Kuala Lumpur, 12 August 1965
1758. Secret Priority
Malaysia: Singapore
I was not surprised to learn from Singapore’s 678 that the reports in Singapore differ from what I have heard here.1 However, Pritchett’s account requires further comment.
2. Lee told Tunku and Ismail that Goh and Barker had threatened resignation. If not true this seems a remarkable and unnecessary story to have dreamed up. The explanation of our contradictory accounts may be in the fact that at this stage Barker or Goh could hardly be expected to be disloyal to Lee and admit that they threatened to resign. I agree that Barker would not be able to exercise much influence but the same would not apply to Goh. In the past, I have noticed Lee’s heavy dependence on Goh and both Razak and Ismail are emphatic about his strong position. As Ismail put it, ‘Lee was not prepared to let him go’. I have also noted from Singapore’s 669 that Pritchett thought it worth reporting Goh’s remark that ‘Lee would be kept under control’.2
3. The word ‘architects’ has been used on a number of occasions during past few days by Ismail to describe to me the part played by Goh, Razak and Barker. I agree that Barker was more a draughtsman than an architect, but I am satisfied that Goh played a big part in the settlement and this is confirmed by Razak. Razak has explained Goh’s change of portfolio as a move that will enable him to work more closely with the Malaysian Government than if his responsibilities were in the economic field where the sharpest controversies will arise.3 Razak is certainly looking for a new start in Singapore/Kuala Lumpur co-operation although not under-estimating the difficulties.
4. Both Razak and Ismail have told me independently that Lee insisted on secrecy but I agree that the Kuala Lumpur ministers had no intention of letting outsiders know, particularly in view of the representations that were made when disengagement was first mooted.
5. Lee’s policies, particularly recently, only make sense if he was deliberately raising temperature to obtain disengagement on his own terms. But I agree that he was not prepared for a complete break. Razak tells me that Lee’s terms were a looser association with Singapore enjoying financial autonomy and the Central Government sacking six of its people. If so, these were clearly impossible demands. I can quite understand that Lee feels a sense of defeat and that his bitterness against the Malays and Tan Siew Sin has intensified. Lee is reputed to harbour grudges and this could be a source of concern for the future. It seems to me, however, that Singapore has at least as much, if not more, to gain from co-operation than Kuala Lumpur and that although economic conflicts are inevitable, the good practical sense of the Chinese will help in dealing with them.
6. As far as Malaysia is concerned, my worry at present is not so much about Malay extremism as about the attitudes of some of the MCA leaders and the pressures that business men will want to exert. I have suggested to Razak that Malaysia and Singapore should set up a Joint Economic Council. He agrees, but said, ‘not just yet’. He also agreed that it would be useful to include a level-headed person like Ismail on the Council.
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6571]
1 Document 297.
2 Document 296.
3 Goh had relinquished the Finance portfolio and been appointed Singapore’s Minister for Defence.