Kuala Lumpur, 21 January 1965
184. Top Secret Priority
At our meeting this morning (21 January), Razak, after expressing his concern about the Indonesian build-up in Borneo and Sumatra, said he hoped Australia would be able to provide more troops. Razak was inclined to speak in general terms but emphasises that the main requirement was S.A.S. troops and helicopters which were now badly needed in Borneo. He also hoped that we would be able to provide another battalion, in addition to 3 R.A.R. and that both would be available to serve in rotation in Borneo. Razak emphasised that without further reinforcements an additional unit of the Commonwealth Brigade could not be deployed in Borneo without weakening mainland defence against threat posed by Sumatran build-up.1
2. I explained our difficulties especially over helicopters but assured him that we would do what we could to help. I suggested that the Malaysian requests should be regarded as informal until we knew what we could do and he readily agreed to this.
3. Razak also gave me a list of the equipment which the Malaysians hoped to obtain from Australia for their defence programme. (Copy is being forwarded by bag.) He confirmed that the list would be part of the proposals which will be considered shortly by Commonwealth Defence Aid Committees in Kuala Lumpur. The list does not include .303 rifles which Razak says he needs urgently to arm the local defence corps especially in isolated areas. The total requirement of .303 rifles or shot guns is 40,000 but the Malaysians hope to obtain 4,000 rifles and some million rounds of ammunition from New Zealand.
4. In my talks with Razak, Ismail and Fenner, I found that they all strongly favoured training Malaysians for a commando raid role. They strongly hinted that any assistance that Australia might be able to give in this training would be appreciated. There are still military reservations (including Tunku Osman’s) about training Malaysians for a commando role2 but Razak made it clear that he would push ahead without delay.
[NAA: A4940, Cl473]
1 See footnote 1, Document 232, and Document 234.
2 A significant military reservation was the length of time required to train inexperienced forces in the specialised skills associated with commando operations.