Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 1965
1795. Confidential Priority
Tunku, Razak, Ismail and Tan Siew Sin have now given me their account of the developments leading to Singapore’s separation.
2. The Tunku said he reached his decision in hospital on June 29th and shortly afterwards told Lim Kim San who was in London. Thus a Singapore Minister knew before Malaysian Ministers. On July 1st, while still in hospital, he wrote to Razak explaining how he felt and I1 asked him to talk things over with senior Malaysian Ministers.
3. On about July 13 (I hope to be able to confirm the date later), Goh came to Kuala Lumpur ostensibly to see Lim Swee Aun2 but asked instead to see Razak. This was the first hint the Malaysians had of a new Singapore initiative. Goh, according to Tan and Ismail, suggested disengagement and emphasised Singapore’s desire for autonomy in finance. He appears to have fallen in quite readily with Malaysian views that disengagement could only be based on complete separation.
4. Malaysian Ministers claim that by July 20 there was an understanding on how the separation should be achieved and that Barker was asked to go ahead with the legal drafting. They claim that Barker did all the drafting and that Kadir,3 the Malaysian Attorney-General, was only brought in at the end.
5. By the time the Tunku returned to Kuala Lumpur on August 5 the agreement was to all intents and purposes complete. Five people seem to have been directly involved in the negotiation—Goh and Barker for Singapore and Razak, Ismail and Tan Siew Sin for Kuala Lumpur.
6. On August 6, Tunku met Razak, Ismail, Tan and Sambanthan.4 They discussed efforts to talk peace with Singapore and agreed on the inevitability of separation. Lee appears to have come down to Kuala Lumpur from the Cameron Highlands that same day.5 Toh and Rajaratnam also came to Kuala Lumpur in great secrecy and had discussions with Lee, Goh and Barker.
7. On the morning of August 7, Goh telephoned the residency and made an appointment for Lee to see the Tunku at 12.30 p.m. There, he and Lee met the Tunku, Razak and other senior Malaysian Ministers. Lee asked for a private meeting with the Tunku and then went into an inner room.
8. I have to assume that Lee had been kept fully informed by Goh and Barker of the developments. Both had given categorical assurances to the Malaysians that Lee would accept the agreement. At some stage, I am still to find out the exact day, Goh signed the Agreement. Lee subsequently argued that he should only have initialled it presumably instead of facing him with a fait accompli. But I suspect that Lee was happy to have this excuse and may even have contrived it. The same pattern is evident in Lee’s claim that Goh and Barker had threatened to resign. Tunku believes that Lee was hell-bent on being an independent Prime Minister. He assures me that Lee raised no objections personally to the separation but said that he was having trouble with Toh and Rajaratnam. Lee said it was Goh that mattered and that if he had to choose he would be prepared to do without Toh and Rajaratnam. At Lee’s request, the Tunku agreed to write his letter to Toh. Lee assured Tunku that with this letter Toh and Rajaratnam would sign.
9. Lee then asked for an RMAF aircraft so that he could have the agreement signed by all members of his Cabinet and returned through his secretary the same day.
10. It is difficult to assess whether Goh took the initiative or whether Lee directed from afar. But I find it difficult to believe that the separation was not acceptable to Lee from the outset. At any rate, it seems clear that there was no question of Singapore being forced out of Malaysia.
11. It can be argued that Lee had good reason to allow Goh to take the initiative while he himself remained in the background. Thus, if it was criticised or failed to work out he could disassociate himself from it. Also it is in line with Lee’s ability to get himself accepted at home and abroad as the ‘victim’ of Kuala Lumpur’s machinations and narrow outlook. In this case such a presentation has special advantages. If this is a correct analysis of Lee’s reasons for remaining in the background, it will be interesting in the future—especially if Singapore runs into trouble—to watch the relationship between Goh and Lee. Personally, I think they were cooperating closely.
12. It is, of course, also possible (and not inconsistent with the foregoing) that Lee was hovering over the prospect of a divided Cabinet so that he could present a favourable image to all sections.
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6571]
1 Presumably, a transmission error.
2 See footnote 3, Document 297.
3 Abdul Kadir bin Yusof.
4 V.T. Sambanthan, Malaysian Minister of Posts, Works and Telecommunications.
5 See paragraph 2, Document 288.