Kuala Lumpur, 12 February 1963
5. Secret
Malaysia—Relations with Indonesia
Notwithstanding Tunku’s arguments, I agree he and Malayans generally have been more outspoken towards Indonesia than is in their interests. I have long suspected that the Indonesians—in particular Subandrio—have been deliberately provocative with a view to encouraging a battle of words and building up an atmosphere in which they can more
2. I have not been alone in urging Tunku to exercise restraint and these efforts have had some effect. Unfortunately with the continued provocation from Indonesia, it is difficult if not impossible to restrain a man as outspoken as the Tunku. His accessibility to the Press is also a disability.
3. In any case I see difficulties in some of the suggestions in your telegram 85 of the 6th February.1 Tunku’s support for Malaysia is based primarily on the belief that it will strengthen the area against communism. Whether he is right or not he can hardly be expected to express the reverse view in public. I do not think that the Tunku could be persuaded for example to say that he understood Indonesia’s interest in the security of Borneo Territories when he considers that the major threat to their security now comes primarily from Indonesia itself. Again it would be a damaging admission of lack of confidence if he admitted that he understood Indonesia’s doubts about Malaya’s ability to administer the Borneo Territories. A public reference to a genuine Indonesian fear that the Territories might fall under Chinese control is even more complicated because it would have communal overtones in Malaya.
4. If Indonesia is sincere in its concern about Chinese Communist influence in Malaysia, the last thing it should be doing is attacking the Tunku and seeking to split the Malays. By far the strongest force for stability and against communism in the Federation is the solidarity of UMNO2 under the Tunku’s leadership. This has been pointed out to the Indonesians, for example, by Senu when he was Ambassador in Djakarta.
5. Recent Indonesians accusations that the Federation supported the rebels during the 1958 revolution do not square with the carefully correct policy followed by the Malayan Government. Similarly the suggestion that the Tunku endeavoured to mediate in the West New Guinea dispute without the agreement of Indonesia is simply not true.3 It seems curious that the Indonesians have taken so long to raise objections to Malaya’s alleged policies on these issues.
6. The Tunku is aware that as a small nation with limited defence capacity, Malaya should not lightly ‘embark on luxury of quarrelling with large and powerful neighbour’ (your paragraph 3). Basically, however it seems to me that it is Indonesia who has embarked on the quarrel as a matter of policy. From here, Indonesia’s pretended alarm at Malayan hostility depressingly recalls Hitler’s accusations about the hostility of Germany’s small neighbours.
7. I agree that it will be most unfortunate if Malaysia comes into being in face of permanent hostility from Indonesia and Philippines. But I fear that Indonesia is now implacably opposed to Malaysia and hopes that our concern about her hostility can still prevent its formation.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 2]
1 That is, 5 February (see Document 24).
2 United Malays National Organisation.
3 In September 1960, the Tunku had attempted to assist in the resolution of the prolonged Indonesian–Dutch dispute over West New Guinea. He put forward a proposal that the Dutch hand the territory over to the UN, that it then be given to Indonesia as a UN Trusteeship and that the UN be persuaded that the terms of the trusteeship include the eventual handing over of the territory to Indonesia after a period of instruction.