Kuala Lumpur, 15 April 1966
1013. Secret Priority
Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia
I finally managed to see Tunku and hand over Prime Minister’s message1 just before dinner engagement. Tunku asked me to convey reply on following lines—
Begins
He thanked Prime Minister for message and reciprocated kind remarks. He agreed that it would be well and good if the proposed recognition of Singapore were a move in the right direction. But the recognition carried the well-publicised threat to intensify confrontation and other hostilities against Malaysia.2 The implication, therefore, was that Indonesians estimated that they would have a greater opportunity to do so when they had established relations with Singapore as a result of recognition. The Tunku read into it that the motive behind the recognition was a hostile act; the Indonesians intended to recognise Singapore in order to spite Malaysia. As soon as the Indonesians had heard about the intention of the Philippines to resume relations with Malaysia, they had tried by every means possible to prevent it. They had even gone to the extent of threatening to break relations with the Philippines if the latter went ahead with the resumption of relations. (The Tunku’s authority for this was Dionisio, the Philippines Consul General in Kuala Lumpur.) In the case of Singapore, as soon as the Indonesians had heard of Lee’s readiness to consult and negotiate with Kuala Lumpur on defence and economic cooperation,3 they took steps immediately to announce their intention to recognise Singapore. The obvious purpose of this was to drive a wedge between Singapore and Malaysia. The Tunku found it difficult to interpret the Indonesian actions in any other way. He had been left with no choice but to decide, as he had already said publicly, that Singapore must choose between Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result of the Tunku’s firm stand, Singapore had now recognised the true motives of Indonesia. The Tunku referred to Lee’s message to him from Bangkok (my 1011)4 and a subsequent message from Rajaratnam. (Despite a leading question from me the Tunku did not offer me details of latter message; I shall pursue this with Ministry on Monday.)
Ends
2. After outlining reply which he wished me to pass to Prime Minister, Tunku went on to speak to me about Sukarno’s insane hatred and jealousy of Malaysia. Tunku said that we and others might regard the Indonesians as a homogeneous people and perhaps closely related as a whole to the Malays. The real facts were that the people of Sumatra and Borneo were basically Malay and were naturally attracted to their brothers in Malaya, whereas the people of Java and other parts of eastern Indonesia were quite distinct and had been treated as such throughout Dutch colonial period. In trying to extend his control throughout Indonesia, Sukarno had tried to blur this fact; the competing attractions of Malaysia for the peoples of Sumatra and Borneo were the basic reason for Sukarno’s desire to destroy Malaysia and to expand his domination throughout the area.
3. Reminding the Tunku that Nasution was a Sumatran, I queried his implied assumption that Nasution and the other generals shared the attitude and aims of Sukarno. The Tunku would not be dogmatic as to what the generals would or might do if they were in supreme and undisputed control. If they did achieve that position and showed that their aims and objectives were different from those of Sukarno, the Tunku would be happy to deal with that as a new situation. The fact was that Sukarno was still President, that the generals had not yet effectively neutralised him and they were making public statements completely consistent with the Sukarno line. In these circumstances he could not take any different attitude at this stage from the one which he had taken. I reminded the Tunku of several reports, available to him as well as to us, which suggested that the generals had a definite programme for the final neutralisation of Sukarno but that, in the intermediate phase, they found it necessary to go through the motions of verbal threats while in fact reducing the actual practice of confrontation. The Tunku said in effect that he would judge that pudding when he had tasted rather more of it.
4. I referred the Tunku back to the following part of his outlined reply to the Prime Minister, namely, ‘as a result of the Tunku’s firm stand, Singapore had now recognised the true motives of Indonesia’. I asked him whether this meant that the misunderstanding between himself and Lee Kuan Yew had been resolved and that he was reassured that Lee would not act in a detrimental way without at least full consultation. I queried whether mere acceptance of recognition by Indonesia would prejudice Malaysia if Lee’s intention was to consult the Tunku before considering the acceptance of Indonesian representation in Singapore. The Tunku referred me back to the comment in his letter to me earlier today (my telegram 1010)5 namely, ‘I am unable to gauge what is in his mind so I would prefer to make no comment on it’. The Tunku did go on to reiterate, however, with some asperity that Lee, while ‘welcoming’ the Indonesian intention, said specifically that he had noted the declared reason for this. When I hinted that there might perhaps be some ambiguity in this statement and that it might imply a reservation rather than an acceptance, the Tunku was unimpressed and commented tartly that Lee was a clever lawyer and a clever politician and could be presumed to choose his words deliberately. Tunku went on to complain that, when Indonesian intention was first announced, Lee telephoned him to say that he did not know what was behind it and was disposed to ignore it. Tunku had advised him that he should not do so but should say publicly that he would withhold comment until he knew underlying reasons. Despite this advice Lee had not only publicly ‘welcomed’ Indonesian intention, but had also added that he had noted subsequent declaration of Indonesian reasons.
5. As it became obvious that the Tunku would become more irritated than impressed by any further suggestions that he might have interpreted Lee over-harshly, I did not press any further discussion. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to carry matter further when he meets the Tunku.6 The Tunku said he was very ready to motor down to Butterworth to see Mr Holt in the early evening of 28th and I shall work out timings more precisely with protocol on Monday.
[NAA: A6364, KL1966/04]
1 Document 356.
2 In an interview on 12 April with a New Zealand journalist from the Los Angeles Times, Malik had claimed that to humour Sukarno, the decision to recognise Singapore (see footnote 3, Document 356) had had to be portrayed as being motivated by a desire to exacerbate relations between Singapore and Malaysia and thus bring an intensification of confrontation.
3 Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew had met on 20 March, their first meeting since separation. The Tunku later spoke of ‘fruitful discussions’ and an invitation to Lee to be in ‘constant contact’ to enable Singapore and Malaysia ‘to get closer together’. See also Document 351.
4 15 April, forwarding text of Lee’s advice to the Tunku that he knew nothing about press reports in Bangkok, published on the day of his arrival (13 April), saying Malik had said the negotiations to recognise Singapore were being handled in Bangkok. Lee assured the Tunku: ‘I will not do anything to injure Malaysia’s interests; Singapore is not negotiating for recognition. They can recognise us or not recognise us as they wish. But it would be absurd to say publicly that I do not want them to recognise Singapore, even if they recognise Singapore without negotiations or conditions; no move against Malaysia’s interests will ever be made’.
5 15 April, containing the Tunku’s covering letter to Lee’s message (footnote 3) for Eastman.
6 Holt was to visit Malaysia 27–30 April, as part of his first Southeast Asian tour as Prime Minister.