Canberra, 11 June 1965
898 . Top Secret Immediate
Reference your 1351.1
We are not in a position to have an opinion whether the plan is genuine or not. However, even if it is genuine, we see the following grave difficulties:—
(a) The plan could well be at an embryonic stage among Diah and his immediate associates. It could be doubtful whether firm agreement exists between them and the Army leaders.
(b) We do not see why President Sukarno should agree to go to Bangkok. He is at present acutely suspicious of plots. Why should he not suspect something engineered by Diah whose loyalties he would already doubt?
(c) If (b) is true, the Tunku might find himself drawn more and more into the centre of developments. Thus Diah might have to present the prospect to Sukarno as a meeting which the Tunku wants and has initiated. The Tunku could rapidly find himself in an impossible position.
(d) We have the greatest doubts whether a plan of this nature could be successfully developed in secret without coming to Sukarno’s knowledge. Once that happens he could exploit his knowledge with damaging effect against the Tunku, particularly at the time of the Afro-Asian Conference.
2. If you are given further opportunities to comment you should raise the foregoing points.
[NAA: A ll537, 14]
1 Document 273.