Singapore, 17 August 1965
726. Secret Priority
I have just returned from interviews with Goh, Rajaratnam and Lee. Goh was the only one with whom I could have a sensible discussion.
2. I spoke to Goh along the lines of your 920.1 He was thoroughly receptive, though initially somewhat sceptical about the position in London. He was quick to appreciate our common interest and the need to avoid giving any support to forces in London favouring a reduction of the British presence here, as for example by public dissension with Kuala Lumpur, statements about restrictions on the use of the bases or any independent initiative with Indonesia. He brushed Rajaratnam aside, saying we were not to pay any attention to him. ‘Shall overrule him’, he said. I pointed out the damage and embarrassment that some of Rajaratnam’s statements could cause. Goh took the point—but I am doubtful if he will intervene in this respect with much weight at this stage.
3. Goh said absolutely no consideration had yet been given to the question of the Defence Agreement. He himself had not even looked at it. I spoke to him on various aspects mentioned in the Department’s cables and he listened carefully. (He will expect views from us on how this question might best be handled.) Regarding the Singapore forces, he said it had been silly of the Tunku to write to Brigadier Alsagoff to put himself under Lee’s command.2 He had persuaded Lee of this. Things should be left alone.
4. On Indonesia, Goh’s position was similarly sound, but he spoke of the pressure from the traders and the difficulty that could arise if Kuala Lumpur took an uncooperative or domineering attitude.
5. Economic considerations at present dominate Singapore’s view of future relations with Kuala Lumpur. Goh spoke once more of the urgent need for economic cooperation from Kuala Lumpur and his worries about this. He said Tan Siew Sin had behaved with complete bad faith over the common market and could be expected still to seek to squeeze Singapore. He was a fool. He just did not realise that only the Communists could benefit, for the PAP could not expect to hold Singapore if economic conditions became bad. The tariffs and other trade measures promulgated by Singapore on August 9 had been designed to jolt Tan Siew Sin and people in Malaya into realising the importance of cooperation with Singapore. He (Goh) was happy to see the response apparent in this morning’s press reports about demands by Malayan manufacturers for a common market. Talks were going on with Kuala Lumpur and the immediate prospect was of some progress (after a bit of jockeying for position I gathered). But Goh stressed again that he was seriously worried by Tan Siew Sin and believed he could easily ruin things. He thought the Tunku distrusted him politically and asked was there anything we could do to ensure that Tan Siew Sin did not block cooperation.
6. In a brief interview with Rajaratnam, I outlined the position as to Goh, and emphasised the importance of discretion in all references to the bases and the Defence Agreement and to Indonesia. I said we fully realised and respected the ideological considerations moving the Government and the Party, and the need to appear independent. However, our own interests were closely involved and it would be most helpful if our position could at all times be borne in mind. Once the Singapore Government addressed itself to the question of the Defence Agreement and relations with Indonesia, I looked forward to close consultations. Rajaratnam accepted this, with some comments about the need to present an independent front and not to appear a stooge of Kuala Lumpur. He agreed that there was at present no prospect of any genuine settlement with Indonesia and explained references to a possible diplomatic role for Singapore again in terms of public posture.
7. I am reporting separately the interview with Lee. It was not to the point.
8. I believe that the anxieties expressed in the Department’s 908 are premature3 and that the Government has not taken up the question of policy towards Indonesia, except in the context of relations with Kuala Lumpur. In this respect, Rajaratnam’s latest statement, our 725,4 should help to calm fears in Kuala Lumpur (and was possibly stimulated by a visit from Ghazali over the weekend).
9. Similarly, there has been no consideration of defence matters.
10. With Lee out of action (he is on ‘official leave’) and Goh and Rajaratnam still without any staff, we shall have to wait a while before Singapore’s attitudes are further defined.
1 Document 316.
2 See Document 302. Pritchett had advised on 12 August that the Tunku’s letter was to be withdrawn. Brigadier Syed Mohamed Alsagoff, a Singaporean, had been on leave at the time and not received it.
3 Document 311, repeated to Singapore 908.
4 17 August, reporting Rajartnam’s statement that the political differences between Singapore and Malaysia did not mean Singapore would join ‘with anyone to crush our kith and kin in Malaysia’. His statement had been in response to a high-level Indonesian army claim, reported in Antara , that if Singapore was ‘really independent it would join Indonesia in confronting “necolim” ’.