Canberra, 18 February 1963
Confidential
[ matter omitted ]
Malaysia
The Minister remarked by way of introduction that what was happening now in respect of Malaysia could be looked at as an early baptism of what lay ahead of Australia. Australia would have to give still more thought in the future to taking early steps to check possible future moves by other countries in South East Asia which would be against our interests.
Malaysia had sprung from the Tunku’s enthusiasm, but perhaps without too much careful thought. He had believed it to be the solution for the racial problem resulting from a Malaya–Singapore merger. The British accepted it as a convenient way of disposing of their colonies. They tended still to think of the disposal of their colonies as being of no concern to anyone else. Australia’s reaction had been kindly but not wildly enthusiastic. Neither the Philippines nor Indonesia had at first shown much interest at all.
The attitude of the Philippines and Indonesia had however undergone a very marked change.
The Philippine claim to British North Borneo had begun as a semi-private affair to raise some money. The British had not treated it very seriously and the Philippine attitude had hardened. The Government had stepped in and it had become a national claim. Talks recently held between Britain and the Philippines had been inconclusive.
During his visit to Manila,1 the Minister said he had raised the point that the Philippines might have more trouble with Indonesia if there were no Malaysia. At the time this seemed to have made some impression, but the Filipinos were now talking in terms of being more comfortable with Indonesia than with Malaysia. Indeed it could not be completely ruled out that the Philippines and Indonesia might be discussing or at least contemplating some division of North Borneo—British North Borneo to the Philippines—the rest to Indonesia.
So far as Indonesia is concerned a factor was the real antipathy between Soekarno and the Tunku.
However, it should be realised that both the Philippines and Indonesia have genuine cause for concern and real interests. The Indonesians doubted the capacity of the Malay Government to administer the territory effectively and they were disturbed by the prospect of an unstable territory on their borders which could be subject to Communist Chinese influence both because of its links to Singapore and because it already had an active Chinese population.
However, it should be realised that both the Philippines and Indonesia have genuine cause for concern and real interests. The Indonesians doubted the capacity of the Malay Government to administer the territory effectively and they were disturbed by the prospect of an unstable territory on their borders which could be subject to Communist Chinese influence both because of its links to Singapore and because it already had an active Chinese population.
The Indonesian attitude, like the Philippine, had hardened and the possibility of armed conflict over Malaysia had to be considered. Failing that, the Indonesians could cause a lot of trouble in Malaysia by infiltration and subversion.
Australia must be concerned about the possibility of a weak Malaysia leading to trouble in the area. But Malaysia was in Australia’s best interests. It would keep Britain in the area from the defence angle—the Americans had made it clear that they were not prepared to accept primary responsibility for Malaysia’s defence. This responsibility was Britain’s and the United States regarded itself as coming into the defence picture only as a last resort. Australia must therefore do what it can to get the Indonesians and Filipinos into talks about Malaysia, so that they could feel they were being consulted. This might make them more prepared to accept the Malaysia idea and avoid a further hardening of their position to a point from which it would become impossible for them to turn back. The question of self-determination was a worry both to Australia and to Indonesia.2 Some form needed to be devised that would make possible some degree of consultation with the local population. This should, however, not be allowed to delay the creation of Malaysia.
The Minister, commenting on the United States’ attitude, remarked that the Americans were anxious not to take any steps that might push the Indonesians into the arms of the Communists. This tended to make U.S. policy rather more accommodating towards the Indonesian point of view.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 5]
1 Barwick had made an official visit to the Philippines 17–20 December 1962.
2 The question of self-determination for the Borneo territories could have ramifications for the process of self-determination for the peoples of New Guinea to be undertaken by Australia in Papua and New Guinea and the Indonesians in West Irian (West New Guinea).