Canberra, 16 August 1965
920. Secret Priority
Please see the telegram of instructions which I have just sent to Critchley.1 I understand you have a copy of the Tunku’s letter to the Prime Minister.2 The Department has also repeated to you and Critchley the reports from Eastman which suggest that a hard-headed review of the overall situation is taking place in London.3 Without betraying confidences I wish you to urge upon Singapore Ministers, in a spirit of friendship and common interest, the serious position that they face.
2. You need not refrain from stressing that the British mean what they say when they speak about reviewing their policies. You should confirm that there are growing pressures in London for a substantial reduction of the South East Asia commitment. We conceive it to be in Australia’s interest for Britain to maintain substantial forces in the theatre in defence of the Malaysian area and we believe that we have a strong common interest with Singapore as well as Malaysia in this respect.
3. You could also make the point as necessary that, at this stage, when we are fighting to hold Malaysia together and resist confrontation it is unreal and positively harmful to focus public attention on matters like the use of defence facilities for S.E.A.T.O. purposes.4
4. You should assure Singapore Ministers that, as the Prime Minister has already said publicly, we are anxious to play our part in the defence of the Malaysian area including Singapore.5 We have an abiding interest in the stability and economic progress of the area. But if we are to stick to Malaysia and Singapore they must stick together. We cannot afford over-commitment in circumstances where governments may falter, divide from each other or work against each other, or embark on new courses which appear as a defeat for our policies.
5. There are clearly serious problems of continued mistrust and possible miscalculation on both sides. Lee Kuan Yew should understand from the record of Australian efforts with Indonesia that we would not blindly oppose anything he might try to attempt to improve the situation. But he must proceed with the greatest caution if he is not to create serious breaches with Kuala Lumpur. He must also understand that if Singapore and Kuala Lumpur do not stand close together there is the prospect that Sukarno will turn to Kuala Lumpur and offer inducements (for example developing and building on common anti-Chinese feeling).
6. On the broad issue of a genuine settlement with Indonesia we see little or no worthwhile prospect at this time. In the continuing revolutionary and turbulent mood of the Indonesian leadership, there is no sign of any real intention on the part of its leaders to come to grips with either external or internal problems. They are still in a destructive mood.
7. We were pleased to read Lim Kim San’s handling of questions about trade with Indonesia.6 The Department can make economic information on Indonesia available to you for him if required.
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 15]
1 Document 314, repeated to Singapore 921.
2 Document 308.
3 See Document 303 and footnotes 3 and 6, Document 309.
4 See footnote 5, Document 309.
5 In his statement of 10 August (see paragraph 8, Document 298), Menzies said that Australia was ‘determined to play [its] part with all the other countries concerned in continuing a common resistance to attacks upon the Malaysian area, an area which will still include Singapore, though it is no longer part of the Federation of Malaysia’.
6 On 15 August, Pritchett had reported that Singaporean traders were pressuring the government to resume trading with Indonesia but Lim Kim San and Rajaratnam had stated ‘unequivocally’ that there would be no Singapore-Indonesian trade while Indonesia’s confrontation policy against Malaysia continued.