Singapore, 20 February 1965
170. Top Secret Austeo
Lee talked with me today about the proposal for constitutional revision.
2. He said that as far as he knew this was first mooted by Razak in an off-the-record talk with journalists in Kuala Lumpur on December 28. Some two or three weeks ago he heard that the Federal Government had decided to seek Singapore’s withdrawal from the Federal Parliament and Malayan politics and an arrangement equivalent, Lee said, to the reduction of Singapore to the status of a colony of Kuala Lumpur. When he saw the Tunku last Monday, February 15, this had been modified and the Tunku now proposed that though the PAP withdrew from Malayan politics, Singapore remain in the Federal Parliament, speaking only on defence and external affairs. Singapore would recover its financial autonomy making a contribution in respect of defence, and would act for the Federal Government in Singapore in respect of all federal matters except external affairs and national defence. The development of the common market would continue.
3. Lee did not go to Kuala Lumpur on Thursday and said he is now to see the Tunku on Monday, February 22. He emphasised how nebulous it all was still and the great delicacy of the talks with the Tunku.
4.
Lee said that a disengagement along these lines was imperative. It was not being entered upon lightly. He and his colleagues had given the question the most intense consideration and some were opposed, arguing that nothing would be gained and preferring to let the conflict with Kuala Lumpur be joined. Lee spoke of four major disadvantages:
(a) that in the interval before re-engagement (‘five, ten years’) Malay extremists would become so firmly established in Malaya and would have brought about such changes in society and the polity there that a re-engagement would in the event be impossible;
(b) that the PAP would be throwing away for an indefinite period the opportunity of carrying its policies in Malaya. Those who had turned to the PAP would be deserted and the PAP would find it immensely difficult to recapture the spirit and support that it now held;
(c) that the disengagement might prove illusory;
(d) that the PAP would betray itself.
However, the situation could not be allowed to develop along the lines of recent months. This would lead within two years at the outside to collisions of such magnitude that Malaysia would have no prospect of survival. The ‘ultras and extremists’ had now become too powerful for the Tunku and his moderate associates and they could no longer withstand the pressure to push Malay interests and work for a Malay Malaysia at the expense of other communities.
5. Lee argued all this at considerable length, referring to such factors as the national language agitation, the campaign against Singapore and the PAP, the Tunku’s increasing concern to present himself as a Malay and a Moslem, Malay aggressiveness in the Borneo States, and the fact that the Tunku and his associates had bowed to pressure to insulate Singapore, which Lee held was dictated by Malay extremists. Lee said that the Tunku suffered from a sense of guilt at having betrayed the Malays by depriving them of the preponderance they had enjoyed in old Malaya. The inclusion of the Borneo States had not, in fact, redressed the balance and the union with Chinese Singapore had proved intolerable to the Malays. It had, at the same time, weakened the position of the Tunku in restraining Malay extremism since he could no longer point to Malay preponderance and a certain comfortable political majority. The advantage of the proposed disengagement was that it would allow the moderates in Malaya an opportunity to regain control.
6. Lee said that without a disengagement the situation would rapidly become politically intolerable for him since the PAP could not continue much longer its policy of restraint. PAP branches in Malaya understandably wanted action and there was continuing pressure from Borneo, in particular Donald Stephens,1 for the PAP to come in. Lee said that the situation could not stand an active campaign by the PAP and disengagement was, therefore, the only alternative. He thought it was now too late to hope for a national coalition government. The Tunku’s authority in Malaya was no longer sufficient to carry this.
7. Commenting on the effect in the Borneo States of Singapore’s withdrawal, Lee said that this would be the end of the attempt to win Malay domination there. He thought the effect on Singapore’s Malays would be manageable. The last Singapore elections had shown they could be won.2 The rest of Singapore would present no problems: the Tunku had lost the confidence of the community here and it was solidly behind Lee and the PAP.
8. Lee professed no concern about the international implications of a loosening of the federal ties so soon after Federation. He said this could be presented simply as a domestic readjustment. Malaysia would still exist and Singapore would still remain in it. He was most anxious, however, about the effect domestically of a premature disclosure of the talks between him and the Tunku. He said there was already talk and a leak was likely. To maintain confidence it was most important that the Tunku be ready with a strong statement reaffirming Malaysia.
9. Lee said that he did not know how much the British knew of the Tunku’s position. However, he quoted Head as very reluctantly agreeing with him, Lee, that disengagement was necessary. Lee said that when Mountbatten and Head called on him on February 123 they had spoken of an approach to the Tunku. (Lee was not clear, though I questioned him, if anything more specific was contemplated than a strong appeal to the Tunku to end the conflict with Singapore.) Lee had commented that the British had rather exhausted their credit in Kuala Lumpur and that any approach might come better from the Australians. Mountbatten had said that he would speak to Sir Robert Menzies. Lee suggested that, as Moore, the British Deputy here, had not told me about this, the British might have decided on another line. He, therefore, asked this report be not mentioned to them.
10. Lee hinted at some PAP comment on the situation before too long, saying he had no intention of taking the blame for what was happening.
[NAA: A11536, 18]
1 See footnote 2, Document 10.
2 In the September 1963 Singapore elections, the PAP won 37 of the 51 seats. The victory included defeating UMNO in the three predominantly Malay constituencies.
3 See footnote 2, Document 245.