Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1965
1867. Secret
Parkinson1 returned from Borneo today. Following is my assessment of the present situation.
2. The separation of Singapore appears to have created uncertainty and some tension among sections of nearly all the racial groups in Sabah and Sarawak. These arise out of—
(a) A belief that the balance of Malaysia has been upset by Singapore’s succession— exposing non-Malays to disproportionate Malay pressure;
(b) Some temporary fears that the Malays would turn to Sukarno and sell out Sarawak and Sabah;
(c) An accumulation of two years of difficulties in the federal/state relations compounded by both real and imagined grievances against Kuala Lumpur.
3. The Tunku’s visit allayed (b) but it gave added strength to (a) and (c).2 His blunt threats were not well received, either in Sarawak or Sabah.
4. Both the Tunku and Razak have expressed the opinion to me that Stephens overplayed his hand and they seemed to believe that without office his influence would be curtailed.3 This seems an over-optimistic assessment. Admittedly, Stephens appears to have moderated his extreme aim of secession. Nevertheless, there is some Kadazan feeling against the Central Government which, together with his own ambition, will continue to work on him. He must now realise that there is no chance of his replacing Peter Lo the easy way, i.e. by Kuala Lumpur appointment. But his aim will remain the Chief Ministership and to achieve it he will probably attempt to form a new combined Sabah National or Natives’ Party. Such a party would include UPKO and, provided his stated aims were no more than greater autonomy for Sabah within Malaysia, Jayasuriya4 and other moderate leaders would probably go with him. He would then campaign in an attempt to force elections which the Central Government will presumably wish to postpone.
5. This relatively moderate plan could be drastically altered if the Central Government attempt strong measures against Stephens. Some observers in Sabah believe that such a move would lead to bloodshed and the formation of an extreme anti-Malaysia party in Sabah, supported by nearly all groups except USNO.5 It would also affect Sarawak.
6. In Sarawak there is a misleading calm. Ostensibly the Alliance governing parties are solidly pro-Malaysia and only SUPP and Machinda have called Malaysia into public question by advocating a referendum. Nevertheless, there is concern and division within and between the parties forming the Government. In a country where 83 percent are non-Malays and where the Chinese and Ibans are more compatible than the Chinese and Malays, there is a wide-spread anti-Kuala Lumpur sentiment. In addition, following the 27th June incident which demonstrated the extent of native in addition to rural Chinese support for the CCO and Indonesian infiltrators,6 the gravity of the internal security threat has increased.
8. Ningkan told Parkinson that if it had not been for Razak’s promise of dollars 100 million this year for development and continuing financial support, he would share Stephens’ attitude. He added, ‘If those Malays try to push me around, we will go it alone’. Ningkan has not forgiven UMNO for its part in the crisis last May which he believed was a Malay takeover attempt.7
9. For the time being, Brunei seems relatively unaffected by the events of the past fortnight. Nevertheless, it is a feudal anachronism and the potentially explosive forces previously exploited by Azahari are still present.8
10. The foregoing assessment, although gloomy, is not meant to predict inevitable disintegration of eastern Malaysia. It does, however, mean that some changes are likely. Much will depend on the tact of the Kuala Lumpur leaders over the next two or three months and on their willingness to accept the financial and security burdens which Sarawak and Sabah represent. It is of great importance that the Tunku and other Malay leaders appreciate that Sarawak and Sabah, whatever their legal position, need to be dealt with in a different way to the eleven Malayan States.
[NAA: A1838, 3028/2/1 part 3]
1 Nicholas Parkinson, Counsellor, Kuala Lumpur.
2 See footnote 2, Document 320.
3 The general view was that Stephens had resigned his portfolio so that the Tunku could re-appoint him Chief Minister and thereby avoid Sabah’s secession.
4 Thomas Jayasuriya, Sabah’s Minister for Natural Resources.
5 United Sabah National Organisation, the Malay-Muslim party led by Datu Mustapha.
6 On 27 June a police station approximately 24 km inside Sarawak and 29 km from Kuching was attacked and held briefly by a force of around 20 Indonesians and 10 Sarawak CCOs. The presence of the latter and apparent native support for the Indonesian infiltrators accounted for the party being able to penetrate so far into Sarawak territory undetected. One policeman, Ningkan’s brother, was killed and four wounded, and all arms and ammunition were lost. The civilian casualties totalled nine, including six killed. There was evidence that some of the killings were reprisals against Chinese who had refused to cooperate with the Indonesians and their local CCO agents.
7 At the May session of the Sarawak Council Negri, a bill to revise the land zoning system was introduced. The proposed change permitted the native peoples to sell the land provided to them by the Brooke regime and also removed the strict limit on land aggregation imposed by the regime. This would benefit the Chinese whose land allocation under the existing system was inadequate for their needs and it would allow Sarawak to move to intensive agriculture. Although the bill was suddenly withdrawn after it was introduced, Muslim leaders used the issue to form a native Alliance, a coalition of the predominantly I ban and Islamic non-multiracial parties. Over the following weeks, Ningkan resolved the situation by ensuring that the notion of an all-native Alliance was eliminated by restructuring the party membership and racial composition of the State Cabinet—an action made possible by the expatriate officers relinquishing their Cabinet posts. The view was that the raising of the land zoning issue was an attempt to diminish the expatriate and Chinese influence in the Sarawak Government in order to reconstitute a government more amenable to the views of the Federal Government.
8 See editorial note, Brunei Revolt.