Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 1965
581. Secret Priority
Talks in Bangkok
Your 373.1
All Malaysians I have talked to, including the Tunku would agree with the analysis in your paragraph 2. The Tunku believes that confrontation is being pushed by the Communists and is working to their advantage but he appreciates that even if the Army cracked down on the PKI they might well find it in their interests to continue hostilities against Malaysia.
2. Tunku would explain his willingness to talk in terms of international opinion and especially Afro-Asian opinion. At the same time, I believe that as a secondary consideration, he has in mind the possibility of making things easier for the Army and the Chaerul Saleh–Adam Malik group. In this he may have been influenced by views such as those expressed by Forrestal (my 408).2
3. I have been talking so much to the Tunku and others about risks of ascertainment and an Afro-Asian Commission that I cannot say much more on the subject without causing irritation. I am assured by all that Malaysia will not accept ascertainment and that this is a firm policy. But the Malaysians are disinclined to take the initiative by insisting that ascertainment be excluded. Their view is rather that they will only agree to an Afro-Asian Commission if all members accept in advance Malaysia’s sovereignty. They believe that this in itself rules out an ascertainment. They will also want terms of reference directed to ‘finding ways and means of normalising’ relations. Tunku referred to this phrase as having been ‘agreed in Tokyo’ but I find that it was only agreed to by the Malaysians and put forward by them. In Tokyo, no detailed consideration was given and no decision taken on the terms of reference of the Commission because the Indonesians would not accept the prior obligation to end hostilities.
4. Tunku’s reply to Subandrio as conveyed by Thanat is probably only precise about the four points in paragraph 6 of my 554.3 Tunku believes that Thanat has let the Indonesians know that an ascertainment is not acceptable but I would not expect Sukarno to make this an issue in advance.
5. I agree that there is no evidence to justify optimism and that the Malaysians are likely t of find themselves in a difficult situation. I have expounded these views at length. Further efforts to dissuade the Tunku from going to Bangkok or to dissuade Malaysia from accepting an Afro-Asian Commission would not be welcomed. Our efforts could, however, be directed to making the Afro-Asian Commission as safe as possible by encouraging the Malaysians—
(a) to insist on an end to hostilities before there is any detailed consideration of a Commission;
(b) to insist that all members of the Commission recognise Malaysia;
(c) to make clear to the members of the Commission in advance that there can be no question of any ascertainment;
(d) to insist on terms of reference that will restrict the Commission to seeking ways and means of normalising relations between two independent and sovereign countries. Some thought could also be given to drafting a preamble to any terms of reference that would make appropriate use of ‘Bandung’ language4 advantageous to Malaysia.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 24]
1 Document 258.
2 17 February, reporting Critchley’s talks with Forrestal who was visiting Kuala Lumpur after a visit to Jakarta. In Forrestal’s view, Indonesia’s attitude to Malaysia would continue but be believed that Sukarno, the Army and the Saleh-Malik group (see Document 227) ‘would welcome some respite to enable them to draw back from military conflict while continuing confrontation by subversion’. Forrestal was also concerned about the advantage that the PKI was taking of confrontation.
3 Document 256.
4 See footnote 3, Document 47.