Singapore, 20 April 1965
Secret
I write to thank you for the rare opportunity you afforded me of putting across the problems now bedevilling Malaysia to your Cabinet colleagues.1
I have waited for a fortnight after returning before composing my thoughts in writing, as you so kindly requested. I am convinced that if a solution is not found by the time the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meet in London in June, things may drift dangerously beyond redemption.
May I summarise the problem of making our multi-racial society a success.
1.
The basic problem
The basic problem is to create a Malaysian Government which can take the place of the former colonial government, and keep the peace between the different racial, linguistic and cultural groups that have settled in Malaysia during the period of British rule. The British maintained peace and order by superior authority in an age when the indigenous peoples were reconciled to being ‘protected’, and the migrants, mostly Chinese and Indians, were satisfied with making money to send back to their homeland.
A Malaysian Government has to derive its support from the loyalty, or at least the consent, of a majority of the people of the main communities, the Malays, Chinese and Indians. It must also be supported by a majority of the people in each of the four component units of Malaysia—the old Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.
This is the only enduring solution, the creation of a Malaysian leadership which cuts across the division lines of race, language, culture and religion.
2.
The immediate danger
We knew that the first Government of Malaysia would in fact be the government of the old Malaya, at best enlarged to make it more representative of the three new units, i.e. Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. It was not possible to hope that there could immediately be a government which would be able to command majority support in each of the main racial groups. The Malay leadership represented by the Tunku was not ready emotionally or politically to make this major adjustment.
Unfortunately, a year after Malaysia, it became obvious that the Tunku and his colleagues were either unable or unwilling to create a government more representative of the new Federation. A token representation was made for Sarawak, and later for Sabah, with two new appointments, one a Minister for Sarawak Affairs and another for Sabah Affairs, both having no portfolios, and unable to influence pan-Malaysian policy. There has been no move to have even a facade of Singapore representation in Federal matters. This is not for want of trying either on the part of Singapore, or persuasion on the part of Britain, Australia or New Zealand. Unfortunately the more this was urged on the Tunku the greater became the antipathy from his colleagues.
After my party’s participation in the general elections in Malaya in April 1964, the chances of this ever happening were diminished. But worse, now all the latent conflicts of Malaysia are quickly coming to the fore. Faced with the challenge of a radical multi-racial party and uncertain of their strength in the enlarged Federation, some of the Tunku’s communal-minded lieutenants have tried to force the three new states into the Malayan mould to make them become like one of the states in old Malaya. There they believed, quite falsely, that the non-Malays had already been coerced or cajoled into accepting Malay supremacy. They used stock techniques to rally Malays together, the call of one race, one language, one culture and one religion. This has triggered off a reaction which is very different from what they had been accustomed to in the old Malaya. Instead of being cowed the non-Malays who constituted the majority of the three new states have been angered and have rallied against them. The ultra-Malays are bewildered to such an extent that in January 1965, 16 months after Malaysia’s formation the Tunku proposed that Singapore should ‘hive-off’. He meant by this that Singapore should become a completely self-governing state with no representation in the Malaysian Parliament, but with defence vested in the Malaysian Government.2
3.
What would happen if immediate danger is not headed off?
If we go on as at present then it is most likely that there will be more race conflicts leading ultimately to disintegration.
If the present struggle goes on—on their part to assert Malay dominance, on our part to resist this and insist on a multi-racial Malaysian nation—then race riots will recur, probably in Singapore. And if not the next one, then the one after that, will spread to Malaya, leading to a bitter and ugly situation. After such an experience it may never be possible to bring the Malays and Chinese together again.
4.
How this danger can be avoided?
To avoid this danger, we must find a formula which will shelve both this assertion at a Malay nation and our counter insistence on a Malaysian nation. If my party were to opt out of the competition for power at the centre and so not pose this challenge of making Malaysia a Malaysian not a Malay nation, the Tunku and his colleagues may regain their confidence and composure and check the excesses of their party lieutenants. He is not doing this now partly because of confrontation. The Indonesian leaders are making an appeal, over his head to his own Malay followers, to be more Malay. Not being a Malay orator like Sukarno he is on the defensive, particularly because he also realises that there is some truth in what his ultra-Malay lieutenants have said that by Malaysia he has in fact weakened the prospects of a Malay nation by making the Malays a permanent minority.
We can remove part of his problems by an interim political truce. My colleagues and my party can agree not to participate in the next general elections outside Singapore. The Tunku, his colleagues and his party in turn should not participate in elections in Singapore.
This will mean giving up our capacity to bring influence to bear on Federal policies through mobilising opinion throughout Malaysia. So it becomes necessary to have constitutional adjustments to ensure that Singapore is not made to suffer as a result. This can be secured by delegating all Federal powers other than Defence and External Affairs to the Singapore Government.
In particular, we must be sure that the economic growth and internal security of Singapore must be secured. First there should be firm arrangements for the development and integration of the economy through the common market. The Tariff Advisory Board at present is only advisory. The Malaysian Minister of Finance can always reject the recommendations of the Board, however sound they may be. This will have to be amended to make its recommendations mandatory.
Second, Singapore should not be held to communal blackmail by more race riots. The Singapore Government must have the right to initiate action, to order the Police to take action against communal and other subversive elements. The ultimate power to override any decisions of the Singapore Government can still be vested in the Central Government.
This is an interim solution. It does not solve any of the basic problems of Malaysia. But it will reduce the danger of collision, race conflicts and disintegration.
From discussions with British, Australian and New Zealand representatives, I find the point at variance between us is whether this constitutional adjustment will hold the situation and ultimately lead to a more favourable climate in which the long-term problems can again be tackled, or whether it will lead to a drifting apart of the Federation and ultimately to dissolution. The Commonwealth representatives fear that similar demands will be made by Sabah and Sarawak tending to break up the Federation. This can be avoided if at the same time the Tunku were to arrive at some understanding with Sabah and Sarawak State Governments to leave them for the time being to sort out their problems of leadership amongst themselves, and not complicate them by trying to assert Malay dominance through backing Malay elements in these two territories.
5.
Ideal long-term solution
The ideal long-term solution is a multi-racial Malaysian nation. Whilst the different communities may not be fused racially, they can and will become more integrated, socially and economically. This admixture of Malays, Chinese, Indians, Dyaks, Ceylonese, Eurasians and others will create the basis for an enduring separateness from either Indonesia, China, India or any of the other powers of Asia.
My colleagues and I were able to see that a separate Singapore would lead to a Chinese Singapore making it vulnerable to Chinese influence from China. Hence we wanted merger and Malaysia. Unfortunately, the Tunku and his colleagues are unable to see that a Malay Malaysia will always be vulnerable to manipulation and pressures from Indonesia, which is the biggest Malay power in this region. Against them 4� million Malays in Malaysia will never be able to put up a separate identity.
We have enough common ground in our fight against our common enemies, namely Indonesian expansionism and Chinese Communist subversion. After the next elections, a coalition government between the Tunku’s party and my party may be possible. At present the Tunku is not able to get his colleagues to accept a coalition.
He has long-term social and economic problems which cannot be resolved just by suppressing the manifestations of social and economic discontent. It is not unlikely that once confidence is re-established by our not competing for political supremacy in Malaysia, that he or his successors would welcome our co-operation in dealing with the social and economic problems which he faces. When that moment arrives, then we are on the way towards integrating the three new territories into Malaysia and also moving forward towards an integrated multi-racial nation.
It would take one or probably two generations before a stable and viable amalgam can be achieved. But it is the only way to rationalise this problem which a hundred years of British rule has bequeathed us, a hundred years in which migrants had arrived in numbers to equal, and then to exceed the indigenous peoples of these four territories.
The Tunku is very much in the doldrums at present. He is confused. Instinctively, he wants this disengagement and to be rid of the problems of Singapore, thinking thereby that he could go back to the happy old days of Malaya. On the other hand, he has been frightened by representations made to him from the three Commonwealth governments that this would mean the end of everything. He does not know where to go. If you decide between now and June on what is the right course of action, then the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London is the time where you can crystallise for the Tunku what is his right step forward.
There is probably no person who can play the role of friend and counsellor to him better than you. I know you command his respect and, even more important, his confidence.
It would be best if the ground could be prepared even before the Conference through one of your senior Ministers.
I have tried to reduce a complex situation into a brief and simple summary without, I hope, distorting the picture.
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6328]
1 See footnote 1, Document 263.
2 See Document 244.