Jakarta, 17 February 1965
207. Secret
Part 1.1
I had one and a quarter hours of friendly and light-hearted talk with Sukarno this morning, [ matter omitted ]
2. His references to Australia were not at any time in the least hostile.2 He said he thought that the Prime Minister was being a bit ‘cocky’ but that in general he had no criticism of us. Even if we were being ‘a bit naughty’ we clearly had no aggressive designs. It would not have escaped my notice that there had been no demonstrations against Australians in Djakarta.3 I mentioned the guards on the office and the residence to the President and he said they were merely there to make sure that there was no minor incident from some foolish person.4 He took in good part my suggestion that he had put the guards on the residence purely to spoil my fun.
3. Between two interludes of little more than banter, we had some perfectly serious conversation about matters affecting our relations. Sukarno had with him three or four of his Cabinet Ministers so it was possible to get some of our ideas across, as they are always very attentive in the President’s presence.
[ matter omitted ]
5. We then turned to Malaysia, Sukarno immediately said that we should ‘twist the Tunku’s ear’. We should assist in the arranging of a meeting, ‘without pre-conditions’, of Sukarno, the Tunku, and Macapagal at which an Afro-Asian Commission would be set up, all of whose decisions Sukarno would accept in advance. But apart from the Tunku’s saying that it was pointless to negotiate with Sukarno ‘who is a liar’, he heaped all sorts of insults on Indonesia. Could we not try to stop this and persuade him to talk?
6.
We discussed what the President meant by ‘pre-conditions’ and I suggested that the important thing was perhaps not so much public references to the withdrawal of guerrillas, which was, of course, from our point of view desirable, but the raids on Malaya and over the Borneo border. I asked whether these could stop. If they did for an appreciable time then much might flow.
Part 2.
Sukarno was evasive and began by saying there were no raids. This, however, was taken as something of a joke by me and by his Cabinet Ministers and the President himself laughed. He then said that what was going on was the action of ‘fishermen and angry volunteers’ determined to help the Malaysian people to their freedom. I returned to these ‘fishermen’ again and again but got no indication that he was prepared to stop [their activities]. He was, however, clearly interested in the idea that this was possibly the only basic precondition to our being willing to consider suggesting negotiations. We then turned to the build-up of forces in the area. I told the President that I had received a lively impression since my return to Djakarta5 of fear on the part of many Indonesians that they will be subjected to an unprovoked attack by the United Kingdom. Sukarno then made a series of exaggerated references to British strength saying that practically the whole of the British Navy and Air Force were in Singapore and that the British had more strength on the ground in Borneo than Indonesia. I contested this and he finally agreed that Indonesian strength in Borneo was the greater. I said that we in Australia were worried about the dangers of escalation and wanted to find a way to stop the process of the mutual building-up of forces. I told him that the British and other Commonwealth forces in Malaysia were there for its defence and gave him a categorical assurance that there would be no attack unless Malaysia were attacked first. Sukarno said ‘you say so, why don’t the British?’ I said that the British had already said that their forces were for the defence of Malaysia and not to attack Indonesia. Sukarno denied this and said further ‘why don’t you get the British to make a statement that they will not attack. If you do, then I will consider what would be a new situation’. He made it clear that as things are at the moment, he fears a new Suez and he assured me in very strong terms that if there were an attack there would be immediate full-scale reprisals and that he had ordered Omar Dani,6 who would be mainly responsible, to that effect. Omar Dani, incidentally, was present. I told the President that Indonesia’s freedom was assured and not threatened, and he replied that this was my view and not, in present circumstances, his.
7. Sukarno said that Indonesia would not attack and did not want war. He would be patient and he wanted talks. Could we not help to get them? I reiterated our attitude towards the cessation of activities by his ‘fishermen’. Could not he get them to fish elsewhere? Much would flow from a cessation of incursions. Our position on Malaysia was based on our attitude towards a small friend who had the right to be left alone.
8. Sukarno made some references to China which were unusual and ominous. I said that we were greatly concerned about China and regarded it as the ultimate threat. Sukarno made some confused references to his having ‘solved’ the problem but was, I thought, referring to his internal Chinese problem. But this was not so as when I enquired whether it was still his view as he has frequently said before, that China was the ultimate threat to the area, he said ‘no, this is no longer my view’. If the President has reached this view, his capacity to change the thinking of the vast majority of the Indonesians hostile to China could be most dangerous. I left him in no doubt as to what we felt about China.
9. I do not think I got too far with Sukamo but I may have got some thoughts into his head when he was in such a receptive and pleasant frame of mind.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 33]
1 Cablegram transmitted in two parts.
2 This was Shann’s first discussion with Sukarno since the 3 February announcement that Australian combat forces would be deployed to the Borneo states.
3 Anti-American demonstrations had been occurring in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and Jogjakarta since December 1964, mainly directed at US policy in Vietnam. A major protest had taken place at the US Embassy and Cultural Centre in Jakarta on 15–16 January following the retaliatory attacks by the US and South Vietnam against North Vietnam. At the time of this cablegram, demonstrations of varying sizes had been occurring daily in Jakarta since 12 February. At a mass meeting staged on 15 February, demonstrators had demanded the takeover of American companies, the arming of workers and farmers, the seizure of the US Information Cultural Centre, the closing of the Ford Foundation and the expulsion of Peace Corps members and journalists.
4 At times of anti-Western unrest in Jakarta during confrontation, Indonesian guards were often placed outside Australian diplomatic premises without explanation. Of particular note on this occasion was that a police guard of about 40 had been placed on the Australian Trade Office.
5 Shann had returned to Jakarta from leave during the last week in January
6 Air Marshal Omar Dani, Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff.