Singapore,1 16 November 1965
1109. Secret
Indonesia
Over the weekend the Tungku spoke to me about Ghazali’s talks with Sukendro and elaborated on what Ghazali had told me.2
2. Sukendro had emphasised that the Army were determined to crush the communists. For this it was essential to create a good image early and Sukendro had asked for dollars M. 3 million aid from Malaysia mainly in the form of medicine.
3. The Tungku said Malaysia could not really afford aid on this scale but the issue was so important that neither could it afford to refuse help. He realised there was a risk that the aid would be misused but Malaysia would watch carefully and if this happened it would be stopped.3
4. The Tungku hoped that Western countries would help Malaysia aid Indonesia both because of Malaysia’s economic difficulties and because direct Western aid would be unwelcome and politically disadvantageous to the Indonesian Army. In this connection the Tungku said the Americans were already giving aid through Thailand and mentioned a figure of 35 000 tons of rice.
5. I said I saw advantage in giving Western aid through Malaysia not only for the reasons he had mentioned but because it might be the best means of ending confrontation and promoting co-operation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Another advantage was that Malaysia could make stipulations about the proper use of the aid that would be impossible for Western countries. The Tungku agreed and added that it would also demonstrate the common desire of Malaysia and Indonesia to fight communism. From the way he spoke I gathered that the Tungku is considering requesting Western countries including Australia to subsidize Malaysian aid to Indonesia.
6. According to the Tungku the Army is hoping to appoint the Sultan of Djogdjakarta4 as Prime Minister (and I suspect as the eventual successor to Sukarno). The Tungku spoke of the Sultan as the man best qualified to lead a civilian administration on behalf of the Army and as untarnished by the events of recent years. He was critical of Sumitro whom he considered corrupt and said he believed that Sumitro had ‘pocketed rebel funds’.5
7. Generally the Tungku was optimistic about the prospects of normalising relations with Indonesia. He speculated that Razif6 might be the best man to re-open the Indonesian Embassy. For what it was worth I suggested that he might do worse than Mukarto.7
8. The Tungku has promised to let me have a copy of Ghazali’s detailed report of his talks with Sukendro and I shall follow this up when I return to Kuala Lumpur tomorrow.8
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 30]
1 Critchley was in Singapore to make his farewell calls. He was due to leave Malaysia on 22 November for a brief visit to Australia before taking up the post of Senior External Affairs Representative in London.
2 On 13 November, Critchley had advised that Ghazali had summed up his talks with Sukendro, held in Bangkok on 12 November, by saying ‘Indonesia wanted any help Malaysia could give, especially over the next six months when the Army would gradually exert pressure to change Indonesian policies including confrontation’. Aid was needed, particularly rice and medicines, but Sukendro thought that aid from countries like the US and Australia should be given indirectly, ‘even through Malaysia’. Ghazali had also told Critchley that he had the impression that the Army was not sure of its strength against Sukarno and Subandrio and that Sukendro had claimed that the Army was trying to remove Subandrio, who was ‘the main obstacle to changing Indonesian policies’.
3 On 26 November, Ghazali advised that the Malaysians ‘were now ready to go ahead through Bangkok and Hong Kong; that they would ensure only goods and not money were handed over; and that they would check to make certain the goods actually went to Djakarta’.
4 See footnote 3, Document 273.
5 See footnote 4, Document 40.
6 Former Indonesian Ambassador to Malaya (see footnote 3, Documen
7 Mukarto Notowidagdo, Indonesian Foreign Minister (1952–53), Ambassador to the US (1953–60), Ambassador to India (1960–64) and Ambassador to Canada since 1964.
8 Razak provided a copy of Ghazali’s record of conversation with Sukendro which Critchley forwarded to Canberra on 18 November.