Canberra, 8 March 1965
401. Secret
Talks in Bangkok
Reference your telegram No. 581.1
I am uncertain whether there is clear thinking behind the Malaysian argument that if all members of an Afro-Asian Commission accept in advance Malaysia’s sovereignty, then this in itself rules out an ascertainment. This line of argument only has strength if it is also accepted that sovereign independence gives to Malaysia the sole power to make, in accordance with her own constitutional structure of Malaysia, the relationships between its component parts or its territorial boundaries. Does the Tunku see this and will he insist on it? Similarly, I think your point (b) in para 5 has to be spelled out to refer clearly to Malaysia as at present constituted and to embrace not only the visible geographical and political fact of Malaysia but the principles of sovereign independence and territorial integrity.
2. I note from London telegram No. 1695 that the British see the same risks as we do. However, the British instructions seem to stop short of positive advice to the Tunku not to accept reascertainment.2 In these circumstances our role must continue to be to urge on the Malaysians great caution concerning the terms on which they would agree to the establishment of a Commission. If the Malaysian policy is firm about not accepting reascertainment, as we hope it is, it seems to us that they should allow no ambiguity on this point.
3. Subject to the foregoing I agree with the points in your para 5 .1 appreciate the risk that pressure may cause irritation and leave to your judgement how and when you continue to exert our influence most helpfully.
[NAA: A2908, M120 part 4]
1 Document 259.
2 5 March. It provided further information on Lord Head’s instructions (see footnote 1, Document 251). Regarding the Afro-Commission, Head was to point out to the Tunku the likelihood that the commission would favour reascertainment in the Borneo states. The decision was to be left to the Tunku but should he decide to risk reascertainment, he would have to consider whether to conduct the process quickly or whether to look to delay it as the Indonesians had negotiated in West Irian (see footnote 4, Document 34, and footnote 2, Document 61).