Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1965
474. Secret
Tunku called me to an urgent meeting this morning (February 23). Others present were Razak, Ismail, Tan Siew Sin, Ghazali and the British, New Zealand and Canadian High Commissioners. Canadian did not speak during the meeting.1
2. Tunku said he had very good news and gave us copies of a message from Thanat passing on a suggestion from Subandrio for a Ministerial meeting between Malaysia and Indonesia in Bangkok during the first week of March. The text, which should be protected from the Thais, is in my immediately following telegram.2
3. Tunku believed the Indonesians were genuine and he was proposing to send Razak. It would be impossible to keep the meeting secret and the Malaysians would propose a simultaneous announcement on the eve of Razak’s departure from Kuala Lumpur.
4. Asked for our opinions, the Commonwealth High Commissioners agreed that advantage should be taken of the proposal. I suggested that some thought might also be given to what the Indonesians were likely to want at the meeting.
5. Tunku thought some face-saving for the Indonesians would be needed and indicated that he was considering the idea of a vague future plebiscite that would probably never be held. In the absence of any comments, I felt it necessary to hint that it would be premature for Malaysia to drop her guard and to suggest that the acceptance of the principle of another ascertainment, not least one for the future, could involve serious risks. Ministers and Ghazali then spoke up and all agreed with me. Ismail and Ghazali were the most emphatic and argued that acceptance of the principle of a plebiscite could jeopardise Malaysia’s standing in the United Nations. Head wondered whether some formula such as a ‘reaffirmation of Malaysia’ could be included in the next elections. Ismail strongly rejected this suggestion and he was supported by the Tunku who thought that the political situation in the Borneo states was too difficult to permit this complication.
6. The consensus was that at Bangkok Malaysia should not agree to anything that could impair her sovereignty and that the best prospect of face-saving was in an Afro-Asian commission which could if necessary visit the Borneo territories and make an independent pronouncement. It was recognised that because such a commission could make awkward proposals, Malaysia would need to make it clear from the outset that her territorial integrity and sovereignty had to be respected. It was agreed that the terms of reference for the commission should be directed to making it possible for Indonesia to recognise Malaysia and towards promoting conciliation between the two sovereign states.
7. I was disturbed by the Tunku’s optimism and what I fear could be a readiness to make risky and unnecessary concessions to Indonesia. Ghazali introduced a note of realism by suggesting that the proposal was probably a Subandrio tactic to make it possible for Indonesia to accept without walking out Malaysia’s attendance at an Afro-Asian Conference. On the other hand it is just possible that the Indonesians may have hopes of bolstering their case for keeping the Malaysians out. There were also suggestions around the table that Sukarno might want a period of quiet for his impending visit to Vienna for medical treatment.
8. Whatever Subandrio’s motive, I believe the move reflects Malaysia’s growing strength including an improving position with the Afro-Asians. It is interesting that the proposal follows Sastroamidjojo’s and Supeni’s3 African tours and his own visits to Tokyo, Karachi, and Bangkok.4 1 have a hunch that Subandrio may feel better qualified to cope personally with a holding operation with Malaysia rather than risk Japanese, Pakistani or other third party efforts that could get out of control.
[NAA: A2908, M120 part 4]
1 Charles McGaughey.
2 Subandrio nominated that he would attend if Razak did, otherwise another Indonesian minister would head a small delegation which would include a few members of the armed forces. The meeting was to be convened by Thanat and be private. At Thanat’s request, the Indonesians had also agreed to implement a two or three week truce starting around 23 or 25 February.
3 Ali Sastroamidjojo, Deputy Chairman of the MPRS (Indonesia’s Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly), and Mrs Supeni, Deputy Foreign Minister. In the months leading up to the Algerian Afro-Asian Conference, now expected to be held in June, Indonesia intensified its diplomatic efforts to have Malaysia excluded from the group (see footnote 8, Document 242). On 8 February, the Algerian summit conference had again been postponed until 29 June, with the foreign ministers’ meeting to begin on 25 June.
4 Between 11–20 February, Subandrio had visited Tokyo, Phnom Penh, Karachi, and Bangkok