Canberra, 13 August 1965
4190. Secret
Malaysia and Singapore
As stated in our telegram No. 1166 to Kuala Lumpur1 we do not wish at this stage to express considered official views about changes and modifications in the existing defence treaty arrangements. We are pleased at the progress at the meeting held in Kuala Lumpur yesterday in which Doctor Goh took part.2
2. However, we should like to have any views you may have formed, or which you understand the British/Malaysians/or Singaporeans may have formed on the question of whether further major legal processes are necessary in respect of Singapore.
3. In this regard, we note the reference in your telegram No. 6886 to ‘the possibility of arranging more favourable terms with Lee for the Singapore base’.3 On the face of things, this would be difficult to obtain and we wonder what specifically is in mind. We also see serious risks in the adoption of separate and different understandings and formulae as between Singapore and Malaysia in respect of defence matters except, of course, in so far as they exist already in the more advantageous conditions in respect of Singapore under existing arrangements.
4. The agreement on the separation of Singapore from Malaysia provides under Article V(3) for use by the Malaysian Government of the bases in Singapore for purposes of external defence as the Government of Malaysia may consider necessary. In Annex B of the Agreement under the heading of ‘International Agreements etc. relating to Singapore’ it is stated that the treaties entered into by Malaysia are deemed to be treaties entered into between Singapore and the countries concerned. Specification is then made of the relevant sections of the Anglo/Malaysian Defence Treaty. This is all, of course, part of the Separation arrangements package.
5. Does the foregoing represent an intention on the part of the Malaysian and Singapore Governments to complete and dispose of the legal aspects of the continuation in force of the Anglo/Malaysian Defence Treaty for Singapore? If so, is it considered to be a sufficient procedure? Or are there some further steps to be taken, such as the Singapore Government associating itself with the Treaty through a protocol? Paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 6846 refers.4
6. Our preliminary feeling is that if there is to be a substantial renegotiation with the Singapore Government on these matters, Lee could well have difficulty in defending the provisions giving the United Kingdom freedom of unilateral action in respect of operations beyond the defence of Malaysia. This, of course, has always been a problem with the Malaysian Government (for example, the recent exchanges over the further questioning of Razak in the Kuala Lumpur Parliament) and it would seem that Lee would have no lesser problem and possibly a greater one.5 Lee would also have in mind the need to take the edge off Afro-Asian criticism. The dangers we see are that Lee might have to adopt a political posture on the question; that this could have consequences for Kuala Lumpur; and this could affect British public opinion in respect of the British role in South East Asia. These considerations suggest careful thought should be given before opening up negotiations on a substantial basis if what has been done already is sufficient as a legal process.
7. This is not a definitive statement of views but is a preliminary reaction to indicate some of the considerations turning over in our minds.6
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 16]
1 Document 302.
2 Razak had invited Goh to a special meeting on 11 August to confirm the Malaysian Government’s proposed defence arrangements for Singapore (see footnote 1, Document 302). On 12 August, Pritchett advised that Goh had ‘expressed his satisfaction’ with the meeting and been ‘fully satisfied with Razak’s attitude’. He had also said that he intended to continue with present defence arrangements, ‘certainly until we have done some hard thinking about our position’.
3 11 August. It advised that British officials were ‘broadly in favour of “defence usiness as usual’” , although they would look to gain better terms for the use of the Singapore base, and that they recommended an early quadripartite meeting (UK, US, Australia and New Zealand) ‘to compare assessments and concert policy’ before deciding on longer term readjustments to existing arrangements.
4 9 August, providing the CRO’s ‘tentative comments’ on the separation in light of the Office’s paucity of information about the issue. Paragraph 5 put Eastman’s view on the legal aspects of continuing the UKMalaysian Defence Agreement and stated: (a) that the agreement ‘would subsist … so far as concerned matters remaining’ in Kuala Lumpur’s jurisdiction; and (b) that the new agreement between Singapore and Malaysia could not ‘legally establish rights and duties’ between the UK and Singapore in respect of the Singapore bases. On this latter point Eastman thought that from a ‘de facto point of view arrangement might or might not be acceptable but confirmatory agreement between Britain and Singapore would be necessary to put it on legal footing’.
5 A reference to ensuring the availability of British forces stationed in alaysia/Singapore for SEATO operations (see footnote 4, Document 91). On 12 August, Rajaratnam, the new Singaporean Foreign Minister, had said that Singapore would adopt a non-alignment policy and that its attitude towards SEATO was ‘not one of understanding or sympathy’.
6 Eastman’s reply, received 14 August, advised that UK officials believed that the negotiation of a defence agreement could be ‘safely postpone[d] for some weeks … while they turned attention to more fundamental and higher priority questions’. They were ‘not disposed’ to discuss the risks put forward in this cablegram, saying that Australia would have the opportunity to raise any concerns in the proposed quadripartite talks (see footnote 3). On the question of more favourable arrangements for the Singapore base, Eastman advised that the UK were not looking to gain greater freedom or a better financial basis for the use of the base, but rather whether the ‘tenure might be renegotiated for fixed term instead of original open-ended arrangement’.