Jakarta, 11 August 1965
940. Secret Immediate
Subandrio
I saw Subandrio this morning. He was understandably enough in rip-roaring form and rubbed my nose in a number of things although he did it fairly pleasantly and was by no means offensive and cocky. He said that we must now understand that in its approach to the Malaysia question, Indonesia had, at least in some ways, been right. Despite all our arguments to the contrary, the concept, we must now admit was not viable. It had been wrecked as Indonesia had anticipated on communal difficulty, a subject which Indonesia well understood and which we with our tranquil and homogenous background could not be expected to appreciate. Could we not now reconsider the whole concept of Malaysia? I told him that the Government would certainly be considering developments in Malaysia, and he asked me to put it to the Government that the concept no longer held water. Sabah and Sarawak had been attached to the Federation artificially to counter-balance the weight of the Singapore Chinese. The proposition no longer had any relevance. We should arrange to give independence to Sabah and Sarawak, combined with an agreement that everyone, including Indonesia, should keep their hands off. If Indonesia subsequently proved to be naughty then I could call him a liar. I promised that I would put what he had said to the Government.
3. 1 I asked Subandrio what he proposed to do about Singapore and it is quite clear that, for the moment Indonesia proposes to wait and see. He did not deny it when I suggested the possibility that Indonesia would, at least, continue with her economic confrontation of Singapore. I said that I hoped that Indonesia would recognise Singapore quickly and end all confrontation with it as this, at least, would reduce the area of the problem. I also asked Subandrio whether, in view of what had happened, he was still able to claim that Malaysia was no more than a British puppet? He countered this by saying that obviously we had all known well in advance of what was going to happen as there had been public discussion in London of the possibility of removing the Singapore base to Darwin or Perth. I told Subandrio that this was nonsense and that indeed we had had very little advance notice. Subandrio then suggested that if we were angered by this, we might withhold recognition of Singapore. I said that this was extremely unlikely as naturally we respected Singapore’s right to assert its independence if this was what they wanted.
5. I remarked on the fact that I had not seen the Foreign Minister for a couple of months, indeed, not since his angry reaction to some remarks made by Mr Hasluck in Kuala Lumpur.2 Subandrio said that his irritation had stemmed from the fact that the Minister had equated the problems of Vietnam and Malaysia implying that Australia regarded itself as having a role to contain what it regarded as Indonesian aggression, but he remained anxious for good relations with us as he had tried to show in the letter he had earlier written to Mr Hasluck apologising for not seeing him at the airport in Djakarta.3 I then gave Subandrio the Minister’s reply, which he read carefully.4 He went on to say that Australia was in this area and was not like others coming from a long way away who might, in a month or so, forget harsh words spoken about them. The difficult relationship between Indonesia and Australia, in his view, continued, and he and the Indonesian Government would exercise what restraint they could to achieve good relations while reacting as he must to harsh words by Government leaders in Australia.
7. I suggested to Subandrio that there must be reciprocity in this. Many harsh words were said by the Indonesians and maybe there was fault on both sides. We were accused of engaging in encirclement and so on. It was a pity that I had never been able to convince him that Australia had a lively understanding about a strong and unified Indonesia as contributing to Australian defence. To us, Indonesia seemed to be becoming more and 0more excited, and Indonesian leaders, including the Foreign Minister, were saying things that they knew could not be believed in Australia. As an example I quoted what he had said yesterday about Indonesian relations with China—‘indestructible’, ‘intertwined’, ‘permanent’ and so on. Not unexpectedly, this produced a predictable discourse about National unity, the need for the acquisition of a National spirit before technology, and so on. In this Indonesia was far ahead of India and Malaysia. It was all very well for us with our unity and stability, but we must attempt to judge Indonesia on our position 100 years ago, when we were facing the beginnings of Nationhood. I replied merely that in my mind Indonesia had already achieved an Indonesian identity, and that continuing excitement and whipping up of hatred did nothing except cause fear and distrust amongst the Indonesians’ neighbours.
8. Subandrio said that Australia and Indonesia had some joint responsibility for peace in this area, but in the preservation of peace by the adoption and use not of an attitude of superiority and expecting Indonesia to touch her cap in Kuala Lumpur. I said that Australia had an equal anxiety for reciprocal respect. We did not appreciate accusations about building bases to the South directed against Indonesia. So far as such allegations concerning Christmas Island were concerned,5 this was ludicrous as he would see for himself if he were to go there, but Subandrio again returned to the old theme of National unity, claiming that it was his genuine wish to settle down, be more tranquil and concentrate on economics. I suggested that this was just not so, and that Indonesia in its present mood would find such a thing too dull. He accepted the suggestion with a giggle.
9. Finally I asked Subandrio to tell me some secrets. Did Indonesia, for instance, propose on August 17th to kick out the United States, United Kingdom and Australia?6 He at once discounted any likelihood of doing so with the United States or Australia, but said that ‘very serious consideration’ was being given to throwing out the United Kingdom. However, what had happened in Singapore had changed things to a certain extent. He and Yani yesterday afternoon had had a long talk with Sukamo and endeavoured to try to persuade him not to be too violent with the British on August 17th. The probability that they expected that the Malaysia question would continue to escalate on both sides no longer exists. He repeated later to me as we went to the car, that he would continue to try to dissuade Sukamo from precipitate action, as Indonesia needed friends and not enemies.
10. I did not enjoy the interview very much despite Subandrio’s expansive mood. It seems to me that the ball is very much at his and Indonesia’s feet, and that we face a new situation of an Indonesia rather dizzy with success, combined with a probably more than somewhat impressed international audience.
11. This was not the occasion for me to raise issues such as borders and war graves7 but after August 17th I will seek another appointment with him to discuss these questions. New Guinea was never mentioned this morning.
[NAA: A6364, JA1965/07]
1 Paragraphs 2–4 were marked ‘paragraphs numbered as received’ on original document
2 At a press conference in Kuala Lumpur on 21 May, Hasluck had said: ‘If aggression succeeds in South Vietnam, it is not just a case of South Vietnam having lost its independence and being brought under subjection to someone else. It is a case of other countries seeing that it is no use resisting. You are bound to fail. And the same in Malaysia. It is not just a case of making the Indonesians fail, so that Malaysia will survive. But if Indonesia succeeded in Malaysia it would affect other countries. They would say ‘the aggressor can win’. So we have got to resist aggression, and make it plain that the aggressor is not going to win.’
3 Hasluck had stopped briefly in Jakarta on 28 April for a discussion with Shann on the current situation in Indonesia while on his way to the SEATO Ministerial meeting in London (see footnote 1, Document 267). Subandrio had been ill at the time and had written apologising to Hasluck on 18 May.
4 Hasluck’s reply, dated 8 June, had been brief, saying he agreed with Subandrio’s view that ‘direct dialogue’ between the two of them was important and that he had now asked Shann ‘to speak to you personally’ about the New Guinea border demarcation programme.
5 Australian territory, 380 km south of Java.
6 That is, on the occasion of Sukarno’s annual Merdeka Day address.
7 That is, the marking of the border between West Irian and Papua and New Guinea, and the completion of the Commonwealth War Graves cemetery in Ambon. As a party to the War Graves Agreement, the Indonesian Government had undertaken to assist where necessary in arrangements for the building of cemeteries in Jakarta and Ambon. Shann had reported that, since early 1965, there had been ‘imperceptible’ Indonesian cooperation over the border marking and local obstruction to the work on the Ambon cemetery.