Canberra, 17 May 1965
529. Secret
Please pass to Mr Hasluck on arrival.1
From the Prime Minister.
Jockel2 is carrying with him a copy of a recent letter to me from Lee Kuan Yew.3 I am sending reply by air tomorrow. I emphasise that the correspondence was at my suggestion and on the understanding that it was personal and confidential between us. Therefore, the letters must not be used except for your own private background.
2. What I would like to do immediately in relation to the letter is to give you a series of observations which, if you endorse them, you might put to the Tunku and if appropriate to Lee.
(a) Lee argued the case for Malaysia very effectively in Australia and generally avoided provocative or embarrassing statements.
(b) We were impressed by his resolute attitude towards Indonesian confrontation.
(c) He made a considerable point of the need for an effectively multi-racial Malaysia—a point which we felt had substance.
(d) He expressed the view that a communal approach was no longer the answer to the problems Malaysia had t of ace and would tend to throw the Chinese into opposition with the Malays which he would regard as an extremely dangerous state of affairs threatening national strength.
(e) In our experience of federation, we find it unusual that an important State should be unrepresented at a senior level in the federal government—there may be very good reasons for this, but we are extremely apprehensive of the dangers that would result if Lee personally is kept at a distance or pushed into a position of open hostility. Without Singapore it is hard not to believe that Malaysia would disintegrate.
3. We are seriously concerned at what has happened in Kuala Lumpur-Singapore relations since Lee returned to Singapore. We do not know whether Lee’s attempts to form a united opposition group from among non-Alliance parties represented in the Central Parliament4 means that Lee has abandoned ‘disengagement’ or whether it is designed as a means of exerting pressure on Kuala Lumpur to agree to a ‘disengagement’ solution on this (his) terms. While Malaysian suspicions regarding Lee’s intentions are understandable, our concern is that a reasonable relationship be established between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, if Malaysia’s survival is not to be endangered.
4. It seems to us here that Lee’s attacks upon the present Malaysian leadership are tending to bring about a closing of the ranks against him in Kuala Lumpur, a refusal to deal with him and a paralysis in working relations between the two Administrations. While the risk at present that the extremist elements in UMNO could get their way of taking direct action against Lee under internal security powers seems slight, it would be unfortunate for the future if a break were to develop between Lee and large sections of the Malays. Some of the attacks made upon Lee by Malay Ministers and others, including demands for his resignation and hints of active measures against him,5 are the sort of thing that would destroy the possibility of good relations. Both the Tunku and Lee need to avoid these dangerous trends developing further.
5. These seem to me to be the considerations to bear in mind in your talks with the Tunku and Lee but if you find yourself out of step with any of the above, you should feel free to exercise your own judgment about what you put to the Tunku and Lee. Nobody knows better than you that the Tunku can be explosive and has to be handled with some care. The advocacy therefore, needs to be of a delicate character. You could of course make it clear that nothing associated with Lee’s visit has weakened our respect and admiration for the Tunku himself or our belief in his courageous leadership.
6. Lee’s message refers to the possibility of discussions in London.6 I would think there would be much merit in having him available over there and brought into talks with, say, Wilson, the Tunku and me. I want to turn this over in my mind a bit further but it may be that I will sound out Wilson or Bottomley in that sense. I mention this only for your own background at this stage and I would be glad of your advice when you return on the best way of bringing such talks about if that is what we favour.
[NAA: A 1209, 1965/6328]
1 Hasluck was to stopover in Singapore on 18 May, before visiting Kuala Lumpur, 19–21 May, and returning to Singapore for talks on 22 May.
2 Jockel was to accompany Hasluck during these visits.
3 Document 266.
4 Throughout the early months of 1965,the increasingly proMalay view in the UMNO-dominated Federal Parliament resulted in the formation of the Malaysian Solidarity Convention—first announced by PAP Chairman, Toh Chin Chye, on 27 April. The Convention was a loose grouping of likeminded opposition parties ‘who subscribed to the ideals of a truly Malaysian Malaysia’—a platform that implied a strong attack on the Malay leadership. Included in the grouping were the PAP, the SUPP, the United Democratic Party (UDP), the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), and the Sarawak Machinda Party.
5 The possibility of Lee’s arrest and detention had been widely mooted during the previous weeks. There had been resolutions from UMNO branches calling for his imprisonment and the possibility of this had been discussed at the party’s 18th general assembly on 15 May.
6 That is, during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, 17–25 June.