Canberra, c. 28 May 1965
Secret
Notes on Visit to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
Accompanying the Minister, I was in Kuala Lumpur from Wednesday, 19th May t of riday, 21st May, and in Singapore on Saturday, 22nd May.
2. In Kuala Lumpur the Minister had a private talk with the Tunku, and he had talks in which I took part with Tan Siew Sin, Ismail, Razak, and met socially and talked with other Ministers like Senu, Khir Johari,1 Lim Swee Aun2 and others. In Singapore we had a conversation with Lee Kuan Yew followed by a lunch with members of his Government.
3. The Tunku privately told the Minister that there was no question of any consideration of suggestions like ‘disengagement’ so long as confrontation continued. There was no need for any outside country to promote talks between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. He was confident about the situation, there was nothing to worry about. Lee Kuan Yew was a lawyer who knew the constitution and could judge how far he could go in his activities.
4. Malaysian Ministers generally shared the view that the present trouble was due to ‘one man’, Lee Kuan Yew, who, in Razak’s words, ‘wanted to be the next Prime Minister of Malaysia’. Malaysian Ministers based their hostility to Lee on the dangerous course he was following in inflaming communal opinion. They said they had no objection to Lee competing for political power as this was the birthright of everybody in a democracy. But it had always been understood that no party should make its appeal on racial lines. Even the opposition Socialist Front was organised on the basis of an alliance between a left-wing Chinese party and a left-wing Malay party. This was the only practical way for the foreseeable future that Malaysian politics could work. There was no possibility of single inter-racial parties competing upon a basis of political and economic programmes. Lee’s appeal was based on race and not, as he claimed, upon an economic, social and political programme appealing to all races. Lee’s so-called multi-racial objective was a disguised appeal to Chinese chauvinism.
5. Tan Siew Sin said that Lee Kuan Yew could not succeed without bloodshed, and even then he could not succeed. When that time came, Lee Kuan Yew would be in London or somewhere else out of the country. Tan Siew Sin said that Lee Kuan Yew did not understand the Malay. Nor did he really understand the Chinese. Lee did not understand the shrewd, self-interest of the Chinese-speaking Chinese. The latter appreciated the realities of the communal situation. Lee and his group in Singapore represented a small, London-trained element who relied for their power and their influence on the machinery of the Singapore Government rather than upon a substantial Chinese following. Lee’s vote was drawn from the moderate elements of the community which had previously voted for Lim Yew Hock. In rebutting a suggestion that Lee had to concern himself with the problem of the highly politically-motivated and radical youthful Chinese element in Singapore, Tan Siew Sin said that Lee did not get their vote anyway-it went to the Barisan Socialist Party.3 In subsequent conversation, Tan Siew Sin said Lee would find himself competing with the Socialist Front in Malayan electorates. The Socialist Front, which was communist penetrated, considered Lee an enemy. (Note: Under the Malayan electorate system, voting is on the principle of first past the post. Thus there could be three candidates of Chinese origin in any particular electorate, representing the M.C.A., the Socialist Front, and the P.A.P., apart from representatives of minor parties.)
6. In the discussions, Malaysian Ministers offered no clear answer to the current problem whereby the 1.7 million Malaysians in Singapore had no official participation in the processes of decision-making in the Central Government. This was recognised as a weakness by Dr. Ismail. He said that one had to go back to the original bargain (which, he claimed, Lee Kuan Yew had breached by entering candidates in Malayan electorates)4 concerning the terms and conditions of Singapore’s entry into Malaysia. That had been a quickly contrived arrangement but there was no hope in present circumstances of altering it. It was necessary to make the best of it and to live with it. Subsequently, Tan Siew Sin himself, after discussing the difficulties of the financial relationship between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, mentioned privately that the present arrangement for Singapore did not make sense in the long run and that eventually there should be complete merger or secession (this, however, seemed to be just a personal view in the back of his mind). In general, one had the feeling that the present mood of Malaysian Ministers was that nothing would be done which might strengthen Lee’s hand and that Lee could not be trusted to keep to any agreement.
7. Malaysian Ministers made two main points about the Malays. On the one hand, they stressed the danger of Lee inflaming Malay opinion to the point of a feeling of a struggle for survival at which point the Malay reaction could be very dangerous. On the other hand they stressed the loyalty of the Malay to the leadership and claimed that, as at the just concluded U.M.N.O. Conference, the Malays would come to Kuala Lumpur, air their grievances, and be satisfied to leave the problems with the Tunku as their leader. In so stating the position, they no doubt sought to leave on us the twofold impression that, if forced into an extreme position, the Malay would react dangerously and violently but that, otherwise, the Malay was prepared to trust the present moderate leadership in its continuing task of making progress towards a true multi-racial society. There was also some mention that pressure from Lee could cause the Malays to look to Indonesia. It was not possible for me to discern how serious were the conflicts within U.M.N.O. e.g., between those wanting to maintain the hold of the moderate, English-educated elements and those asserting traditionalist Malay values; or the conflict between those who were out to have Lee arrested and those who were opposing it.5
8. In Singapore, Lee did not have much to say that was new. He said that he was not concerned about the pace of progress to what he called a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ but he had to be sure that Malaysia was going in the right direction. He castigated the Tunku for saying that the Chinese should stick to business and leave the running of the country to him. That could never be accepted. His concern was not with the pace of progress towards ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. That could be slow but it had to be in the right direction. But a reactionary trend within U.M.N.O. was gathering pace to ensure the domination of the Malay within Malaysia. The extremists would sooner or later try and arrest the process of constitutional evolution. He had to stand up to this and show that the Chinese would be intimidated by threats of direct action against himself or threats of Malay violence. He did not have many ‘levers of influence’ but he had to be prepared to use what power he held. In answer to a question, he said that after the Tunku was gone, he would prefer best of all to work with Ismail, then with Razak, and then Senu and Khir Johari (I was not sure whether these were placed in descending order of favouritism or whether the latter two were regarded as dangerous men). He said he had been encouraged by two factors which had emerged in recent days, one was the Tunku’s wish to have an atmosphere of calm and avoid a crisis, and the other was Ismail’s declaration that there should be no interference with the constitutional play of politics by resorting to arrest. He believed that if he were not interfered with (e.g. by changes in the constitution, resort to emergency powers, or action to detain him under the internal security regulations) he could organise his political strength in Malaysia in 18 months. He could eat heavily into the Socialist Front and he planned to attract vigorous, modem-minded young Malays through scholarships tenable in Singapore. He said that he did not necessarily want to proceed in this way. A sound, firm arrangement for a common market would be sufficiently important for him to give a guarantee that he would not challenge the Alliance at the 1969 elections. That would ease the political tensions. When questioned about this, he quickly added he would need control of the police as well.
9. The view is held by some British representatives in Malaysia that (contrary to what he told Bottomley)6 Lee’s aim is to force an early crisis. The theory is that Lee wishes to bring about a situation, through pressure, whereby he can reopen the whole question of disengagement. In my view, while Lee is always ready to make tactical readjustments,including a modified form of disengagement or ‘truce’ mentioned in the final sentences of the previous paragraph, his present disposition seems to be to assert and exercise his constitutional rights and to engage in open political competition within Malaysia. Here, too, he greatly values British, Australian and New Zealand goodwill and understanding. Our usefulness to him at the present time is that, as he sees it, we exercise a moderating influence in Kuala Lumpur and we help, one might say, to keep the constitutional ring open for him. Our role, accordingly, is a delicate one. We need to keep in touch with him in a positive way while being careful that our attitude does not breed over-confidence in his own mind.
10. The present financial relationship between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore was briefly discussed. Tan Siew Sin said it was inequitable. Malaysian development was suffering because of the strain on the budget. On the other hand, Singapore had a surplus after ‘splashing money about’ on industrial projects and paying higher social welfare benefits. Singapore could not be allowed to become an oasis of prosperity in a Malaysian desert. The equitable distribution of revenue would have to be determined by the adjudication of the World Bank.
11. The distribution of internal security powers was briefly discussed. The Malaysians tended to say that Singapore had an adequate participation through the State Executive Security Committee.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 22]
1 Malaysian Minister of Education.
2 Malaysian Minister of Commerce and Industry.
3 See footnote 2, Document 9.
4 See footnote 5, Document 169.
5 See footnote 5, Document 268.
6 See paragraph 2, Document 267.