives in London and Kuala Lumpur indicates however that the United Kingdom is likely to approach Australia in the near future for the use of our battalion in the Strategic Reserve in Borneo in rotation with other ground forces in the theatre. It is understood that this question could well be raised with the Minister for Defence during his visit to Malaysia.
Ground Forces
6. It is not clear from Mr. Wilson’s message whether, in the reference to the need for a further battalion the United Kingdom has in mind the Australian force (3 R.A.R.) with the Strategic Reserve or an additional battalion over and above 3 R.A.R. If the request is for the deployment of our battalion in the Strategic Reserve for operations in Borneo in rotation with the British battalions we would support it. There is a clear military need for additional ground forces in the Borneo operations in view of the stepping up in Indonesia’s confrontation tactics and the threatening situation posed by the build-up of Indonesian forces in Kalimantan.
7. We would not recommend that Australia offer to commit an additional battalion to Malaysia if requested. A battalion is available at operational readiness in Australia from forces earmarked for S.E.A.T.O. limited war plans, but, following the recent approach by President Johnson for further military and non-military assistance in South Vietnam2 there is a possibility that Australia may wish to deploy this battalion to South Vietnam should joint military discussions reveal that the planned United States Phase 2 operations there are feasible and that United States intends to proceed with them.3
8. We would also support the deployment of a S.A.S. squadron to Borneo on the grounds of military need. A squadron of comparable size to the British S.A.S. squadron, some 86 all ranks, is available and could be despatched promptly.
9. It is our firm view that, if we commit our battalion in the Strategic Reserve and a S.A.S. squadron to Borneo, they would have to operate under the same conditions of engagement as British and Malaysian forces, and thus be available for patrolling and ambushing activities up to 10,000 yards inside Indonesian territory. Under any other conditions, the Commander-in-Chief would meet serious operational difficulties in arranging their employment. Further, the morale of the Australian forces and the Australian image in Malaysia would both suffer if our forces were to be limited to duties within Malaysian territory only.
10. Although Australia is in a different position to Britain and New Zealand as regards patrolling within Indonesian territory in view of our common land border with Indonesia in Papua/New Guinea, the military view is that participation by Australian forces in such cross-border operations would not in itself have any significant effect on Indonesia’s policy or intentions on subversive activities in respect of Papua/New Guinea. It is felt that Indonesia would undertake such activities if and when it suited her policy to do so. She would not be influenced in refraining from these activities simply because we respected her border in Kalimantan. On the other hand it could be argued that cross-border operations by Australian forces could possibly provoke Indonesian retaliatory activities in Papua/New Guinea.
Helicopters
11. It would be impracticable to deploy any R.A.N. Wessex helicopters to Borneo. Our Wessex are not compatible with the British version and are not suitable for the operations in the area. The R.A.N. is short of helicopter pilots and support personnel and any diversion of helicopter effort to Borneo would weaken considerably the anti-submarine capability of the Australian Fleet, and have a markedly bad effect on the training programme for our planned increase in Navy strength.4
12. There are currently four R.A.A.F. Iroquois helicopters deployed to Malaysia. The Chiefs of Staff Committee on 14th January considered the possibility of increasing this number. Any further deployment could only be made with detriment to commitments in Australia, in particular R.A.A.F. helicopter support for Australia based Army units. The Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded that no additional Australian helicopters should be made available to Malaysia in the present phase of the British defensive strategy to counter Indonesian confrontation.
Logistic Support of Any Additional Australian Force Contributions
13. It would not be practicable for Australia to institute a logistic support organisation for any additional ground force contributions to Malaysian Borneo including 3 R.A.R. on a rotation roster basis. Such support would have to be provided by Britain on a reimbursable basis as is done for our battalion on the Malaysian mainland.
Continuation Of Defensive Strategy In Malaysia
14. The reinforcements required to match the present substantial Indonesian build-up, whilst maintaining a defensive strategy, are considerable. They would be even greater if authority were not being given to permit patrols to proceed to 10,000 yards across the Indonesian border.
15. It is certain that even more acute problems will develop in the future if there is a further Indonesian build-up. With the continuance of the present defensive strategy no limit can be imposed on the period of deployment of the additional forces. The indications are that the availability of re-inforcements in the future will be even more limited and that the British, New Zealand and ourselves are approaching the position where consideration will have to be given to more positive military measures unless a political solution to the confrontation problem can be found.
16. Mr. Wilson’s message states, in part:—
‘Useful results might be achieved by small-scale commando-type operations against the small Indonesian bases on islands close to Malaysian territory from which attacks on the mainland of Malaya are mounted. These would be different in kind from the Plan Mason operations in that the basis of the plan would not be air or naval bombardment.5 Secondly, if the Indonesians were to launch a major attack in Borneo or to step up their raids to the point where there was a danger of the defences being saturated, it might become necessary to operate against major Indonesian military targets well back in Indonesian Kalimantan. Plan Althorpe deals with the circumstances of full-scale overt aggression, but the possibility of some intermediate scale of operation needs to be studied. We have therefore authorised the Commander-in-Chief to prepare new plans for both these types of operation for submission to us, but have instructed him that they are not to be put into operation without further ministerial authority. We will be discussing the first plan with the Malaysians but we are not telling them anything about the second.’
17. This indicates that the British authorities do not exclude the likelihood of undertaking offensive action in some areas as a continuation of their present policy. The Australian Chiefs of Staff recognise this but consider that the Indonesian confrontation problem cannot be solved by continuing the present defensive strategy. They are of the opinion that, from a military point of view, it would be preferable to act offensively if there were any further increase in the build-up of Indonesian forces against eastern Malaysia and/or any increase in the scale of Indonesian activities in Malaya/Singapore. However, it has always been the policy that so long as the possibility of a political solution exists no military action should be taken to prejudice that possibility.
18. We think that the British Government should be informed that, although we agree that the present defensive strategy should be maintained at present, there is a serious danger in contemplating its indefinite continuance. We note, however, that new plans are being developed for offensive action in circumstances short of full-scale overt aggression and we would like to have the opportunity of discussing these plans when they have been formulated.
Consultation With Malaysian And United States Governments
19. As with previous military assistance to Malaysia it would be necessary for the request for any additional force contributions to be made formally by the Government of Malaysia.
20. In view of the United States treaty liability under A.N.Z.U.S. to come to the aid of Australian forces if overt hostilities should develop in Borneo, it would also be necessary to consult the United States authorities on any proposals to increase our force contributions in the area, and on the conditions under which they would be employed before making any commitments to the British or Malaysian Governments.
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6647 part 4]
1 Not published.
2 Johnson wrote to Menzies on 14 December 1964 suggesting that Australia provide 200 additional combat advisers, minesweepers, supply and transport craft, salvage and repair ships, and hospital ships.
3 The second phase of the US effort in South Vietnam was the move towards closer involvement in military operations in that country.
4 On 10 November 1964, the Australian Government had announced a 50 percent increase in the Australian defence establishment that included increases in the personnel strength of the three Services.
5 Plan MASON was the British defensive plan (ALTHORPE being the offensive plan, see footnote 4, Document 206) to become operational in the event of a major invasion by Indonesia of the Malayan peninsula.