Canberra, 27 August 1965
1259. Secret
Sabah and Sarawak
Reference your telegram No. 1867.1
Thank you for this assessment. Although the situation is fluid, we need to be as clear in our minds as we can about trends and developments. Your assessment gives rise in our minds to a number of questions about the future. You might ask Pritchett to assist in preparing the answers in view of his recent familiarity with the region and the relevance of Singapore’s attitudes.2 Our questions fall into several groups.
2. First, when you say ‘changes are likely’ what are the sorts of changes you have in mind that would be feasible and constructive? What would be involved in ‘greater autonomy for Sabah with Malaysia’? We recall Razak’s success in the negotiations he conducted when Malaysia was being formed. He then allayed the concern in Sabah and Sarawak lest they be absorbed on the same basis as the existing Malay States. But the device largely used was for ‘transitional’ arrangements to be made preliminary to full integration.3 What would be possible now? Would Sabah and Sarawak be satisfied with spinning-out ‘transitional’ arrangements or would they want a new basis, perhaps along the lines of the earlier disengagement proposals in respect of Singapore?
3. Is the Kuala Lumpur Government likely to possess the flexibility and judgment necessary for changes and adjustments to be made? How much danger is there that Kuala Lumpur will give up the Malaysia idea, despite the Tunku’s present display of determination, if too many difficulties arise? As you say, much will depend upon the willingness of Kuala Lumpur to accept financial and security burdens. But might these burdens lead to a reappraisal of the value of Malaysia, especially if Sabah and Sarawak are pressing for more autonomy and freedom from the Central Government? It would be helpful to know what Razak and Ismail and other U.M.N.O. leaders are thinking as well as the Chinese.
4. The second group of questions relates to internal stability within Sabah and Sarawak. You mention uncertainty and tension among racial groups. Given the situation that their internal politics revolve round communal questions and relations with the Central Government how much change and readjustment is possible on a peaceful and orderly basis? In Sabah, for example, is there a likelihood that a demand by Stephens and U.P.K.O. for greater autonomy would produce a strong reaction on the part of the pro-Kuala Lumpur Muslims? In Sarawak, could the precarious structure of the Alliance splinter and lead to a collapse of effective Government and internal disorder? It seems to me that one of the fundamental problems is internal political cohesion in each of the two States. We need a judgment as to the arrangements and relationships for the two States which would be most likely to secure internal stability and equilibrium.
5. This leads to the question, for which no clear answer may exist, as to what the two States see as their own best future in the new situation brought about by the Separation of Singapore from Malaysia. Is it some readjustment, a looser arrangement, or succession and independence? If there is serious thought being given to succession, what views are being formed about resources for development and about future security, both internal and external? Is the hope entertained that effective Commonwealth military aid would be available? What effect has British advice had in Sabah that British military protection to an independent Sabah might not be given? Are hopes likely to rest on possible future membership of the Commonwealth? How could the weight of Indonesian pressure and subversion be withstood unless external power is present in tangible form? Is apprehension about Indonesia in fact likely to be a dominating consideration in thinking in the two States?
6. In theory a series of independent States in the Malaysian area could be linked together in a tight Commonwealth defence structure for combined defence. But there seem to be two major difficulties:
(i) Malaya might not be willing to be involved in defence of the two States if they secede;
(ii) As independent States, Sabah and Sarawak would be so weak internally that their Governments would be vulnerable to insurrection and takeover.
7. A particular question arises in respect of Sarawak. If Sarawak were to become independent would it be possible for a non-Chinese Government, lacking any effective police or military power, to remain in being? Could there be a left-wing Chinese takeover?
8. I should be glad to have your thoughts early next week on these involved and difficult matters.
[NAA: A1838, 3028/2/1 part 3]
1 Document 322.
2 Cablegram repeated to Singapore 994.
3 That is, the safeguards recommended by the Cobbold Commission, and incorporated by the Lansdowne Committee on the constitutional arrangements for Malaysia (see footnote 3, Document 8, and Document 10).