Canberra, 3 February 1965
AP11. Confidential
Further Australian Military Assistance to Malaysia
We are cabling separately the text of the statement made today by the Acting Prime Minister on further measures to assist Malaysia.1
2. Please give a copy of the statement to Government to which you are accredited and discuss it with Government authorities drawing as appropriate on the following background points.
(i) For eighteen months the Indonesians have mounted military pressure on Malaysia. In the first half of last year two meetings at Foreign Minister level and one at Heads of Government level between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were held but were unsuccessful because of Indonesia’s refusal to evacuate military units operating under her command in the Malaysian Borneo States, and her insistence that the units would be withdrawn only when Malaysia had made political concessions, the natured of which was never defined.2
(ii) The situation entered a more serious phase when Indonesia began to conduct operations in the Malayan peninsula. In the first sea-borne operation about 100 men were landed. In early September over one hundred were dropped from an Indonesian Air Force transport aircraft.3 The Malaysians, who had reported preceding attacks and infringements of their territorial integrity to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, made this air-drop the occasion of an appeal to the Security Council. All members of the Council except Russia and Czechoslovakia, were critical of Indonesia’s acts of aggression and infringements of the Charter. Only the Soviet veto prevented the adoption of a resolution calling on Indonesia to desist from these acts.4
(iii) Since the Council debate and in face of this expression of international opinion Indonesian raids and attacks have continued. On the 7th January and again on 28th January Malaysia gave the President of the Council information about the large build-up of forces which Indonesia was making in the Borneo border.5 It was because of these reinforcements and the danger they represented that the British Government sent emergency reinforcements to the forces which it has stationed in Malaysia for the defence of that country and the Malaysian Government requested further assistance from Australia and New Zealand.5
(iv) Malaysia has several times in the past year stated her willingness to enter into talks with Indonesia, though not while under armed attack. She made efforts to put her position to the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo,7 and she made it plain that she wants to attend the Second Afro-Asian Conference which is to be held in 1965 and to exercise her rights to maintain her position against Indonesian criticism.8
(v) It remains Australian policy to prevent any avoidable deterioration in relations with Indonesia and to work for a peaceful solution as indicated in the Acting Prime Minister’s statement.
For Posts in Commonwealth countries.
3. You might also draw on the fact, and in some cases base your approach upon it, that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at their meeting in July, 1964, assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country and to promote a peaceful and honourable settlement of current differences between Malaysia and neighbouring countries. Within a month of this statement being made Indonesia made its first attack on the Malayan peninsula. Were it not for the assistance being given by three members of the Commonwealth, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, Malaysia’s position would be critical. In addition to committing its own forces for the defence of Malaysia, Australia is assisting with equipment and training for Malaysia’s armed forces and with political and diplomatic support internationally.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1 part 24]
1 CNIA , vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 98–9.
2 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.
3 See Documents 197 and 198.
4 See Documents 199–204 and 207–209.
5 See, for example, Document 233.
6 Documents 230, 231, 238 and 240.
7 See Document 215.
8 Malaysia had been encouraged by support for its attendance at the conference from Egypt, Ghana and Morocco and decided to establish diplomatic representation in a number of the African countries in order to widen this support base. Recognising the importance of having the host nation’s acceptance, a diplomatic office under a charge d’affaires was to be opened in Algeria ‘without delay’. In addition, Razak would visit the east African countries, Tanzania, and the Malagasy Republic, from the end of February, and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong would undertake state visits to the UAR, and Saudi Arabia in April. Following a request from the Algerian Government in early January that the conference be postponed from the proposed 10 March date, it had been announced in Jakarta on 21 January that the opening had been deferred until 20 May.