Singapore, 10 August 1965
669. Secret Priority
Your 851.1
Some of the points you raise will have been partially covered by our 660, reporting Lee’s talk with Commonwealth representatives, and our 668, reporting Lee’s press conference today.2 In particular you will have noted that though Lee contemplates a resumption of trade and consular relations with Indonesia, given Indonesian recognition, he specifically rules out a settlement with Indonesia that does not take account of Malaysia’s security and ruled out a separate peace to the Commonwealth representatives.
2. I do not believe we can be sure of Singapore’s attitude beyond the early stages of independence, when the defence arrangements are still being worked out with the Malaysians, the British and presumably ourselves and the New Zealanders and when relations with Kuala Lumpur are still taking shape. If Djakarta offered cessation of confrontation and resumption of trade, the Government would be under strong pressure to accept. But I should expect them to stand firm initially. Should relations with Kuala Lumpur deteriorate a great deal further, Singapore might well later resort to contacts with Djakarta as a lever on Kuala Lumpur or in a search for trade. I doubt that we can usefully say more at this stage than that the balance of advantage for Singapore lies clearly in continued support for Malaysia against Indonesia: but that it is not difficult to envisage the development of circumstances in which Singapore might feel this was changing.
3. As to relations with Kuala Lumpur, you will also have noted Lee’s statement that ‘the emphasis is co-operate. We need them to survive’: and his references to certain material factors, such as water, trade and geography that urge co-operation. There are also sentimental and political factors favouring co-operation (for example, I believe Singapore’s administrative and professional classes are generally greatly dismayed by today’s developments and will look for eventual re-union—but in some constituencies there have been fireworks celebrations). But these factors are not new and have proved insufficient these last two years to carry the growth of closer ties. The argument has been that co-operation would be eased if the political factor were taken out of the relationship and Kuala Lumpur has now sought stability in the severance of almost every tie. But there remains ample ground for friction. The economic field will be crucial. Razak told Moore, the departing British deputy, two weeks ago that Kuala Lumpur was deliberately not cooperating on economic matters so as to bring political pressure against Singapore. Even should Kuala Lumpur now drop this attitude, it will still presumably seek to limit Singapore’s share in the region’s economic development for the benefit of Malaya while Singapore will be pushing aggressively to expand. Severe conflicts can easily develop that can adversely affect other relationships. I think the most that can usefully be said at this stage is that the balance of advantage for Singapore clearly favours co-operation with Malaysia and is likely to continue to do so for a long time: but that Singapore will be quick to retaliate against any threat to its interests and to seek new relationships if it decides no progress with Malaysia is possible. In any case it will be seeking new relationships in various fields, such as commerce and foreign affairs, that could cut across close cooperation with Malaysia.
4. You ask was Lee a willing participant in Kuala Lumpur’s decision to expel Singapore. I am uninformed on this, so for having been able to talk only with Goh Keng Swee (most of whose comments on this aspect were jeers at Rajaratnam’s histrionics). However, my impression is that Lee was far from acquiescent in the timing and nature of the breach and that this was forced on him by the threat of progressive action and bloodshed. (‘We should have been butchered’, Goh said.) As you know, Lee has always argued that the Kuala Lumpur regime was too unstable to take political opposition (e.g. its violent response to quite moderate criticism of its budget last December)3 and since early this year he has argued for a political disengagement as the only way to avoid a disastrous collision. My assessment has been that he also saw in disengagement an opportunity to re-build his own position, weakened by merger and the PAP’s failure in the 1964 Malayan elections.4 In later months Lee talked of ‘alternative arrangements’ to Malaysia and of partition, but this was in rhetorical terms and with reference to the end result of Kuala Lumpur’s continuing to seek a ‘Malay Malaysia’. He declared both when Mr Bottomley told him of British opposition and when he participated in the Malaysian Solidarity Convention that disengagement was ‘off’ .5 But there is evidence suggesting that to some extent the vehemence of his recent ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ campaign was calculated to alarm Kuala Lumpur into negotiating some sort of trace based on a modified disengagement. In recent weeks he has become alarmed by the mounting evidence of extremist feeling in Kuala Lumpur and nervous of the future. I think he hoped to explore the possibility of a modus vivendi with the Tunku and was quite unprepared for the ultimatum that the Tunku seems to have put to him – to get out or be suppressed—although he had prophesied as much. Lee is a great rationaliser and will soon be finding all sorts of advantages in the present arrangements. But I believe he did not seek Singapore’s partition from Malaysia and that the signature of the partition agreement was indeed ‘a moment of anguish’.6
5. The Cabinet was divided, Rajaratnam, Toh and possibly Othman Wok7 wanting to stay in Malaysia and fight on. But, as Goh put it, the strong Chinese instinct for survival prevailed and Lee was authorised to surrender.
6. Goh took the break phlegmatically saying Singapore had lost nothing but a prospect, and that fast dimming. He spoke of the long haul ahead and the need for hard work and ‘none of the nonsense of the last six months’. He remarked that Lee would be kept under control.
7. Goh is now Defence Minister and I asked him about our defence relationship, but he did not know the answer. Seen from here, the first requirement is recognition. I shall try to advise further on other matters to-morrow.
8. For what it’s worth, I think Kuala Lumpur will now have greatly increased difficulties in holding Sarawak.
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 15]
1 Document 294.
2 9 August. They set out Lee’s account of the difficulty of the decision that Singapore leave the federation, his regret that it had occurred, and his hopes that the rest of Malaysia would hold together. He had also spoken of his plans to honour all agreements to retain bases, to establish diplomatic relations with Malaysia, and to support it in its dispute with Indonesia—although trade and consular relations with Indonesia would be considered with Indonesian recognition. Singapore was to adopt a neutralist position and seek membership of the Commonwealth and the UN, but would need Commonwealth support to remain non-communist.
3 See footnote 4, Document 263. The budget debate had been acrimonious on both sides. Lee had later complained that Tan had retaliated against his criticisms of the budget by demanding that Singapore should contribute 60 per cent of its revenue, rather than the 40 per cent agreed in the financial arrangements of the merger.
4 See footnote 3, Document 194.
5 See Document 267, and paragraph 6, Document 272.
6 In a televised press conference in Singapore following the announcement of the separation, Lee had said: ‘Every time we look back to the moment we signed this document it is for us a moment of anguish. For me it is a moment of anguish’.
7 Singaporean Minister for Social Affairs.