Canberra, 9 March 1965
Secret
Relations between the Federal and Singapore Governments
The present relations between the Federal Government and the Singapore Government in Malaysia are causing us a great deal of concern. There is no real working relationship between the two Governments. The two strongest political forces are U.M.N.O. and P.A.P., but there is no working relationship between them and, on the contrary, there is a state of considerable tension at present. Relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore have been strained since the People’s Action Party entered the Malayan elections in May last year (winning only one of the nine seats it contested); they were further strained after the race riots in Singapore in July and September last.1
In recent months things have become worse, with [more] and more public criticism of each other coming from leaders of both sides. Things have been so strained that the Tunku and Lee (the former making the first suggestion) have been considering some serious alteration to Singapore’s position in the Federation. The suggestions were made in very general and imprecise terms. Briefly they were: Singapore should have virtually full powers of self-government, except in defence and external affairs. There would be a renegotiation of the agreement on financial arrangements made when Singapore joined Malaysia to give Singapore more financial autonomy. The P.A.P. would refrain from political activity in Malaya. Suggestions for the important question of internal security in Singapore were inconclusive; at first the Tunku thought it should be left entirely to the Singapore Government, but the Minister for Home Affairs thought this dangerous and suggested that there be some division of powers between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore for internal security. Present indications are that the Federal Government is unlikely to delegate any authority to Singapore for the maintenance of internal security.
Current preoccupation with the Indonesian proposals for talks in Bangkok has diverted immediate attention from this question. The Tunku now says there is no prospect of ‘disengagement’ (as it is being called) being proceeded with. Unfortunately his personal relations with Lee are now bad and he says he is refusing to talk to Lee.
For your convenient reference, the following is a summary of the instructions which you sent to Critchley:
We would expect the Malaysian leaders in both Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to be extremely cautious about precipitating serious constitutional issues, with all the political complications that they involve, at the present time, of national danger. The prospective improvement must be substantial or the present difficulties intolerable before such a course would be justified.
The Tunku shows no evident concern about the possible repercussions in Sabah and Sarawak. We must reckon on possible adverse effects in Sabah and Sarawak where there is a good deal of political friction and rivalry which could be further aggravated.
A genuine multi-racial Malaysia should remain the goal subject to the necessary safeguards and balances required in such a complex grouping. Singapore should be involved as much as practicable in the common political and constitutional framework of Malaysia in order that it be firmly anchored. A major ‘disengagement’ could lead to a self-governing island state in what amounts to a treaty relationship with the rest of Malaysia for economic, defence and external affairs purposes. The danger is that under a radical or chauvinistic government the federal powers could be frustrated and the problems we have always associated with an independent Chinese state in Singapore could re-emerge.
The retention of federal power for internal security is of key importance. The need to deter unconstitutional challenges to the Singapore Government; to ensure that the defence base establishments can be worked in times of crisis; and the need to retain foreign economic confidence all make it essential for the Central Government to maintain its strong powers for internal security.
We do not want to leave the impression that we believe that the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Governments must accommodate themselves to the existing constitutional framework for an indefinite period. We fully appreciate the need for a process of adjustment. Our concerns are that Malaysia should be preserved; that inadvertently a process of disintegration should not be started; and that Indonesia should not be encouraged that ‘confrontation’ is working.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 21]
1 See Documents 193 and 194. A second wave of rioting had begun on 2 September resulting in 13 killed, 102 injured and 240 arrested by the time the imposed curfew was lifted on 9 September.