Kuala Lumpur, 15 July 1965
1187. Secret
The Challenge of Mr Lee Kuan Yew
I refer to Singapore’s memorandum No. 847 of 3rd July.1
2. I read with concern the report of Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Mr Turner and Mr Nixon in Singapore on 1st July.2 It confirms that Lee has embarked on a campaign for national leadership and I suspect that this has been in mind from the beginning. I have always found it difficult to understand, for example, how a man of Lee’s intellect could have expected UMNO to dissolve its alliance with the MCA in the interests of a political association with the PAP. It seems probable that Lee was aware that he was making an impossible demand from the outset.
3. Basically, Lee’s campaign consists of a two-pronged attack, firstly on Malay political ascendency and secondly on Malay leadership and in particular the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman.
4. Since Lee refrains from attacking the constitutional guarantees of Malay rights, his allegations about Malays wanting to maintain their political ascendency carry the implications that the Malay Tunku/Razak leadership should be replaced by a Lee Kuan Yew leadership with the support of Malaysia’s non-Malay majority. At the same time, Lee’s remarks about the Tunku seek to picture him as a bumbling man who has foolishly miscalculated in the past and is blind t of uture needs.
5. In carrying out his two-pronged attack, Lee is seeking support from both within Malaysia and from abroad in the following manner:—
(a) Within Malaysia Lee is attempting to rally the majority of non-Malays behind his attack on Malay political ascendency.
(b) Outside Malaysia he seeks support by warning that with Malay political ascendency, Chinese in Malaysia will eventually turn to Peking. This warning appears to be particularly effective with Americans but I find it naive to consider that the Chinese population could be won over to Malaysia in a short period of time or, for that matter, that greater political power in Malaysia would be likely to affect the attitude of the Chinese to Peking. Lee further warns that backing the Alliance Government against the PAP in the present controversy would lead to another Viet Nam. The ‘message’ is that only Lee can control the Chinese and hold Malaysia together as a multi-racial nation.
6. While arguing that the Malays are guilty of a communal attitude and that he himself stands for a multi-racial Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew has in fact embarked upon a communalistic bid for national leadership. His assault upon Malay political ascendency cannot but be geared to creating anti-Malay feeling—even animosity—among the non- Malay majority of Malaysia. Among the Malays it naturally must arouse the strongest emotional reaction. The end product can only be an explosive communal situation. In my telegram No. 446 of 21st February3 I explained how PAP political competition outside of Singapore would inevitably involve increasing communal tensions and that this in fact was happening. Since then the position has deteriorated. According to Razak, it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold the position in both UMNO and MCA. Other Malay Ministers confirm this and say the PMIP is adopting an T told you so’ attitude. Also that the Tunku and Razak are having their difficulties with the rising Malay feeling.
7. It is true that there are aspects of Malay political ascendency that need to be modified with little delay. But it is a mistake to regard Malay anxiety to maintain their political ascendency as an aggressive attempt to dominate the other communities. It is essentially a defensive policy by a people who see themselves in prospect of losing their birth-right to a newly immigrant people. The Malays feel that they are a neglected and underprivileged group in their own country and that their only hope of approaching equality with the immigrant communities lies in retaining their political advantage for some time to come. Subject to this basic feeling by far the best if not the only hope of dealing with the extreme Malay attitudes is to leave the task to moderate and fair-minded leaders like the Tunku, Razak and Ismail, etc. Unfortunately, by interfering and by making Malay ascendency a political issue, Lee is creating the Malay reactions that he alleges he wants to be rid of. And he is making the task of the moderate leaders extremely difficult.
8. I agree, of course, that one of the most important tasks for Malaysia is to attract and integrate as many non-Malays as possible within the new nation. Unfortunately, for historical and environmental reasons, there is still a large proportion of the non-Malays— in particular the Chinese—who have no genuine feelings of loyalty to this country. But there is also a small but growing body of educated non-Malays whose loyalties are attainable provided rapid progress is made in breaking down communal barriers and inequalities. One of the most regrettable aspects of the controversy between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur is that it provides the wrong atmosphere for progressive policies directed to easing the various frustrations felt by the different communities and to building a united nation. At best, national unity can only be developed slowly. If, as Lee claims, it has to be developed in a few years, Malaysia must fail. However, much faster progress could have been made if there had been a genuine attempt to promote co-operation with Kuala Lumpur and if Singapore’s arguments had been presented privately to the Tunku and Razak rather than as a political challenge to the Alliance Government.
9. There is clearly no prospect of Lee stopping his attacks and consequently I expect the situation to worsen. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see a solution. Increasingly, I am coming to the pessimistic conclusion that if Lee cannot have his way and take over the running of the Malaysian house, he will prefer to risk pulling it down rather than make the compromises that are necessary in the interests of a long-term solution.
10. Perhaps the Alliance’s only counter to Lee is the Tunku. Lee cannot compete with the Tunku as a non-communal leader. The Tunku’s humanity is too well known for him to be tarnished with the brush of communalism. This explains, of course, why Lee has been endeavouring to discredit the Tunku as a feudal Malay leader who was right in the old situation in Malaya but who, having made his miscalculations in the past, is out of step with the present realities of Malaysia. In effect, Lee accuses the Tunku of wishing to preserve the pre-Malaysia status quo and consequently failing to heed the winds of change brought by Malaysia.
11. If Lee can discredit the Tunku as being out of step with the present and future realities and needs and even harass him into early retirement, Lee may expect to have much clearer sailing in his bid for national leadership. Although non-communal, Tun Razak has not the Tunku’s reputation as a good friend—‘a father’—of all the races of Malaysia. Nor is he likely to have the time to win their confidence. Even Razak’s assumption of national leadership from the Tunku could be represented by Lee as showing Malay determination to maintain political ascendency.
12. In my opinion, the Tunku cannot afford to ‘remain above the battle’ but must act within the next few months in a direct challenge to Lee. Nor can there be a ‘truce’. Short of Lee Kuan Yew publicly foreswearing his attack on Malay political ascendency and supporting the Alliance Government as best able to promote a Malaysian Malaysia—and there is, of course, no prospect of this—there is no option for the Tunku but to take up Lee’s challenge. And although Lee has chosen the grounds, the Tunku would not, in my opinion, be weak in any confrontation with Lee on who is best equipped to eliminate communal attitudes and promote a multi-racial Malaysian society.
13. The Tunku’s statement on 6th July in London that he intends on his return to Kuala Lumpur to meet Singapore’s Prime Minister ‘to smooth things over once and for all’ and that there is no basis for a trace, leads me to believe that the Tunku may have drawn the same conclusions as I have.
14. On the other hand, I am doubtful whether the Tunku will relish taking on such a major political challenge at his time of life. It may also be that communal feelings have become so inflamed that they could no longer bear the stresses of continuing and increasing political controversy. If this is so or if the Alliance leaders see it this way, the prospects are bleak.
15. The only alternatives to communal trouble with the threat of civil war would then seem to be:—
(a) repressive measures against Lee and PAP leaders; or
(b) the break-up of Malaysia.
16. As matters stand I believe it is unlikely that Alliance leaders will arrest Lee although there could be a growing movement for this. It seems to me more likely that they will decide that the continued inclusion of Singapore within Malaysia is intolerable. (It can, of course, also be argued that some modified form of disengagement falling short of the exclusion of Singapore from Malaysia is a possibility. But in the present state of distrust it seems unlikely that this could be negotiated.)
17. The hiving off of Singapore from Malaysia would impose tremendous problems. To name the more obvious:—
(a) It would give encouragement to Indonesia.
(b) It might lead to difficulties with the Borneo territories.
(c) There would be the problem of the British base and the Defence Agreement.
(d) Singapore would almost certainly become a centre of subversion.
(e) The economic problems of Singapore would increase.
Notwithstanding these problems and others such as UMNO concern for the Malays of Singapore, we would be short-sighted if we did not appreciate that an attempt to discard Singapore is becoming increasingly probable. That Lee himself sees this prospect is evident in his frequent references to the danger that Malaysia could become another Viet Nam.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 24]
1 Covering letter for Document 281.
2 Document 281.
3 Document 248.