Kuala Lumpur, 2 September 1965
1924. Secret Priority
Sabah and Sarawak
The following are some additional thoughts elaborating on the assessment in my 1906.1
2. My impression is that there is a good deal of sentiment in UPKO for secession. This is opposed generally by USNO although there seem to be some USNO members, notably Mohd. Yasin,2 who are uncertain. Many of the Chinese probably think along the same lines as UPKO but are anxious to avoid being caught on the wrong side of the fence. In this respect, they are likely to be influenced by the Tunku’s firmness.
3. In Sarawak, the Government supports Malaysia but is in no mood to be pushed around by the Central Government and a good deal seems to be going on below the surface.
4. My 1906 may not reflect adequately the influence that Britain, Australia and New Zealand could exert. I mentioned that support for secession was based on the assumption that Commonwealth defence and economic aid would continue for independent Borneo states. But I should have brought out more clearly that the more this is shown to be in doubt the more the State Governments will need to rely on making Malaysia work.
5. My previous telegram failed to deal with one important aspect. I am convinced that an important cause of frustration in Borneo lies in the failings of the Central Government administration and in the tendency of Malaysian public servants to exert rather than delegate authority. Delegation of administrative authority is a complex problem but it is especially so in Malaysia where administrative resources are already over-taxed and where state officers are carrying out federal functions. There is a need for the Central Government, having decided the major policy, to insist that its public servants should leave implementation and less important decisions as far as possible to the people on the spot. Ismail, for example, tells me that his relations with Sarawak have greatly improved since he delegated authority on internal security to the state. I have been speaking along these lines with a number of the ministers and generally have found them receptive. How far this will influence practical arrangements is another matter but I see considerable scope for a wider delegation of authority and functions without any change in constitutional or government powers.
6. Stephens intends to arrange for a by-election so that he can obtain a seat in the Sabah Parliament within a few weeks. His tactics will then probably be based on awaiting the report of the Alliance study group and using this as a platform in the next state elections. Stephens will presumably work for a report seeking greater powers for Sabah within Malaysia. As this would not be acceptable to the Central Government, I believe that Malaysia’s and our best interests would be served by a report that recommended instead improved administrative arrangements and a greater decentralisation of authority within the present constitution. In any case, it will be important to keep in close touch with Sabah while opinions are being formed on these matters over the next few weeks.
[NAA: A1945, 248/10/17]
1 Document 327.
2 That is, Mohd. Yassin bin Haji Hashim.