Canberra, 30 March 1966
Secret
Indonesia: Recent Events
The sequence of recent events in Indonesia seems to be as follows.
2. In securing at least the nominal acceptance, by military and political leaders, of the Cabinet reshuffle on 21st February when Nasution was dropped, Sukarno apparently took little account of the significance of the current student demonstrations or else assumed that the apparent capitulation of the Army would lead to their cessation. For three weeks after the reshuffle, however, the demonstrations continued and grew more serious, despite the President’s attempts to halt them by banning the main student organisation KAMI,1 by ordering the closure of the University of Indonesia, and by endeavouring to form a new ‘umbrella’ student organisation under the control of left wing student groups. Throughout this period the Army afforded some covert support to the students but its role was mainly passive, i.e. failure to act to prevent the demonstrations.
3. At this point, and perhaps because of the army’s posture, Sukarno apparently decided to get rid of General Suharto. This was to have been done at a series of meetings Sukarno had arranged with political and military leaders and with Cabinet on 10th, 11th and 12th March. On 10th March he was able to secure unconditional pledges of loyalty from the political leaders. However, General Suharto anticipated this move against him. On 11th March he placed army units into positions around the Palace where Cabinet was meeting, and then sent in a message demanding that the President cancel plans to dismiss him.
4. Sukarno immediately flew to Bogor with Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh, only to be presented with a further ultimatum requiring the transfer to Suharto of full responsibility for security and public order.
5. On the morning of 12th March Suharto issued—in the President’s name—an rder of the Day authorizing him to ‘take all necessary measures to guarantee the security, calm and stability of the workings of the Government and the progress of the revolution, the personal safety and the authority of the President, and the integrity of the Indonesian nation and state, and to implement to the full all teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution’.2 Statements of support followed from all political parties (except the left-wing faction of the PNI3 and the fellow-travelling PARTINDO4) and from the students.
6. Insofar as the Army had a plan to take over power, it seems to have included three main phases—the banning of the PKI, the purge of all GESTAPU5 and PKI sympathisers from the Cabinet (Subandrio was a primary target) and the launching of an economic recovery programme. In the President’s [name] Suharto immediately banned the Communist Party.
7. When the other expected moves did not follow immediately, fears developed that disunity in the armed forces, and General Suharto’s concern both to consolidate support and retain a seal of formal legality on his actions, might allow the situation to drift sufficiently for Sukarno to re-establish his control. He was, in fact, able to make a public statement to the effect that he retained supreme authority, in which Suharto concurred formally. However, on 18th, Suharto announced (again in Sukarno’s name) that fifteen Ministers had been taken into custody for alleged involvement in the attempted coup last year. They included two of the Deputy Prime Ministers, Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh. On 19th March Suharto announced a new interim Cabinet to provide replacements for those arrested. Sukarno remained both President and Prime Minister. A new interim Presidium was also announced, consisting of the Sultan of Djogjakarta,6 Adam Malik7 (a former Minister of Trade and Ambassador to Moscow) and Roeslan Abdulgani8—all new appointees9—together with Dr. Leimena, a non-political administrator who has served in most Indonesian Cabinets,10 and Muslim political leader Idham Chalid,11 from the Cabinet announced on 21st February.
8. A full new Cabinet of 33 portfolios was subsequently announced by Sukarno on 27th March. Some balance appears to have been preserved in this Cabinet between Army and civilian representation, and between the various groups (Muslims, nationalists, etc.) having significance in Indonesian politics. A number of Ministers from the old Dwikora Cabinet12 retain their posts. Political compromise has clearly played a role in the formation of the Cabinet, but it is too early to make a full assessment of the extent of this. The Presidium also bears formal signs of compromise with the President although this does not seem to have limited the Army’s effective authority. General Suharto, the Sultan of Djogjakarta and Adam Malik control the significant portfolios even though they are formally outranked by Dr. Leimena, Idham Chalid and Roeslan Abdulgani.
9. We do not yet have full details of how the Cabinet has been received, but it appears that those groups which played principal roles in the events leading up to the present situation (the students and the Pantjasila Front)13 are not satisfied with it in terms of size, composition and formal precedence. In these circumstances further demonstrations could follow, and thereby bring on fresh disorders. Suharto has appealed to the people to give the new Cabinet a chance.
10. The positions of Minister for Defence and Army Commander were united in the one person—General Suharto—for the first time since 1962 when General Nasution was removed from direct control of the Army. Suharto’s position in the Presidium has, however, been described as ‘temporary’.14 The significance of this is not clear at present, though it could perhaps be intended to provide room eventually for Nasution. General Nasution himself has now been reinstated in the Cabinet, from which Sukarno had removed him the previous month, with the position of Minister-Deputy Commander of the ‘Crush Malaysia’ Command (KOGAM).15 The appointment carries with it little real power but leaves open the possibility of his eventual return to a position of authority.
11. Whether President Sukarno can exercise any real authority seems now to depend on the personal influence he can exert and his ability to exploit the differences and uncertainties among his opponents. His personal popularity and prestige have been reduced considerably with each rebuff, but the new authorities will be under great stresses and strains brought about by the absence of sound philosophies and programmes relating to economic and social changes, the problems of unity of the armed forces, the turbulence of the political environment and the chronic economic deterioration. Foreign exchange reserves are exhausted and the Central Bank has lost control over much of current export earnings.
12. It is too early to predict what effect the Army’s ascendency will have on confrontation. After years of public indoctrination it certainly could not be dropped immediately. There are probably differences in the new leadership on this question. The pressures of the economic situation may become a stronger inducement to the Government to let up on confrontation, but it will need to move warily and avoid giving Sukarno an excuse for turning on the Army leaders. In a recent background briefing which he gave to journalists in Djakarta,16 for example, the new Foreign Minister, Malik, went no further than to say that he would not rule out the possibility of helpful talks with Malaysia, and that confrontation would go on until it was settled peacefully.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A2908, M120 part 6]
1 Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia —Indonesian Students’ Action Front—a federation of anticommunist university student organisations.
2 That is, President Sukarno.
3 Partai Nasional Indonesia —Indonesian Nationalist Party—the largest political party in Indonesia since 1955. Established in 1945, it was a reforming of the party founded by Sukarno in 1927, that had been banned by the Dutch in 1930. Although closely associated with the reformed party, Sukarno was not formally a member.
4 Partai Indonesia —the Indonesia Party. It was formed in 1931 as the first successor party to the PNI.
5 The acronym devised for the 30th September Movement (see editorial note, The Abortive Coup ) —Gerakan September Tigapuluh.
6 Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Economy, Finance and Development—formerly Minister/Chairman of the State Audit Board.
7 Deputy Prime Minister for Social and Political Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
8 Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Political Institutions and Head of the Agency for the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit. Abdulgani had been a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Minister of Information, and a Co-ordinating Minister in Charge of Communications with the People in previous Cabinets.
9 That is, to the Presidium.
10 Johannes Leimena had served in most of the Indonesian Cabinets since 1946 and had been a Deputy Prime Minister/First Minister since 1957. He was now appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of General Affairs.
11 Appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Relations with State Institutions. He had been Fourth Deputy Prime Minister in the previous Cabinet.
12 That is, the Cabinet from 27 August 1964 to 21 February 1966.
13 Pemuda Pantjasila —a Muslim youth group.
14 Suharto had been appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Security and Defense ad interim.
15 Komando Operasi Ganjang Malaysia. ‘It had been set up by Sukarno on 25 February to replace KOTI— Komando Operasi Tertinggi —Indonesia’s Supreme Operational Command.
16 The off-the-record talk had taken place over the weekend 19–20 March