Washington, 28 June 1965
Top Secret
Malaysia–Indonesia
25. At Mr. Rusk’s suggestion, the meeting turned its attention to Malaysia/Indonesia.
26. Mr. Holyoake said that in New Zealand’s view Sukarno was losing his power of manoeuvre and that the PK1 were acquiring more influence with him.
27. Mr. Hasluck said it seemed to him that the situation in Malaysia had been altered by the improved military capacity on our side. It was 12 months since the first Indonesian landing on the peninsula and in this time 620 casualties had been inflicted upon Indonesia with practically every infiltrator being killed or rounded up, although there might still be a few stragglers at large. It appeared that the Indonesians were bound t of ail with their present tactics. Similarly, we could deal with any situation arising on the Borneo border at the present level of Indonesian activity. However, it was a matter for speculation whether the Indonesians would continue at level or step up ‘confrontation’.
28. Reviewing the political situation, Mr. Hasluck shared Mr. Holyoake’s view that Sukarno was perhaps no longer as completely in control of events as he had been. He had had to humour an increasingly powerful PKI and was riding two horses which were less and less equally matched. It was doubtful whether he could call off confrontation even if he wanted to.
29. Mr. Rusk asked what would be the effect of Sukarno and the Army moving closer together.
30. Mr. Holyoake said that year by year the prospect of the Army gaining any support in a showdown with the PKI was getting less and less.
31. Mr. Hasluck doubted whether Sukarno would put himself at the Army’s mercy. In any event, whilst the upper ranks remained basically anti-Communist, infiltrations had taken place lower down and full obedience in a showdown had become less likely. For its part, the PKI might not want to change the present level of activity against Malaysia or to precipitate a political test of strength with the Army since neither was necessary for it to obtain its objectives. When Sukarno departed, the PKI need not immediately seize power (e.g., there could be an interregnum under Subandrio) and Mr. Hasluck did not believe that it would suit the party to have a full-scale war which would create a national emergency favouring the Army. It appeared that confrontation might continue at much the same level with occasional pretences by Sukarno about conferences and mediation, and that the situation would drift until Sukarno died. This would call for continuing patience and military determination.
32. Mr. Holyoake commented that Mr. Wilson’s firmness on Malaysia was a matter of great comfort.
33. At Mr. Hasluck’s request, Air Chief Marshal Scherger reviewed the military situation. At present the Indonesians were attempting to deploy three regular brigades into Sumatra and to station two at Medan1 and one at Pekanbaru,2 but the movement of these regular Javanese troops was not yet completed. In Borneo, there were 13,500 regular troops divided into 12 battalions of 1,000 strength each, with support units. In neither Borneo nor Sumatra were the forces yet offensively poised, and in Sumatra the logistic capabilities were not up to scratch for an offensive move. The brigade at Pekanbaru would take at least a week to get into position. Air Chief Marshal Scherger repeated the Indonesian casualty figures mentioned by Mr. Hasluck, and said that the number of prisoners taken (500) indicated that the will t of ight was not strong. In Borneo, verified killed and captured totalled 420 on the Indonesian side and 42 on ours. It appeared that the Indonesian Army did not have its heart in confrontation and was merely carrying out the decisions of Sukarno. Should the Indonesians take action calling for a major reaction involving the knocking out of Indonesian shipping and aircraft, Darwin would be needed as a base (for instance, against an offensive deployment at Morotai)3 and all preparations for this eventuality had been made. Air Chief Marshal Scherger commented that there would be room at Darwin for U.S. units. He noted that at Boram4 we were developing an operational airfield and a string of support airfields along the Indonesian border with Caribou and Hercules capacity.
34. Mr. Rusk asked whether there had been any Indonesian activity along the New Guinea border.
35. Air Chief Marshal Scherger said that there was s of ar very little, although he noted the recent ‘arrest’ of a border headman. He also briefly referred to the Mokaginta episode in Sumatra.5
36. Mr. Rusk said that the U.S. assessment of the situation was much the same as outlined by Mr. Hasluck and Mr. Holyoake. There had been no sign of a back-away in Indonesia’s position on Malaysia and it seemed that the at least theoretical maintenance of confrontation was important to him. He said that bilateral relations were ‘down to a very thin line’ and that the U.S. would not try to woo Sukarno unless something positive came from him. Aid had been reduced to a few people in three universities, the Peace Corps had left,6 there had been no PL.480 aid7 for 18 months, and USIA8 had been sharply cut. Oil and rubber companies continued to operate on a week-by-week basis, and if Sukarno were to move in on them, there would be an immediate foreign exchange loss; nevertheless, the removal of Western influence in these companies remained a target for the PKI. Mr. Bunker in his mission had reviewed bilateral relations and had been instructed not to take up the Malaysian issue.9 However, this had been the only subject on Sukarno’s mind.10 The U.S. were concerned at the steady growth of the PKI’s influence, and were watching for any sign of a combination of forces which would reverse this trend. However, Sukarno had yielded to the PKI’s ‘salaami’ tactics.11 While Sukarno remained in office, the situation seemed likely to get worse both internally and externally, and the interests of the West in Indonesia to be further eroded. It was assumed that when he went there would be a major convulsion and he suggested the need for close contacts between the UK and the members of ANZUS on this contingency. There were some hopeful signs in the situation, however, for instance some competition between the Army and the PKI in Sumatra and resistance to the PKI by some Moslem elements in Java. Subandrio appeared to have high hopes of leading a coalition based on the PKI but others appeared to be aware of and resisting these aspirations. It was hard to see Subandrio as Sukarno’s successor. Sukarno had suffered some setback in his Afro/Asian relations, he had gained nothing by his withdrawal from the United Nations, and the U.S. had hoped that he would receive another setback by the seating of Malaysia in Algiers. There was some possibility of his temporarily improving relations with Malaysia, but should this happen he would turn elsewhere, possibly to Timor.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1945, 16/3/7]
1 Major city in the province of North Sumatra (Sumatera Utara).
2 Pekanbaru-major city in Riau province in central Sumatra.
3 The largest northern island of the Moluccas.
4 A World War II airfield at Wewak on the northwest coast of New Guinea.
5 During a major anti-American demonstration in Medan in February (see footnote 3, Document 243), the US Consulate had been under virtual siege and the US1S office taken over by the protestors. On this occasion previous police protection had ‘evaporated’ and the Regional Military Commander, General Mokaginta, had been conspicuously absent.
6 An independent US federal agency designed to promote mutual understanding through programs in which US graduate students assist interested countries in reaching their development goals. Established in 1961, it was a Cold War initiative of the John F. Kennedy Administration aimed at opposing the Chinese and Soviet political-ideological challenge to Western influence in the Third World countries.
7 Public Law 480-US food aid program (also known as the Food for Peace Program). P.L. 480 programs are implemented to combat hunger and malnutrition; promote broad-based equitable and sustainable development, including agricultural development; expand international trade; develop and expand export markets for United States agricultural commodities; and foster and encourage the development of private enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries.
8 United States Information Agency-USIS.
9 At the beginning of April, as US-Indonesia relations deteriorated with the unchecked attacks on American property in Indonesia, Johnson sent Elsworth Bunker (see footnote 8, Document 7) as his personal envoy to Jakarta to ‘assess the prospects’ for the relationship. Bunker’s report following his 13-day visit repudiated the existing US policy towards Indonesia, developed during the Kennedy Administration, and argued for the reduction in the visible US presence in the country. Bunker also believed that Sukarno had not been able to restrain the PKI, as the US had assessed that he could, and that a power struggle was looming between communist and anti-communist forces—which was in US interests to happen.
10 During the first half of 1965, Sukarno had focussed on Indonesia’s efforts to prevent Malaysia being admitted to the Afro-Asian group and in ensuring the meeting in Algiers went ahead. To this end, three different Afro-Asian meetings were held in Indonesia during March and April to focus attention on the forthcoming conference and to celebrate the original Bandung conference ten years earlier.
11 Possibly, a reference to the recitation of the Salaam (Blessings and Salutations) upon the Holy Prophet in Islam. It is deemed a noble action and conducted in the manner of standing with the utmost reverence.