Canberra, 23 August 1965
967. Secret
Reference your telegram 745.1
As you will appreciate, all our emphasis in public statements and private messages has been on the establishment and maintenance of the closest integration in the field of defence between Singapore and Malaysia. As you say this assumes substantial trust. Problems may develop but we should maintain our current emphasis.
2. It follows that we would prefer as far as practicable for Australian co-operation with Singapore in the defence field to grow out of the common effort. We do not wish to take any significant separate initiatives with Singapore at the present time since this might encourage Singapore towards a separate rather than a joint approach.
3. We should prefer you not to offer advice about where Singapore concentrates its effort as between internal security requirements and regular forces.
4. In due course, if the need arises, we could consider what advice we could give Singapore about the establishment of a defence organization.
5. No detailed consideration has been given here to what defence aid allocation we might be able to give to Singapore. As you know, the programme of defence aid which has been approved by Ministers was based on the report of the expert mission concerning the build-up of the Malaysian Armed Forces. We have not thought about how the defence aid should now be allocated between Malaysia and Singapore. Our hope would be that Malaysia and Singapore would themselves talk over their complementary efforts in the defence field in the Joint Council and that adjustments in the implementation of our aid programme would follow thereafter.
6. Your paragraph 5.2 Do you expect a left wing campaign against the bases? What is the present left wing attitude towards bases and the employment they create?
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 15]
1 20 August, in which Pritchett asked for DEA’s thoughts on the establishment of Singapore’s defence organisation and forces. Goh had advised that he was looking to appoint advisers. The ‘first impulse’ had been to establish Singapore’s own armed forces but there had also been arguments in favour of Singapore integrating as closely as possible with Malaysia’s defence arrangements, which would allow Singapore to concentrate on building-up its internal security requirements. Pritchett asked particularly: (a) Was he to encourage Goh to consider ‘a modest target for military recruitment’ and to concentrate on police rather than military forces? (b) What were DEA’s views on Singapore’s share of Australian defence aid? (c) Would Australia be interested in ‘advisory or substantive roles’ in establishing Singapore’s defence organisation and its armed forces? (d) What were DEA’s thoughts on who should liaise with the Singaporeans on Australia’s behalf? or (e) Was it preferred that Australia ‘go slow and encourage Goh to look elsewhere for guidance’?
2 Paragraph 5 related to the establishment of Singapore’s own armed forces. Pritchett had reported that pressure to do this could build up if Malaysia became aggressive or if tension increased in domestic politics—‘e.g. in a left-wing campaign against the bases during renegotiation of the defence treaties’.