Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 1965
1301. Secret Priority
Lee’s Views on the Political Situation.
In our talk yesterday June 4th Lee continued to pursue the line in paragraph 4 of my telegram 1296.1 He singled Ismail out for special praise and said that he hoped to be able to keep a line open to him so that he could maintain communication with the Central Government. If Ismail were thrust aside he would regard it as a very serious sign. Lee added that he could almost accept most of what Razak had said but he took serious exception of Razak describing a Malaysian Malaysia as an ‘insidious concept’ (what Razak was implying was that Lee was using the concept insidiously but Lee refuses to accept this).2 Lim Swee Aun had also impressed Lee as a reasonable man.
2. Lee regretted that the Tunku had not spoken in the debate. If the Tunku had agreed to tell Parliament he did not intend to proceed with the Bill to amend the Constitution and withdraw right of appeal to the Privy Council,3 he (Lee) would have withdrawn his amendment, but the Tunku had refused. (The Tunku had told me privately that he was not prepared to speak in the debate because it would only give Lee an importance he did not deserve. The Malaysians intend to support a proposal for a Commonwealth Court of Appeal at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. If this proposal is not accepted at the Conference the Government will go ahead with the proposed amendment to the Constitution.)
3. We spoke at some length on the importance of allowing political dust to settle and proceeding with the development of the common market. I suggested that while the growing class of educated non-Malays needed to be given a future and political representation this could not be done simply at the expense of the Malays without racial disturbances and perhaps civil war. I thought that the present conflict between the Alliance and the PA.P. was in the interests of neither and that the P.A.P. could not afford to win the next elections. Lee did not contest these points and said there should be a period of quiet on both sides and that his objectives were long-term.
4. Lee asked whether I thought he should see the Tunku. I said that at some stage he would have to but now was not the time. Lee agreed and after reflection said that as he would have to see the British Prime Minister at some time, it might be a good idea if he were to go to London and see the Tunku there after the Prime Ministers’ Meeting and the Afro-Asian Conference.4 I made no comment on this although I do not think that the Tunku while he is worrying about his eye operations will be in any mood to talk seriously with Lee.5
5. Lee claimed that the Malays were responsible for keeping up the political temperature and blamed in particular ‘Utusan Melayu’. The communal attacks in the paper would have to stop if there were to be any relaxation of pressures. I pointed out both sides were involved and that the campaign of public rallies by the Malaysian Solidarity Convention beginning in Singapore on Sunday would hardly improve the atmosphere. Lee accepted this. While not denying his share of responsibility he claimed that he was under pressure especially from P.A.P. leaders with family ties in the peninsula, such as Toh Chin Chye and Rajaratnam.
6. After some discussion about the Malaysian Solidarity Convention rally on Sunday,6 Lee said he would try to use it to project a new line of thought. He would try to direct thinking away from the present by emphasizing that the objectives of the Convention could not be achieved quickly but would have to be worked for quietly and patiently over a long period of say ten or fifteen years. I encouraged this.
7. I asked Lee how he proposed to avoid his Solidarity Convention presenting a Chinese image, particularly in view of the parties that were associated with it. He argued unconvincingly that he could gradually give people like Seenavasigam7 a feeling of confidence and by leading them away from their feeling of isolation slowly convert them to ‘our way of thinking’.
8. Lee went on to suggest that what was needed was an understanding by the Alliance that while his party might have to adopt political postures that the Alliance would not like it could also be counted on not to push matters too far or fast on critical issues. I tried, unsuccessfully, to explain that the Malaysians were not sophisticated enough for this type of politics and that political postures would be taken seriously. Lee contended, however, that the Alliance would settle down and would have to get used to the new situation that Malaysia had created.
9. Lee thought it was up to the Tunku to restore confidence in Malaysia by making appropriate public statements. I argued that Malaysia needed co-operation between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and that this involved a major effort and changed attitudes on both sides.
10. As usual Lee showed great concern about the Tunku’s health. He complained that the Tunku was not following medical advice strictly enough and that the doctors were too easy with him. Lee pointed out that he had an important vested interest in the Tunku’s health as it would be difficult to predict what would happen if he left the scene. He thought he could get along with Ismail and more doubtfully Razak but he was worried about the influence of Khir Johari and Senu.
11. As usual Lee was plausible and reasonable in his presentation. He gave me no real reason, however, to expect that the situation will improve and I fear that both parties may soon find themselves boxed in by a general hardening of Chinese and Malay feeling.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 22]
1 Document 271.
2 Lee’s arguments in the debate following the King’s speech had referred repeatedly to ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ and its applicability to the constitution. On the third day of the debate (31 May), Lee’s amendment to the speech that sought an assurance for the nation that Malaysia would continue to progress in accordance with the democratic constitution towards a Malaysian Malaysia was defeated. Ismail had contended in his speech that there were two stages to integration—inter-racial harmony and ultimately non-communalism. This statement was seen as an assurance of the Central Government’s long-term objective of a multi-racial democratic nation and was accepted as such by Lee.
3 D.R. Seenivasagam, PPP MP from Perak, also spoke against the proposals to abolish appeals to the Privy Council. Outside the Parliament, the Malaysian legal profession were ‘perturbed’ by the government’s proposals, with the Bar Associations of most states making an immediate appeal to the government not to disturb the judicial system.
4 See footnote 6, Document 268, and footnote 3, Document 250.
5 The Tunku was to remain in London after the conference for medical treatment.
6 See footnote 3, Document 271.
7 See footnote 3 above.