Kuala Lumpur, 19 December 1965
Confidential
Relations with Singapore
The Minister asked the Tunku about the present state of relations with Singapore. The Tunku referred to Lee Kuan Yew’s earlier public statements regarding his intention of establishing barter trade with the Indonesians from Pulau Senang. Following Lee’s public statements on this, the Tunku made it clear that he could not accept this proposal for two reasons, one of principle and one of national security. The matter of principle was that, so long as Indonesia maintained its confrontation, any trading between Singapore and Indonesia would be trading with the enemy. The objection on security grounds was that the small craft used by the barter traders were ideally suited for the type of infiltration from which Malaysia had suffered in the last year or two. The Tunku said that he had also asked the British deliberately to leak to the Singaporeans the threat in his letter to Wilson to apply economic sanctions against Singapore if it went ahead with the proposal.1 The Tunku said that, as a direct result of this warning, Lee had climbed down. (The Tunku made no mention, however, of the agreement since reached between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore for Singapore to carry out limited barter trade operations with Indonesia by using ships stationed outside the three-mile limit.)2
Defence Arrangements
2. The Minister asked the Tunku for his views generally as to the present state of defence agreements and arrangements with Singapore. The Tunku said that the separation agreement had provided for the continuance of defence co-operation on the basis of the previous arrangements and also recorded that both Singapore and Kuala Lumpur regarded themselves as still bound by the formal agreement with Britain. The Tunku said that, as far as he was concerned, this was working satisfactorily and he had no reason to seek any further agreements. If the British found it necessary to negotiate a supplementary agreement, he would not mind. Similarly, if Singapore wished to negotiate an agreement bilaterally and directly with Britain on proper terms, he had no objection to that. As to the machinery for defence co-operation, the Combined Defence Council, on which Singapore was represented, was working quite satisfactorily. When the confrontation had been at its peak, it had been usual for meetings to take place every Tuesday and Dr. Goh and other representatives from Singapore had normally taken part. In recent weeks, however, there had been little to discuss; in Mainland Malaysia and in Singapore there had been virtually no confrontation incidents, and therefore there had been little purpose in continuing with formal weekly meetings. In their place arrangements were made for weekly briefing meetings attended by more junior representatives.
Continued British Military Presence in Malaysia
3. The Minister reminded the Tunku of the current British defence review and of the possibility that this might result in a British desire to cut down their forces in Malaysia and Singapore. He asked what the Tunku’s reaction would be to such a step. The Tunku said that such a move would not concern him greatly. As far as he was concerned the British could take away half of their existing forces in Malaysia tomorrow if they so wished; all that he would ask would be that they should not give any publicity to the move, in which event no one would know and hence no harm would be done. The Minister and Sir James Plimsoll queried whether a move of that sort could possibly be kept secret, particularly from the Indonesians. The Tunku did not respond specifically to this point but repeated his view that he would not be concerned if the British reduced their forces substantially. He went on to say that the presence of British forces in Malaysia and their participation in its defence stemmed not from any special British love of Malaysians but from their love of their investments in the country. The British could be expected to be quite shrewd judges of what was necessary to protect these investments, and whatever they decided in that respect would automatically meet Malaysian needs. In any case, if some increased threat developed beyond the capacity of the reduced forces, the British could easily enough build them up again. The Minister warned, however, that if the British ever reduced their forces in the country they would be most unlikely to increase them again in any later situation. The Tunku did not reply specifically to this point. The Minister also queried the Tunku’s statement that the British, in helping to defend Malaysia, were not motivated by any concern for Malaysia’s own welfare. He recalled that, during the Communist terrorist threat in earlier years, not only the British but also the Australians and New Zealanders had given prompt and effective help. The Tunku’s reply was that at that particular time Malaya was a British colony and the British were only looking after their own territory and interests. He went on to say that, at the stage at which he became Chief Minister in 1955, the Emergency was by no means ended and the country still faced a quite serious communist terrorist threat.3 He formed the view, and he pressed it hard upon the British, that until Malaya had an independent government which could appeal to national loyalties, the Communist terrorists would still get assistance from the people and there would be great difficulties in bringing the Emergency to an end. It took more than a year for the British to accept this point of view but ultimately they acceded to the Malayan demand for independence. As soon as Malaya acquired its independence,4 the atmosphere changed dramatically. The people were then willing to cooperate with the security authorities and the Emergency was brought to a rapid and happy conclusion.
[matter omitted]
Indonesia
5. The Minister asked the Tunku for his view of the present situation in Indonesia. The Tunku said that many contacts had already taken place between the Malaysian Government and representatives of the Indonesian Generals, in each instance at the initiative of the latter. Several intermediaries had been used by the Generals, principally Sukendro and more recently (as lately as two days ago) Sugiharto, the former Indonesian Ambassador in Burma.5 Through these representatives the Tunku had received assurances that the Generals would liquidate the confrontation once they had gained final political control in Indonesia; the Tunku admitted that he did not know what reliance he could place on these assurances. On the other hand, he felt it was clearly in our interests that the Generals should defeat the Communists and should maintain overall political control in the country. He had therefore said to their emissaries that, as far as he was concerned, they could keep up confrontation as long as they liked; he did not mind at all; what he would like to see them do was to beat the Communists in their own country as the Communists were the common enemy of both the Generals and of Malaysia. The Tunku said that in reply the Generals had asked for assistance in consolidating their position; in particular, they had asked for a quantity of medical supplies; the Tunku said he seemed to remember a figure of $3 million though he was not sure whether they were American dollars or Malaysian dollars (and none of his assembled officials were able to help him on the point).6 The Tunku said that this request was still under consideration and nothing had yet been decided. If it was decided to respond to the request, it would be necessary to choose an appropriate channel; most probably the Thais would be the best, but these details had not yet been worked out.
6. The Minister said that the Australian attitude to the situation was one of caution. In his belief the Generals were likely to be opposed to Malaysia as their predecessors had been and were likely to continue with confrontation. The Tunku thought that, if the Generals won out and succeeded in maintaining their power, confrontation would probably wither but he agreed that it would be probably some time before we could expect this to happen.
7. The Tunku also mentioned that to his knowledge Lee Kuan Yew had had several contacts with the Indonesians recently. He had sent to Djakarta his own brother, one of his fellow Ministers, and one other representative. (The Tunku offered no further details and made no references to his own attitude to these contacts.)
[matter omitted]
[NAA: A1838, 3027/10/1 part 3]
1 See Document 347.
2 See Document 351.
3 See footnote 13, Document 136.
4 31 August 1957.
5 Brigadier General Sugiharto had also been the Indonesian Consul-General in Singapore prior to the formation of Malaysia and the break in Indonesia–Malaysia relations (see footnote 1, Document 92).
6 See Document 343