314

CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY

Canberra, 16 August 1965

  1. SECRET

Since sending our telegraph No. 1188,1 I have read the Tunku’s reply to the Prime Minister.2 This increases our apprehension. It contains no suggestion of a new beginning or of the need for mutual co-operation between Singapore and Malaysia. On the contrary its tone could be taken as menacing in the reference to the Malaysian Government taking action against Singapore. I say this with full allowances for the stresses of the moment under which the Tunku might be suffering. But it is action taken in the stresses of the moment that could be disastrous.

  1. The fact is that, without consultation, the Tunku has thrown away the control he had over Singapore. That decision has inevitable consequences that he may not have fully foreseen. Whatever ultimate deterrent the Tunku may consider he possesses, and which Lee and his colleagues must take into their calculations, the approach to the future must be based on genuine co-operation.

  2. It would have the worst effects if the Tunku had to act against Singapore on the basis of the flimsy provision of the Agreement to which he refers. Nor would it be a matter affecting Kuala Lumpur and Singapore alone. Threats to deny water supply or to erect economic barriers would seriously impair Malaysia’s international standing on which much still depends. Military intervention would be acutely embarrassing to the Commonwealth countries which have forces stationed on the spot. The complications are endless and they could include such matters as our seconded military officers to the Malaysian Defence Forces and our agreement to give substantial military assistance to the build-up of those Forces.3

  3. As you will see from the Prime Minister’s statement4 we do not wish to spread a mood of pessimism but, on the contrary, to emphasize common interests and a common future. Our assessment is that the new arrangements can work given a measure of goodwill and some disposition to co-operation. But we must recognize that there will be problems and difficulties which the Malaysians probably failed to take into account when making the new arrangement. They must not allow these difficulties, as they appear, to deepen their suspicions and hostilities towards Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew will no doubt say provocative and goading things from time to time, much as we seek to prevent it, but we can have some confidence in his basic realism and that of Goh Keng Swee, Lim Kim San and others who have influential voices within Singapore.

  4. There is a risk of an anti-Western mood growing in Kuala Lumpur. There will also be a temptation to some of the Malaysian leaders to cut the northern Borneo territories adrift. Your excellent personal relations with Malaysian leaders should enable you to use your influence in a way that will do good and make our position known to the best advantage.

[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 15]

  1. Document 311. ↩

  2. Document 308. ↩

  3. See Documents 149 and 151. ↩

  4. Menzies in his statement of 10 August (see paragraph 8, Document 298) said: ‘We regret deeply that it was not found possible to make a full success of the Federation as established in 1963, but at the same time we are glad that the new arrangement recognizes that the two entities must continue to work together in association. We, for our part, apply ourselves with all goodwill to co-operation with both Malaysia and Singapore for their future security and welfare, since we believe, as they do, that this separation should be regarded as the beginning of a new approach to the task of working together to forward their common interests.’ ↩

Date

16 August 1965

Sources
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