Canberra, 7 February 1963
No. 6/1963. Top Secret
Retention of Australian Forces in Malaya
Conclusions
23. It is concluded that—
(a) The Malayan/Singapore bases make possible the continued deployment of substantial Commonwealth forces in support of the overall Allied military position in South-East Asia.
(b) The deployment of our forces to these bases enables Australia to maintain a forward military posture in the area in support of our Treaty obligations and makes possible the deployment of our initial force contributions to SEATO operations within the critical timings known to be necessary.
(c) The immediate prospects for continued effective use of bases in Malaya/ Singapore may improve under the terms of the proposed Malaysian defence agreement. Internal pressures against the new agreement could develop, in due course, however, and the use of the bases could in practice be severely restricted.
(d) The full implications of recent developments regarding Indonesia and New Guinea,2 the Brunei situation and the proposed formation of the Malaysian Federation, are not yet clear. It is clear however that if Indonesian hostility to Malaya and the Malaysian concept continues, and Australian forces continue to be stationed in Malaya, the possibility exists of a clash between Australian forces and those of Indonesia.
(e) In present strategic circumstances, the political and military value of maintaining the Strategic Reserve in Malaya are such that it should continue to be maintained there, the matter to be kept under constant review in the light of developments.
[NAA: A1209, 1960/1032]
1 In addition to the Secretary, DD, and the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee included the Secretaries (or their representatives) of DEA, Prime Minister’s Department (PMD), and the Treasury.
2 Although the UN currently administered West New Guinea, under the Bunker agreement of August 1962, Indonesia was to administer the territory from 1 May 1963, and Indonesian intentions towards East New Guinea were unknown.