Canberra, 28 October 1965
1533. Secret
Indonesia
We have seen Head’s report of a talk with Razak on 19th October.1 Head said that a certain amount of pressure, notably from Fenner, had been put on Razak to intensify operations in Borneo. Head reported that Razak shared his view that perhaps the best to be hoped for was a gradual fading of confrontation brought about by the withdrawal of some of the better troops from Borneo for duty elsewhere in Indonesia. It was important that the Indonesian Generals should not have any cause to expect that the present situation would bring about more aggressive policy by our side in Borneo.
Please use your influence in support of Head’s views. The course of developments in Indonesia is still far from clear but it is apparent that, even under the most favourable conditions, the Indonesian Army faces major internal problems which will tax their strength and cohesion. Reports available to us suggest that, while the Army leadership is showing conviction and determination, loyal and reliable Army resources are fully extended in the present effort to win as much control as possible in the political struggle and to maintain physical security in areas of the country where the P.K.I. is strong. Any weakening of the Army through inability to deploy its better forces to critical areas or through further internal disaffection, which might follow setbacks in the Borneo region, could adversely affect the outcome of the present internal struggle.2
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6647 part 5]
1 Not published.
2 On 31 October, Critchley replied that the Malaysian leaders shared Hasluck’s views and that Razak, with Fenner’s agreement, had given instructions for an easing of operations in the Borneo states.