Kuala Lumpur, 5 February 1963
3. Secret
Indonesian Hostility to Malaysia
I should be glad to have Department’s and Mr. Shann’s assessments of reasons behind Indonesian hostility to Malaysia. My own views on which I should welcome comments follow:
2. Main factor is incompatibility of prosperous Malaysia with Indonesia’s national policies and aspirations. Sukarno is committed (after conflict with Hatta1) to revolutionary approach whereby through suffering and struggle Indonesia could find its own political and economic solutions in guided democracy and guided economy.2 Sukarno has been playing on national pride to persuade people to accept [the] belt tightening that his policies and present economic situation demand. His policy, however, could be undermined by contrast of Indonesia’s economic difficulties with success and progress of Malaysia. A successful Malaysia could also affect the unity of Indonesia by encouraging secessionist movements in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.3
3. This explanation is consistent with attacks against neo-colonialist hegemony, resentment of the intrusion of pro-western influence and agitation about the possibility of concealed S.E.A.T.O. intrusion in the area that the Indonesians regard as their own special concern.
4. A second factor of importance is the personal animosity between the Tunku on the one had and Sukarno and Subandrio on the other. This animosity adds a strong emotional undertone to the basic conflict of interests.
5. A third factor would be associated with the recent build-up of the Indonesian armed forces. The Indonesians having built up their forces for the struggle for West Irian now need to find something for them to do. I understand, for example, that they recently offered a full brigade to the United Nations for use in the Congo.4 For West Irian the use of armed force was not necessary but the Indonesians are probably impressed with the effectiveness of threatening to use force. Despite the fact that the situation is very different in North Borneo, Indonesia could well consider that the state of preparedness of the armed forces provides an excellent opportunity to repeat the West Irian tactics.
6. I do not believe territorial ambitions were originally important in motivating Indonesian policy. Nevertheless the prospect of obtaining control of ‘North Kalimantan’5 must make an appeal especially given Indonesian sympathy for Indonesia Raya6 as a longterm political objective in the area. Moreover, the Indonesians have always tended to look for a ‘deus ex machina’7 to rescue them from their economic ills and they could persuade themselves that the resources of North Borneo might make all the difference to their economic position.
7. The Indonesians also argue that Malaysia will invite Chinese influence backed by Communist China from the Mainland of Asia into Indonesian Territories via North Borneo. This may be a factor but all things considered I would be inclined to regard it as a rationalisation and an argument that can be used (for example with the Philippines) in support of Indonesian policy.
8. It is also worth bearing in mind that Indonesian economic difficulties are particularly embarrassing at present and require some diversion. Hari Raya,8 at the end of the fasting month, is the one occasion of the year when Indonesians expect something extra in food and clothing. Earlier Indonesian Cabinets have found this demand a major political embarrassment and the present Government, with the special economic difficulties following the Java floods9 must welcome a diversion that will help take the public’s mind off their shortages. Moreover, both Sukarno and Subandrio are ambitious to be recognised as leaders by extending Indonesian influence in ideology and foreign affairs rather than tackling their own economic problems.
9. Indonesian aspirations for an Indonesian nationalist solution of the region’s economic and political problems would not concern us so greatly were it not for the fact that—
(a) Indonesia has shown little administrative capacity to organise its resources efficiently;
(b) P.K.I. has now become closely associated with the policy and it would seem impossible to dissociate strong communist influence from Indonesian expansionism. Furthermore it is difficult to see how Western interests can be dissociated from the progress of Malaysia at this stage.
10. If the foregoing analysis is correct we can expect continued friction and rivalry over a long period between Indonesia and Malaysia. Indeed this has been anticipated by Subandrio in recent statements. It also sets a limit to the extent to which Indonesian relations with Malaysia can be improved. I would suggest that the most we could hope for would be an East–West type of modus vivendi. If this is correct our objectives should be—
(a) to avoid war of words;
(b) to arrive at agreements to avoid force;
(c) to encourage contacts and co-operation in limited fields such as language and culture.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 4]
1 Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian nationalist. Former Vice-President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence. A co-revolutionary with Sukarno in Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the Dutch, Hatta supported a more technocratic, less radical style of government for Indonesia as opposed to Sukarno’s radical, revolutionary approach. He resigned from the government in December 1956.
2 The political system first proposed by Sukarno in February 1957 based on indigenous procedures for achieving consensus ( mufakat ) through prolonged deliberation ( musjawarah ). Following the suppression of a challenge to the central government in Jakarta from the outer islands (1957–59), and in the face of continuing chaos in Indonesian party politics, Sukarno returned to the concept in a bid to unify the Cabinet by including members of all political parties. ‘Democracy with guidance’ was introduced by presidential decree on 5 July 1959.
3 Outer islands where opposition to Indonesia’s centralised government remained.
4 UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1961–64. A UN force went to the Congo at the request of President Kasavubu to restore order and assist in reuniting the country following the eruption of civil strife after winning independence in 1960.
5 North Borneo.
6 Great Indonesia
7 In drama, an improbable or artificial device to unravel a plot: here, to resolve a situation
8 A month-long Muslim festival signifying the end of the fasting season of Ramadan.
9 In the second half of January heavy rains had caused widespread and serious flooding in Jakarta and other parts of Java and the Indonesian Government had had to allocate funds, of which they were severely short, for relief measures.