Canberra, 18 February 1965
276. Top Secret Austeo
Malaysia
Your telegram No. 417 gives me a good deal of concern.1 I note your view that the Malaysians have to solve this problem for themselves but it is apparent that any major constitutional changes will be followed with the closest attention in the international world where in a very real sense Malaysia is still under test.
2. We need to know a good deal more about the thinking and planning which is going into the negotiation of these new proposals. Are we correct in the assumption that they have been developed rapidly? Recalling the previous history of negotiations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore I should imagine that careful examination of the issues and reaching agreement upon them would take quite some time. Is it intended that discussions will proceed quietly and in detail or will the temptation be to rush an arrangement to finality which would leave many loose ends?
3. I have asked the Department to prepare submission to help us decide whether we attempt to exert any influence and if so to what purposes. The Department has put forward the following questions to assist it in exploring the matter:—
(a) What in terms of the broad political future of Malaysia, do the Tunku and Lee hope to achieve by an arrangement of this nature? What is the political reasoning of each of them which leads them to agree on the value of this arrangement? In particular, what do you consider to be Lee’s motivation?
(b) We also need your assessment of the likely political reactions in Malaya and Singapore once this process of constitutional changes becomes a matter of public knowledge and concern. Can the two governments confine the matter to formal negotiations between them for these variations in the constitution or is the subject once opened likely to lead to widespread political controversy, to new pressures and to a possible unpredictable outcome? To give one example of the possible problems, how are the Malays in Singapore itself likely to react to the diminution of influence of the Central Government?
(c) Would the making of basic changes in the Malaysian constitution within two years of its adoption lead to feelings of political uncertainty and open the way for agitation for further change? I have in mind the value which Sabah and Sarawak place in the contractual nature of their negotiations for entry into Malaysia and the special safeguards incorporated in the constitution.2 Are they likely to be concerned in the change of the political balance in the central legislature following the withdrawal of Singapore representatives? Are they themselves likely to urge claims for greater self-government and would the S.U.P.P. in Sarawak,3 in particular, have its hands strengthened to press for a similar solution?
4. I should like you and Pritchett to report fully on these matters finding as much common ground as you can without losing the benefit of your different stand points. You might also clarify Pritchett’s reference to Mountbatten and your belief that matter is being kept from the British.
[NAA: A11537, 14]
1 Document 244.
2 See editorial note, Cobbold CommissionM , and Document 8.
3 Sarawak United People’s Party. Formed in 1959, it was one of the first political parties in Sarawak, representing all races and emphasising loyalty to Sarawak.